Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Brown went to Whitehead’s apartment and requested that Whitehead come outside. Whitehead recognized Brown and followed him downstairs. As they reached an exterior door, Brown pointed a gun at Whitehead and fired. Whitehead fell as he ran into the building, believing he had been shot. He had a hole in his shirt and a graze on his back. Whitehead was injured when he fell against a door, which was hit by the bullet. The state charged Brown, as a persistent offender, with first-degree assault and armed criminal action. The court's first-degree assault instruction asked the jury to determine whether Brown “attempted to kill or cause serious physical injury to Dylan Whitehead by shooting at him.” The second-degree assault instruction asked the jury to determine whether Brown “attempted to cause physical injury to Dylan Whitehead by means of a deadly weapon by shooting at him.” Both provided a person “attempts” to cause a certain result when they act “with the purpose” of causing that result. The court refused Brown’s instruction for third-degree assault, which would have required the jury to determine whether Brown “recklessly created a grave risk of death or serious physical injury to Dylan Whitehead by shooting at him.” The jury convicted Brown of first-degree assault and armed criminal action. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed. The trial court's error in failing to instruct the jury on third-degree assault was prejudicial. There is a basis in the evidence from which the jury could conclude Brown recklessly created a grave risk of death or serious physical injury. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

Smith was arrested after a string of break-ins at Sedalia businesses and was charged with one count of first-degree burglary, four counts of second-degree burglary, four counts of felony stealing, and one count of property destruction and resisting arrest. For the first-degree burglary charge, the jury was instructed on the charged offense and the lesser included offense of second-degree burglary. The trial court refused Smith’s request for an additional instruction on first-degree trespass. Smith also requested the trespass instruction for each of the second-degree burglary charges, but the trial court refused to give the instruction for three of the four charges. The jury found Smith guilty of all charged offenses. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed in part. The trial court erred when it refused to give an instruction for first-degree trespass for the charged burglary offenses. Additionally, because the enhancement provisions of RSMo section 570.030.32 do not apply to the definition of stealing in section 570.030.1, Smith’s felony stealing convictions must be reversed and remanded for resentencing as misdemeanors. The court rejected Smith’s claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to convict him for allegedly burglarizing the U.S. Post Office. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

In connection with a home-invasion robbery and murder, Nathan, 16 years old, was convicted on 26 counts. Pursuant to RSMo 565.020.2, the court sentenced Nathan to life in prison without the possibility of parole plus five life sentences and five 15-year sentences, to be served consecutively. While Nathan's appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in Miller v. Alabama, that "the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders." In compliance with the Missouri Supreme Court's instructions on remand, the circuit court entered a finding of guilt for second-degree murder and for armed criminal action in connection with second-degree murder. The jury recommended a life sentence for the second-degree murder conviction, a 30-year sentence for the first-degree robbery conviction, a 15-year sentence for kidnapping, and three life sentences for the related armed criminal action convictions. Nathan requested resentencing by a jury on the 20 convictions that were not part of the remand, claiming a Brady violation because the state failed to disclose, before his original waiver of jury sentencing, a police report detailing an investigation into alleged sexual abuse committed against him. The court rejected his arguments and imposed the jury-recommended sentences, to run consecutively. On appeal, Nathan argued the combined effect of his consecutive sentences amounted to the functional equivalent of life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Missouri Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. View "State v. Nathan" on Justia Law

Carl Kirk was committed to the custody of the Department of Mental Health under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 632.480 through 632.525. On appeal, the court of appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court on the ground that the appeal involved issues within the Supreme Court’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction as set forth in Mo. Const. art. V, section 3. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the issues raised in this case did not fall within the Supreme Court’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction, and even thought he court of appeals erred in transferring the case, the Supreme Court granted transfer prior to opinion pursuant to Rule 83.01 and therefore had jurisdiction; (2) the SVPA, among other things, evidences no punitive intent and violates no constitutional prohibits against ex post facto laws, and the standard of proof required under the SVPA and employed in Kirk’s case is not unconstitutional; and (3) Kirk’s remaining claims of error were unavailing. View "In re Care & Treatment of Kirk" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of sale of a controlled substance and one count of unlawful possession of firearms. Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief. The motion was premature because it was filed prior to a determination on appeal whether the judgment of conviction would be affirmed. After Defendant’s conviction was affirmed, Defendant filed a second postconviction motion alleging that the trial court erred in rejecting his speedy trial claim. The motion court dismissed the postconviction motion as “successive.” The Supreme Court vacated the dismissal of Defendant’s second postconviction and remanded, holding that, under the unusual facts of this case, the motion court should have treated the second motion as timely and as incorporating the first pro se motion. View "McKay v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was committed to the custody of the Department of Mental Health under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 632.480 through 632.525. On appeal, the court of appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court on the ground that the appeal involved issues within the Supreme Court’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth in In re Care & Treatment of Kirk, __ S.W.3d __ (Mo. 2017), decided also on this day, Defendant’s constitutional claims were “merely colorable” and did not invoke the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. However, the court, on its own motion, granted transfer from the court of appeals prior to opinion pursuant to Rule 83.01 and therefore had jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s constitutional claims that the purpose and effect of the SVPA is punitive are rejected; and (2) Defendant’s remaining claims on appeal were unavailing. View "In re Care & Treatment of Nelson" on Justia Law

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Christine Delf’s motion to enforce her plea agreement or in failing to permit Self to withdraw her guilty plea, as the court’s ruling comported with Mo. R. Crim. P. 24.02(d).Delf pleaded guilty to forgery pursuant to a plea agreement. Delft later filed a writ of mandamus challenging the circuit court’s decision to overrule her motion to enforce her plea agreement or, in the alternative, to withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that the circuit court lacked the authority to impose special conditions of probation she argued were excluded by the plea agreement. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition, which it subsequently quashed, holding that the circuit court followed the procedure set forth in Rule 24.02 by accepting the binding plea agreement the parties reached and imposing the sentence Delf bargained for with the state. View "State ex rel. Delf v. Honorable Darrell E. Missey" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was charged with multiple sex offenses, moved to disqualify the prosecuting attorney on the grounds that the prosecutor’s office obtained and disclosed phone calls made by Defendant to his attorneys from the county jail. The trial court overruled the motion but appointed a retired judge as special master to review the jail phone call files and to receive future recorded jail calls. After the special master carried out these orders the trial court ordered that the county pay the special master’s fees. The prosecutor requested a writ of prohibition vacating the trial court’s order. The Supreme Court issued the requested writ, which it made permanent, holding that the trial court lacked authority to order the county to pay the fees of the special master. View "State ex rel. Merrell v. Honorable Robert Craig Carter" on Justia Law

This original proceeding in certiorari stemmed from George Fisher’s pleas of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (NGRI) in two separate cases, one originating in Audrain County and the other in Jackson County. Fisher filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his commitment to the Department of Mental Health (DMH) and alleging that the NGRI pleas entered in both cases were deficient. The circuit court granted habeas relief, concluding that the NGRI pleas were deficient. The Supreme Court (1) declared moot the record granting habeas relief in one case given the prosecutor’s nolle prosequi filing in the underlying criminal case; and (2) quashed the record granting habeas relief in the other case, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by granting relief on the theory that Fisher failed to sign the NGRI notice. View "State ex rel. Hawley" on Justia Law

Defendant filed a Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief approximately sixteen months after the court of appeals issued its mandate affirming Defendant’s conviction for first-degree robbery, despite the rule’s requirement that it be filed within ninety days of the mandate’s issuance. The motion court overruled the motion without an evidentiary hearing on the grounds of untimeliness. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) although Defendant filed an untimely Rule 29.15 motion, his untimeliness was excused because the circuit court misinformed him about the appropriate deadlines to file his motion during his sentencing colloquy; and (2) the motion court clearly erred in overruling the Rule 29.15 motion because Defendant demonstrated he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing concerning his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "Watson v. State" on Justia Law