Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of the class C felony of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment as a prior and persistent offender. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had knowledge and control over the drugs in two closed pouches. The Supreme Court agreed with Defendant and reversed, holding that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant, with knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance, had possession of the pouches containing methamphetamine. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

Ryan Amorine sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from holding a probation revocation hearing after Amorine’s term of probation expired. On May 4, 2011, Amorine pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and second-degree domestic assault. After accepting his guilty plea, the trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Amorine on supervised probation for five years. The trial court also imposed special conditions upon Amorine, which included community service and paying court costs. In 2013, a probation violation report was filed alleging that Amorine failed to pay his court costs or report any community service hours. Amorine admitted the violation in an attachment to the probation violation report. A second probation violation report was filed in 2014, again alleging Amorine failed to pay his court costs or perform his community service hours. The trial court suspended Amorine’s probation and set the matter for a hearing. At the hearing, Amorine admitted to the violation. The court extended Amorine’s probation for an additional year. In early 2015, the Board of Probation and Parole filed a “Case Summary Report” and a “Field Violation Report.” Both documents informed the court that Amorine had an earned discharge date of July 13, 2015, and with continued supervision compliance, an optimal discharge date of April 1, 2015. Both reports also indicated that the only violation of Amorine’s probation was his failure to report any community service hours he performed and the failure to pay his court costs. However, the Field Violation Report recommended that the trial court revoke Amorine’s probation, place him on a new term of suspended execution of sentence probation, direct him to pay his court costs, and perform community service work. In 2015, the court issued an order suspending Amorine’s probation. The docket sheets reflected that the court continued and rescheduled the probation revocation hearing several times in 2015; both Amorine and the state appeared at every court date. By fall 2015, Amorine, his counsel, and the state all appeared for another probation revocation hearing, but the cause was passed again. The court continued to hold case reviews on December 15, 2015, and February 17, 2016, and scheduled the next case review for April 19, 2016. The Supreme Court concluded that the facts and circumstances in this case demonstrated "unequivocally" that it needed to exercise its discretion to issue a writ of prohibition to remedy an excess of authority. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded his authority in continuing Amorine’s probation revocation hearing indefinitely after Amorine should have been discharged. Therefore, the preliminary writ of prohibition was made permanent, and the trial court was directed to discharge Amorine from probation. View "Missouri ex rel. Ryan Amorine vs. Honorable Kelly Wayne Parker" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of two counts of statutory sodomy in the first degree. Thereafter, Appellant filed a Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to verdict directors that allegedly violated his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict and for failing to hire an expert to testify at the sentencing hearing. The motion court overruled Appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant established that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to two insufficiently specific verdict directors, and therefore, the motion court clearly erred in denying post-conviction relief. Remanded. View "Hoeber v. State" on Justia Law

After a fifth jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence on direct appeal. Appellant later filed an amended Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief asserting six broad grounds for relief. Appellant’s public defender was subsequently permitted to withdraw as Appellant’s post-conviction motion counsel. Another public defender remained as counsel for Appellant, and two other public defenders also entered their appearance as his counsel. The circuit court overruled Appellant’s post-conviction motion, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion requesting the post-conviction court to find that he had been abandoned by his post-conviction counsel and asking for permission to supplement his amended post-conviction motion with additional claims. The motion court overruled Appellant’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s postconviction counsel did not abandon him during post-conviction proceedings under Missouri’s definition of “abandonment.” View "Barton v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and multiple counts of first-degree assault, forcible rape, and forcible sodomy. Appellant was sentenced to death for the murder. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15, raising a number of additional ineffective assistance of counsel claims and arguments related to suppression issues presented at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the motion court overruled Appellant’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the motion court did not clearly err in overruling the entirety of Appellant’s rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murdering his aunt, uncle, and their granddaughter. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death on all three counts of first-degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) rejecting Defendant’s proffered jury instruction for felony murder in the second degree; (2) admitting testimony from the State’s cell phone analyst and the State’s fingerprint analyst; (3) excluding testimony and argument that another individual had motive and opportunity to commit the murders; (4) excluding evidence of a witness’s alleged bias against a potential witness; and (5) denying Defendant’s mistrial requests when the State inadvertently showed crime scene photographs of the victims. View "State v. Blurton" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of recklessly exposing another to HIV without that person’s knowledge and consent pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 191.677. Defendant was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that, by compelling her to disclose to potential sexual partners that she has HIV, section 191.677 infringes on her constitutional rights to free speech and privacy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although section 191.677 may compel individuals with HIV to disclose that they have HIV under certain circumstances, the statute imposes only incidental burdens on speech and does not violate constitutional provisions protecting the freedom of speech; and (2) because section 191.677 does not criminalize consensual, non-harmful sexual conduct, Defendant’s right to privacy argument fails. View "State v. S.F." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder, armed criminal action, and first-degree burglary. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the second-degree murder and armed criminal action convictions. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other claims, that the trial court violated his due process rights during the penalty phase by excluding reliable witness testimony, which could have provided a basis for a jury to exonerate him of first-degree murder. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the proposed testimony, as it met the indicia of reliability and could exonerate Defendant. Remanded. View "State v. Hartman" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of one count of second-degree drug trafficking. Appellant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and alleging trial error. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case due to the State’s discovery violations and the circuit court’s error in refusing to grant Appellant a continuance. After a second trial, Appellant was again convicted of second-degree trafficking. On appeal, Appellant alleged that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that that circuit court erred in instructing the jury. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s conviction, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in overruling Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; and (2) the circuit court did not plainly err in instructing the jury. View "State v. Zetina-Torres" on Justia Law

Defendants were charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 571.070.1, which prohibits nonviolent felons from possessing firearms. Defendants had been convicted previously of nonviolent felonies. While the charges against Defendants were pending, voters approved Amendment 5 to Mo. Const. art. I, 23. Defendant moved to dismiss the unlawful possession charge, alleging that amended article I, section 23 does not permit the State to criminalize a nonviolent felon’s possession of a firearm. The trial courts in both cases applied the amended version of article I, section 23, concluding that section 571.070.1 was unconstitutional as applied to Defendants, and dismissed the charges. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments in both cases, holding that article I, section 23, as in effect at the time of Defendant’s alleged crimes, did not prohibit the State from regulating the right of nonviolent felons to bear arms. View "State v. Lomax" on Justia Law