Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, holding that a district court's invocation of general, as opposed to case-specific, concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic does not justify dispensing with a defendant's right to in-person confrontation.Appellant fatally shot his girlfriend in a car in which two children were present. During the jury trial, the district court permitted two witnesses to testify remotely via video. On appeal, Defendant argued that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated because the witnesses' convenience did not justify permitting remote testimony and that the district court should have made case-specific findings before summarily ordering that the witnesses may appear remotely. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because the court did not make the required findings of necessity before allowing the two witnesses to testify remotely Defendant's right to confrontation was violated, but the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Newson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the district court's judgment of conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of attempted sexual assault, holding that when a child under the age of sixteen commits a delinquent act but is not charged until after turning twenty-one, no court has jurisdiction to hear the case.After he turned the age of twenty-one, Appellant was charged with committing delinquent acts as a fourteen-year-old. Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted sexual assault. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction, holding that while the juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over children under twenty-one years of age who are alleged to have committed a delinquent act when the person was at least sixteen but less than eighteen years of age, the juvenile court loses jurisdiction once a child turns twenty-one, and, absent certain exceptions, the district court lacks jurisdiction over any charges of delinquent acts. View "Zalyaul v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence found as a result of and during a protective sweep, holding that a protective sweep does not require a prior arrest.In granting Defendant's motion to dismiss, the district court determined that the officers did not have an appropriate basis for the protective sweep and that the sweep was per se unconstitutional because it was not preceded by an arrest. The district court concluded that the search was not a lawful protective sweep because it was not based on articulable facts supporting a reasonable belief that the premises harbored a dangerous individual. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that because the district court did not indicate the specific evidence that was improperly seized as a result of the protective sweep or as its fruit, remand was required for clarification of the evidence that fell within the scope of the suppression order and which items were properly seized by law enforcement. View "State v. McCall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of a drug offense in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 453.336(2)(a), holding that the statutes governing Defendant's first-offense drug crime mandated judgment deferral under the circumstances of this case.Defendant pleaded guilty to violating section 453.336(2)(a) pursuant to a guilty-plea agreement with the State that did not address judgment deferral. Before sentencing, Defendant filed an election to enter a substance-use treatment program without addressing whether he qualified for judgment deferral. The district court entered a judgment of conviction with a corresponding prison sentence. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the plain language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.211(3)(a)(1) requires the district court to defer judgment where the defendant consents to deferral and pleads guilty to violating section 453.336(2)(a); and (2) the district court lacked discretion to decline to defer judgment. View "Locker v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court convicting Defendant of murder with the use of a deadly weapon, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and related charges, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the footwear impression evidence presented during trial was admissible without expert testimony, and therefore, the district court did not err in admitting the evidence; (2) neither the district court's failure to make express findings under Lipsitz v. State, 442 P.3d 138 (Nev. 2019), nor its decision to allow a witness to testify via two-way video contributed to the verdict and were therefore harmless; and (3) the district court did not improperly limit witness testimony. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court finding Babylyn Tate not negligent in this tort action, holding that none of the challenged conduct or other alleged trial errors warranted reversal.At issue was the procedural question of whether a party must file a motion for a new trial in district court in order to preserve attorney-misconduct claims on appeal. The Supreme Court answered (1) the rule announced in Rives v. Farris, 506 P.3d 1064 (2022), that a party is not necessarily required to move for a new trial to preserve its arguments based on trial error or its ability to seek a new trial as an appellate remedy, applies; (2) the alleged improper ability-to-pay argument and golden-rule argument did not warrant reversal; and (3) there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's challenged rulings. View "Evans-Waiau v. Tate" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction of multiple child sexual assault and abuse counts, holding that the district court's decision denying Appellant's motion to substitute counsel violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.In this twenty-two-count criminal matter Appellant retained Mitchell Posin as defense counsel. On the eve of trial, Appellant filed a motion to substitute counsel, alleging that Posin failed adequately to prepare the defense. The district court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Appellant of most of the counts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court applied the wrong test in deciding Appellant's motion to substitute counsel because Posin was retained, not appointed; and (2) under the appropriate test, the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion to substitute counsel. View "Brass v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court correctly applied Nev. Rev. Stat. 231.1517 and ordered the Parole Board to credit Respondent for the time he spent incarcerated pending adjudication on his new criminal charges.The Division of Parole and Probation issued parole violation reports against Respondent based on new criminal charges. Respondent was remanded into the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) and physically incarcerated in the prison. However, Respondent's parole revocation hearing was continued for more than one year until the day after he entered an Alford plea to the new charge of attempted burglary. Respondent received a consecutive sentence on the new charge and did not begin serving it until after he was parole on the previous charges. Respondent filed an emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he lost over a year of credit for time served due to him. The district court agreed and granted relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Parole Board exceeded its authority by deferring the revocation hearing beyond sixty days after Respondent's return to the custody of NDOC. View "In re Application of Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that counsel's overt interjection of racial stereotypes into Appellant's criminal trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, battery with the use of a deadly weapon, and battery with the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. In his postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Defendant claimed that counsel was ineffective for introducing racial issues into the trial. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) counsel's statements impermissibly tainted the jury pool by introducing racial invective into the proceedings; and (2) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced the defense. View "Dean v. Narvaiza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's third postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the petition.Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly robbery and other crimes. After a penalty phase retrial, the jury returned a death sentence. Appellant later filed a third postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petition at issue on appeal. The district court dismissed the petition as procedurally barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant could not rely on the alleged ineffective assistance of first postconviction counsel as good cause and prejudice to raise grounds for relief from the guilt phase of his trial; (2) Defendant's ineffective assistance claims of second postconviction counsel lacked merit; and (3) Defendant failed to show that the failure to consider his claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice sufficient to excuse the procedural bars to the petition. View "Chappell v. State" on Justia Law