Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision applying the pre-2007 version of Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.4465 to Defendant's criminal conduct in this case, holding that the 2007 amendment to Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.4465 applies when the charged offense is continuous in nature but that attempted lewdness with a child under fourteen is not a continuing offense.Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted lewdness with a child under fourteen and was alleged to have committed the offenses between 2006 and 2013. The district court applied the 2003 version of section 209.4465. On appeal, the State argued that section 209.4465(8)(2007) applied to Defendant's offenses because the attempted lewdness counts were charged as continuing offenses through 2013. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) attempted lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen is not a continuing offense; and (2) the district court properly relied on the 2003 version of section 209.4465 and applied Defendant's earned credits to his parole eligibility. View "High Desert State Prison v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Respondent's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, holding that Respondent properly invoked his speedy-trial right, Respondent was entitled to a presumption of prejudice, and the State failed to rebut that presumption.The district court concluded that the State violated Respondent's right to a speedy trial because the State's gross negligence caused a twenty-six-month delay between the filing of charges and Respondent's arrest, and the State failed to rebut the presumption that the delay prejudiced Respondent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that Respondent was entitled to a presumption o prejudice under the facts enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992); and (2) the State did not rebut this presumption or explain on appeal how Respondent was not prejudiced by the delay. View "State v. Inzunza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of seven counts of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon and other offenses, holding that Defendant made specific factual allegations that could be sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of the requirement that a Defendant choose from a fair cross section of the community and those allegations were not disproved, and therefore, the district court abused its discretion by denying Defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing.At issue in this case was when an evidentiary hearing may be warranted on a fair-cross-section claim. The Supreme Court held (1) an evidentiary hearing is warranted on a fair-cross-section challenge when a defendant makes specific allegations that, if true, would be sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement; (2) the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing on his fair-cross-section challenge; and (3) none of Defendant's other arguments required a new trial. View "Valentine v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court admitting certain out-of-court statements after finding that the witness was unavailable and that Defendant had intentionally deterred the witness from appearing at trial, holding that the district court correctly concluded that the State met its burden under the preponderance of the evidence standard.Defendant was charged with attempted murder with use of a deadly weapon and other crimes. When the State sought to admit Defendant's daughter's out-of-court statements to a district court's office investigator Defendant asserted his right to confrontation. The trial court admitted the statements, finding that the witness was unavailable and that Defendant had intentionally deterred the witness from appearing at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when invoking the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause the preponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate burden of proof; and (2) the district court applied the correct standard, and the court did not err in its application of the exception. View "Anderson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declined to reconsider well-settled Nevada law that when a district court imposes a sentence in a criminal case it must give a defendant credit for any time the defendant was spent in presentence confinement absent an express statutory provision making the defendant ineligible for such credit and remanded the case with instructions for the district court to give Appellant the required credit for time served in presentence confinement.Defendant pleaded guilty to grand larceny of an automobile, less than $3,500, and unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. After she was sentenced Defendant appealed, arguing that the distrixt court erred by failing to give her credit for time served in presentence confinement. The State urged the Supreme Court to overrule established precedent holding that sentencing courts must award credit for time served in presentence confinement. The Supreme Court concluded that there was no compelling reason to overturn precedent, and based on that precedent, held that the district court erred in forfeiting Defendant's presentence credit as a condition of probation. View "Poasa v. State" on Justia Law

In this appeal from the denial of a postconviction habeas petition, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that Appellant was not allowed to raise direct appeal issues related to his 1995 capital trial in this appeal from an amended judgment of conviction entered in 2017.In 1995, Appellant was sentenced to death for first-degree murder. Amended judgments required Appellant to pay an indeterminate portion of restitution. Appellant litigated the judgment of conviction for more than two decades with a direct appeal and various state and federal court proceedings. In the instant proceeding, Appellant filed in 2017 a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that his conviction was not final because the judgment of conviction contained an indeterminate restitution provision. The district court denied the petition but amended the judgment of conviction to delete the indeterminate part of the restitution provision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where for a dozen years Appellant treated the judgment of conviction as a final judgment, Appellant was estopped from now arguing that the judgment was not final; and (2) although the amended judgment of conviction is appealable, the appeal is limited in scope to issues stemming from the amendment. View "Witter v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part Defendant's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district court order denying his pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus and motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, holding that evidence that has been suppressed in justice court proceedings on a felony complaint is not "legal evidence" that may be presented to the grand jury in support of an indictment.The State filed a criminal complaint charging Defendant with murder with use of a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Before the preliminary hearing, Defendant moved to suppress his statements to the police and the gun. The justice court granted the motion. The State thendismissed the criminal complaint and went to the grand jury on the charge of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, presenting the evidence that the justice court had suppressed. The grand jury indicted Defendant on the charge. After Defendant filed a pretrial petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the indictment, without success, he brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding that the State was precluded from presenting the suppressed evidence to the grand jury. View "Gathrite v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners' petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court's decision denying the Parole Board's petition for modification of Marlin Thompson's sentence pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.033(2), holding that the district court misapplied the law.In 1992, Thompson, who was convicted of first-degree murder, was granted parole and has remained on parole since. In 2017, the Parole Board petitioned to modify Thompson's sentence. The district attorney's office opposed the petition, asserting that the minimum term for first-degree murder at the time of Thompson's offense was a life term, and therefore, the court could not reduce Thompson's maximum term. The district court agreed and denied the petition. The Parole Board filed a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the court's order. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) the parole eligibility term prescribed by the penal statute sets the limit for reducing the life sentence under section 176.033(2); and (2) the district court relied on a misunderstanding of the law in denying the Parole Board's petition. View "State Board of Parole Commissioners v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and affirmed the judgment of conviction as to the other charges for which Defendant was convicted, holding that the district court abused its discretion by declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, two counts of child abuse, neglect or endangerment, and ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for a new trial on the murder charge, holding (1) a district court must instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter when requested so long as the instruction is supported by some evidence, even if that evidence is circumstantial; (2) because the circumstantial evidence in this case strongly suggested the killing occurred in a sudden heat of passion upon provocation the district court abused its discretion by refusing to give a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter; and (3) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. View "Newson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court's decision affirming his conviction and disagreeing with Petitioner's argument that he was erroneously denied the right to a jury trial, holding that the offense of misdemeanor battery constituting domestic violence is a serious offense such that the right to a jury trial is triggered.Petitioner was charged with first-offense battery constituting domestic violence, a misdemeanor. Petitioner made a demand for a jury trial, but the municipal court denied the demand. Petitioner then entered a no contest plea to the domestic battery charge. Before the Supreme Court Petitioner argued that recent changes by the legislature made the offense a serious one. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because statutes now limit the right to bear arms for a person who has been convicted of misdemeanor battery constituting a domestic violence and because the Legislature has determined that the offense is a serious one, a jury trial is required. View "Andersen v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law