Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this case where Defendant was convicted of six counts of violating Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.360, which makes it a felony for certain categories of prohibited person to possess a firearm, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction as to counts one through three and reversed and remanded for a new trial as to counts four through six, holding that the State did not satisfy the status elements of the two groups of crimes Defendant was convicted of.Counts one through three charged Defendant with violating section 202.360(2)(a) for possessing firearms as a person who has "been adjudicated as mentally ill" by a state or federal court. The remaining counts charged Defendant with illegally possessing firearms based on his status as a person who is "an unlawful user" of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's assignment to and completion of a Nevada mental health court diversion program did not constitute an adjudication of mental illness that made his subsequent possession of a firearm a felony; and (2) the court erred in instructing the jury by theoretically allowing Defendant to be convicted of illegal possession of a firearm by an "unlawful user" of a controlled substance based on a single current use of the substance. View "Hager v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Appellant of two counts of first-degree murder with a deadly weapon after adopting a framework for analyzing the appropriateness of juror anonymity, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it empaneled an anonymous jury by withholding the jurors' names and addresses from counsel.Due to concerns about juror privacy, the district court decided to impanel an anonymous jury and redact the jurors' names and addresses from juror questionnaires. After a trial, the empaneled jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of murder and found that Defendant had used a deadly weapon in the commission of the crimes. The district court sentenced Defendant to life without parole on each count. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in empaneling an anonymous jury, and its use satisfied the rule adopted today; (2) a district court has no statutory obligation to instruct a jury about the consequences of a deadly weapon enhancement; and (3) the district court did not err when it admitted as consciousness-of-guilt evidence two recorded conversations during which Defendant asked his associates to threaten a key witness. View "Menendez-Cordero v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the judgment of the district court increasing Petitioner's bail from $25,000 to $100,000, holding that the district court failed to engage in a meaningful analysis to determine whether good cause was shown.In his petition, Petitioner argued that the district court lacked good cause to support the increase of his bail. The Supreme Court held that writ relief was warranted because (1) the district court increased the bail after making an initial bail determination, and therefore, the court was required to make a finding of good cause under Nev. Rev. Stat. 178.499(1) for the subsequent increase in bail; and (2) the district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously in increasing Petitioner's bail without explaining the good cause shown. View "Cameron v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the district court did not err in rejecting Appellant's argument that the credits Appellant earns under Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.4465 must be applied to the minimum term of his enhancement sentence.In denying Appellant's habeas petition, the district court held that the applicable sentencing statute specified a minimum term that Appellant had to serve before becoming eligible for parole, and therefore, section 209.4465(7)(b) precluded Respondent from applying the statutory credits to the minimum term of Appellant's enhancement sentence. On appeal, Appellant argued that the sentencing statute is silent as to parole eligibility, and therefore, the district court erred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute that specified the sentence for Defendant's primary offense of second-degree murder also specified the sentence for the weapon enhancement, and that statute specified a minimum term that Appellant had to serve before becoming eligible for parole. View "Perez v. Warden" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for sexual assault but upheld his remaining convictions for other sexually-related counts, including attempted sexual assault, holding that there was insufficient evidence for the sexual assault conviction.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court erred when it allowed the victim to testify by two-way audiovisual transmission in violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and that the district court erred in convicting him of both sexual assault and attempted sexual assault because they were based on the same underlying conduct. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the victim, who was admitted to an out-of-state residential treatment center, to testify by two-way audiovisual transmission at trial; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding to trial without holding a competency hearing; and (3) the State should have charged the sexual assault and attempted sexual assault counts in the alternative, which it did not, and the district court compounded the error by convicting Defendant of both counts. View "Lipsitz v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's procedurally barred postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that he was entitled to a new penalty hearing, holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate good cause to excuse the procedural bars.Defendant claimed that he demonstrated good cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural bars based on Hurst v. Florida, 477 U.S. __ (2016). Specifically, Defendant that Hurst established that the weighing component of Nevada's death penalty procedures is a "fact" that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that Hurst clarified that all eligibility determinations are subject to the beyond the reasonable doubt standard. The Supreme Court previously rejected the first argument in Jeremais v. State, 412 P.3d 43 (Nev. 2018), and rejected the second argument in Nunnery v. State, 263 P.3d 235 (Nev. 2011). The Supreme Court held that the district court correctly denied Defendant's petition because Defendant failed to demonstrate that these prior decisions were incorrect or that Hurst compelled a different result. View "Castillo v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction resulting in Defendant receiving a longer sentence after successfully appealing his first conviction, holding that the presumption of vindictiveness does not apply when a different judge imposes a more severe sentence.On appeal from his first conviction Defendant received a new trial and sentencing hearing before a new district court judge. Following the second trial the judge imposed a longer sentence on some counts than the original judge had. Defendant appealed, arguing that the more severe sentence violated his due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because a different judge presided over Defendant's second trial and at sentencing, due process did not require a presumption of vindictiveness. View "Bowser v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court permitting the State to introduce evidence of prior, uncharged sexual acts committed by Appellant in the instant prosecution for a sexual offense for purposes of showing propensity under Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.045(3), holding that the district court did not plainly err by permitting the State to introuce evidence of Appellant’s prior conduct for propensity purposes.Specifically, the Court held (1) the plain language of section 48.045(3) permits the district court to admit evidence of a separate sexual offense for purposes of proving propensity in a sexual offense prosecution; (2) while such evidence may be admitted without the district court holding a Petrocelli hearing, evidence of separate acts constituting sexual offenses must be evaluated for relevance and heightened risk of unfair prejudice; and (3) the district court did not commit plain error by allowing the State to introduce evidence of Appellant’s prior sexual acts for propensity purposes. View "Franks v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this criminal case for a new trial, holding that the district court clearly erred when it found that Defendant had not made out a prima facie case of discrimination in challenging the State’s use of peremptory challenges to remove two African-American women during jury selection.Defendant was charged with child abuse, neglect, or endangerment and other offenses. Defendant objected to the State’s exercise of two of its peremptory challenges to remove two African-Americans from the jury. The district court denied Defendant’s Batson challenge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court clearly erred when it terminated the Batson analysis at step one of the three-step analysis and that the record did not clearly support the denial of Defendant’s objection. View "Cooper v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of three count of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and other offenses, holding that the admission of photographs of the victims was an abuse of the district court’s discretion, but the error was harmless, and none of Defendant’s other claims warranted relief.After Defendant shot and killed a motorist, the motorist’s car struck a taxicab, killing the driver and a passenger. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court’s admission at trial of photographs of the taxicab victims. The Supreme Court held (1) the challenged photographs, including images of the taxicab victims’ bodies disfigured by fire and subsequent autopsies, should have been excluded because they added little to the State’s case but did create a significant risk of inflaming the jury, but the admission of the photographs was harmless; and (2) Defendant’s remaining claims on appeal were unavailing. View "Harris v. State" on Justia Law