Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The appellant, Barry Rashad Harris, was convicted of first-degree kidnapping resulting in substantial bodily harm, battery constituting domestic violence, misdemeanor assault, and battery resulting in substantial bodily harm constituting domestic violence, following a physical altercation with his girlfriend. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 15 years to life. Harris filed a pro se petition for a postconviction writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of pretrial, trial, and appellate counsel. The district court appointed postconviction counsel, who supplemented the petition with additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.Due to a communication error, Harris, who was incarcerated, was not transported to attend the hearing. The district court proceeded with the hearing in Harris's absence, without a waiver from him of his statutory right to be present. The district court concluded that Harris had not shown ineffective assistance of counsel and denied the petition.The Supreme Court of Nevada found that the district court violated Harris's statutory right to be present at the hearing. The court clarified that counsel may not waive a petitioner’s right to be present at an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction habeas petition where the record does not indicate that the petitioner personally waived the right to be present. Because the record did not support a valid waiver of the statutory right to be present at the evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that the district court violated Harris’s statutory right to be present at the hearing. The court could not say that this error was harmless given the circumstances presented, and therefore reversed the district court’s order and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing. View "Harris v. Warden" on Justia Law

The case involves Jesse Calvin Gilbert, who was pulled over by a law enforcement deputy due to a non-operating license plate light. Gilbert was arrested on an active warrant, and the deputy conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle. During the search, the deputy found a handgun under the driver's seat. Gilbert, an ex-felon, was charged with possession of a firearm and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search was not a true inventory search but a ruse to conduct an investigatory search.The district court denied Gilbert's motion, finding that the deputy appropriately impounded the vehicle and the inventory search was reasonable. Gilbert appealed his subsequent conviction based on the search and the unsuppressed evidence.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. The court clarified that an investigatory motive does not necessarily invalidate an inventory search as long as the search that occurred is the same as the inventory-based search that would have happened absent any such motivation. The court also stated that a court deciding a suppression motion must determine the search's reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances by evaluating the extent to which law enforcement departed from the standardized procedures, whether the scope of the search was as expected in light of the underlying justifications for inventory searches, and whether the inventory produced served the purposes of an inventory search. The court concluded that the search was reasonable and denied Gilbert's motion to suppress. View "GILBERT VS. STATE" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of several Nevada statutes regulating "ghost guns," or unfinished firearm frames or receivers. The respondent, Polymer80, Inc., a manufacturer of gun-related products, argued that the definition of "unfinished frame or receiver" in the statutes was impermissibly vague, making the statutes unconstitutional. The district court agreed with Polymer80, concluding that the definition did not clearly explain key terms or notify individuals when raw materials would become an unfinished frame or receiver. The court also found that the definition allowed for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada disagreed with the lower court's findings. The court found that the terms used to define "unfinished frame or receiver" had ordinary meanings that provided sufficient notice of what the statutes prohibited. The court also concluded that the statutes were general intent statutes that did not lack a scienter requirement and did not pose a risk of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision, holding that the statutes were not unconstitutionally vague. View "Sisolak v. Polymer80, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, D.C. Jr., who was charged with murder, attempted murder, and robbery. D.C. Jr., who has an IQ of 66, was 14 years old at the time of the alleged crimes. His counsel requested a competency determination before proceeding to the certification hearing. After an initial finding of incompetency followed by competency-restoration sessions, the juvenile court declared D.C. Jr. competent to proceed. However, the court did not explicitly address the conflicting expert testimony regarding D.C. Jr.'s understanding of the proceedings and ability to assist counsel.The juvenile court certified D.C. Jr. for prosecution as an adult. The court's decision was based on the assumption that the competency standards for juvenile court applied, which was a mistake. The court did not adequately support its determination with findings, and it appears to have applied an incorrect standard.The Supreme Court of Nevada vacated the certification order and the competency determination. The court held that a juvenile facing the possibility of prosecution as an adult on serious criminal charges must meet the adult criminal court standard for competence. The court remanded the case for the juvenile court to reassess D.C. Jr.'s competency using the correct standard. The court emphasized that the stakes were high, and the record did not show that the juvenile court correctly assessed D.C. Jr.'s competency to proceed. The court also vacated the order certifying D.C. Jr. for criminal proceedings as an adult, which followed the competency determination. View "In re D.C." on Justia Law

Ramel Ortiz was convicted of six counts of sexual assault and other felonies after breaking into M.P.'s house and forcing her to engage in multiple sexual acts. Four of these sexual assault counts arose from an incident during which Ortiz subjected M.P. to intercourse in different sexual positions. Ortiz appealed his conviction, arguing that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support multiple sexual assault convictions.Ortiz's case was first reviewed by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, which denied his postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Ortiz then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada found that appellate counsel's omission of a sufficiency challenge to the multiple convictions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court concluded that because the sufficiency challenge stood a reasonable probability of success had it been raised on appeal from the judgment of conviction, Ortiz was prejudiced by appellate counsel's omission of that challenge. The court therefore reversed in part and remanded for the district court to vacate three of Ortiz's sexual assault convictions. However, the court affirmed the district court's decision as to Ortiz's remaining claims, which it found to lack merit. View "Ortiz v. State" on Justia Law

In 2016, 21-year-old Kwame De-Markquise Morrison initiated a sexual relationship with a 12-year-old girl, A.M. In 2017, A.M. became pregnant and gave birth to a child, who was later adopted. Morrison was charged with six counts of sexual assault upon a minor under 14 years of age and one count of use of a minor under the age of 14 in producing pornography. Morrison admitted to having sex with A.M. but claimed he believed she was 16 years old.The district court convicted Morrison of three counts of sexual assault upon a minor under 14 years of age and one count of use of a minor under the age of 14 in producing pornography. The court instructed the jury that a lack of knowledge or a mistake as to the victim's age is not a defense to a charge of using a minor in producing pornography. Morrison appealed, arguing that the instruction was inaccurate because the State is required to prove that the defendant "knowingly" used "a minor" in producing pornography.The Court of Appeals of Nevada agreed that the instruction was inaccurate. However, it found that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Morrison admitted that he believed A.M. was 16 years old—and therefore a minor—during their sexual relationship. The court also rejected Morrison's other claims on appeal, including that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss counsel and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct. Therefore, the court affirmed Morrison's judgment of conviction. View "Morrison v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada dealt with the issue of the scope of a valid search warrant and its implications under the Fourth Amendment. The appellant, Deva One Smith, was convicted of two counts of possession of a visual presentation depicting sexual conduct of a person under sixteen years of age. The case centered on the validity of a search warrant that officers used to seize and conduct a forensic search of Smith's cell phone.The court clarified that under Nevada law, an affidavit may be incorporated into a warrant to establish probable cause, but that affidavit cannot expand the scope of the search and seizure permitted under the warrant's specific language. Officers must search only the places authorized on the face of the warrant. In Smith's case, the officers had a valid warrant for his residence only; however, they seized his cell phone while he was outside his residence.The court found that the imminent destruction of evidence exigency justified the seizure of the cell phone. However, no other exigent circumstance allowed for the subsequent forensic search of the cell phone. The court concluded that because officers failed to obtain a warrant to search the cell phone, the search of that device violated Smith's Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Smith's motion to suppress the evidence found on the phone. As a result, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reversed the judgment of conviction. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves Christopher Kabew, who pleaded guilty to attempted residential burglary, his first felony conviction. His sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation with the condition that he complete a substance abuse treatment program. After successfully completing the program, Kabew petitioned the district court to set aside his conviction under NRS 176A.240(6)(a), which states that upon completing the terms and conditions of a drug court program, a court "shall discharge the defendant and dismiss the proceedings or set aside the judgment of conviction" unless the defendant has a prior felony conviction or previously failed to complete a specialty court program. The district court denied the motion, and Kabew petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada.The Supreme Court of Nevada found that the district court improperly denied Kabew's motion. The court held that NRS 176A.240(6)(a) is mandatory and does not afford district courts any discretion to deny a motion to set aside a judgment of conviction when the defendant meets the statutory requirements. The court further held that the statute does not intrude on judicial functions, as it is within the legislature's power to define crimes and determine punishments. The court concluded that the district court failed to perform a duty required by law by denying Kabew's motion, and ordered the district court to set aside Kabew's conviction. View "Kabew v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

In a case tried in the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada, the appellant, Kim A. Judd, was charged with one count of felony injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle and one count of felony coercion. This came after an altercation where Judd struck a 1957 Chevrolet truck several times with a sledgehammer following a disagreement with the owner of the vehicle, Scott Reber, over payment for repairs.The key issue addressed by the court was the interpretation of the phrase "physical force" in NRS 207.190(2), which distinguishes between coercion being punished as a felony versus as a misdemeanor. The court needed to determine whether "physical force" should be limited to physical force against a person, and not merely against property.The court concluded that the Nevada Legislature intended for the distinguishing statutory element of "physical force" to be limited to force against a person. As such, the jury should have been instructed accordingly. The court emphasized the importance of giving proper jury instructions for the essential elements of a crime and ruled that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the definition of physical force as being limited to force against a person necessitated the reversal of this conviction.However, the court affirmed the felony conviction for injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle, concluding that the jury was correctly instructed on the proper measure of damages for the partial destruction of property. The conviction for injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle was based on the uncontroverted expert testimony at trial, which provided a replacement cost for the damaged parts of the vehicle. View "Judd v. State" on Justia Law

The appellant, Demitri Gee, was convicted for driving under the influence resulting in substantial bodily harm. He appealed the judgment of conviction, challenging the restitution amount of $9,940 that was awarded to the State of Nevada Victims of Crime Program. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada found two main issues: whether an order of restitution must be based on competent evidence and whether a defendant’s restitution obligation should be offset by the amount the defendant’s insurance provider paid to the victim for the same losses.Gee had been driving while intoxicated when he lost control of his vehicle and collided with another car, severely injuring the occupants. He subsequently fled the scene. As a result of the collision, Gee was charged with two counts of driving under the influence resulting in substantial bodily harm among other charges. A civil settlement agreement was reached with the victims, and they received compensation through Gee's insurance.The court found that the restitution amount of $9,940 was not supported by competent evidence as the state failed to present evidence to support it. The court also found that the district court had not evaluated whether the restitution should be offset by the insurance payment made by Gee to the victims. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that the district court had abused its discretion by ordering restitution not supported by competent evidence and by failing to evaluate whether the award needed to be offset by the compensation provided to the victim through Gee’s insurance. The court then vacated the $9,940 in restitution, affirmed the rest of the conviction, and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding the restitution amount. View "Gee v. State" on Justia Law