Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court finding Babylyn Tate not negligent in this tort action, holding that none of the challenged conduct or other alleged trial errors warranted reversal.At issue was the procedural question of whether a party must file a motion for a new trial in district court in order to preserve attorney-misconduct claims on appeal. The Supreme Court answered (1) the rule announced in Rives v. Farris, 506 P.3d 1064 (2022), that a party is not necessarily required to move for a new trial to preserve its arguments based on trial error or its ability to seek a new trial as an appellate remedy, applies; (2) the alleged improper ability-to-pay argument and golden-rule argument did not warrant reversal; and (3) there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's challenged rulings. View "Evans-Waiau v. Tate" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction of multiple child sexual assault and abuse counts, holding that the district court's decision denying Appellant's motion to substitute counsel violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.In this twenty-two-count criminal matter Appellant retained Mitchell Posin as defense counsel. On the eve of trial, Appellant filed a motion to substitute counsel, alleging that Posin failed adequately to prepare the defense. The district court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Appellant of most of the counts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court applied the wrong test in deciding Appellant's motion to substitute counsel because Posin was retained, not appointed; and (2) under the appropriate test, the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion to substitute counsel. View "Brass v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court correctly applied Nev. Rev. Stat. 231.1517 and ordered the Parole Board to credit Respondent for the time he spent incarcerated pending adjudication on his new criminal charges.The Division of Parole and Probation issued parole violation reports against Respondent based on new criminal charges. Respondent was remanded into the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) and physically incarcerated in the prison. However, Respondent's parole revocation hearing was continued for more than one year until the day after he entered an Alford plea to the new charge of attempted burglary. Respondent received a consecutive sentence on the new charge and did not begin serving it until after he was parole on the previous charges. Respondent filed an emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he lost over a year of credit for time served due to him. The district court agreed and granted relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Parole Board exceeded its authority by deferring the revocation hearing beyond sixty days after Respondent's return to the custody of NDOC. View "In re Application of Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that counsel's overt interjection of racial stereotypes into Appellant's criminal trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, battery with the use of a deadly weapon, and battery with the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. In his postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Defendant claimed that counsel was ineffective for introducing racial issues into the trial. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) counsel's statements impermissibly tainted the jury pool by introducing racial invective into the proceedings; and (2) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced the defense. View "Dean v. Narvaiza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's third postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the petition.Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly robbery and other crimes. After a penalty phase retrial, the jury returned a death sentence. Appellant later filed a third postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petition at issue on appeal. The district court dismissed the petition as procedurally barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant could not rely on the alleged ineffective assistance of first postconviction counsel as good cause and prejudice to raise grounds for relief from the guilt phase of his trial; (2) Defendant's ineffective assistance claims of second postconviction counsel lacked merit; and (3) Defendant failed to show that the failure to consider his claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice sufficient to excuse the procedural bars to the petition. View "Chappell v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of sex trafficking of a child under eighteen years of age, first-degree kidnapping, living from the earnings of a prostitute, and child abuse, neglect, or endangerment, holding that the trial court's Faretta canvass was in appropriate in this case.Defendant, who represented himself at trial, was found guilty of sex trafficking of a child under eighteen years of age, first-degree kidnapping, living from the earnings of a prostitute, and child abuse, neglect, or endangerment. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction on the basis that the waiver of his right to counsel was invalid, holding (1) the trial court's determination that Defendant validly waived his right to counsel was unreasonable in light of the inadequate inquiry into Defendant's understanding of the sentences he faced if convicted; and (2) the trial court should refrain from disparaging Defendant's choice to waive counsel. View "Miles v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of sexual assault, battery with the intent to commit sexual assault upon a victim age sixteen or older, and open or gross lewdness, holding that Defendant was not denied a fair and just sentencing hearing.At issue on appeal was whether Defendant's right to be present was violated when the sentencing hearing was conducted by simultaneous audiovisual transmission over the Zoom videoconferencing platform because of the district court's administrative orders forbidding in-person hearings due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's sentencing hearing was fair and just considering the surrounding circumstances; (2) the district court properly admitted evidence of Defendant's previous conviction for battery with intent to commit sexual assault; and (3) the district court did not err in limiting inquiry into Defendant's prior conviction that the court had determined would be admitted as evidence. View "Chaparro v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of two counts of driving under the influence resulting in death and one count of felony reckless driving but vacated his sentence, holding that the district court wrongly considered certain statements during sentencing.Under Nev. Const. art. I, 8A, also known as Marsy's Law, and Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.015 victims are afforded the right to be heard at sentencing. At issue was how to reconcile the provisions' different definitions of "victim." The Supreme Court held (1) neither definition includes anyone and everyone impacted by a crime, as the district court found in this case; (2) when presented with an objection to impact statements during sentences, a district court must first determine if an individual falls under either the constitutional definition or the statutory definition of "victim," and if the statement is from a nonvictim, the district court may consider it only upon a determination that the statement is relevant and reliable; and (3) the district court erroneously considered statements, over objection, from persons who do not fall under either definition of victim without making the required relevance and reliability findings. View "Aparicio v. State" on Justia Law

In this original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the order of the district court denying Petitioner's motion to dismiss counts of an indictment, the Supreme Court held that the district court manifestly abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to dismiss Douglas County charges for lack of venue.Petitioner was charged with committing three burglaries in two murders in Washoe County and two burglaries and two murders in Douglas County. A Washoe County grand jury indicted Petitioner for all of the above offenses. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the Douglas County charges for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion, concluding that venue was proper in Washoe County for each charge. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the State's theories supporting venue in Washoe County were too speculative and unsupported by the evidence to make venue proper for the Douglas County charges. View "Guzman v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and related charges, holding that there was no reversible error in jury selection or closing arguments.During his trial, Defendant stipulated to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole if he was found guilty and to waive his right to appeal issues "stemming from the guilt phase of the trial." The jury found Defendant guilty, and the court sentenced Defendant to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Defendant raised errors relating to the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence, jury selection, closing arguments, jury deliberations, and sentencing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not waive any error that occurred during closing arguments, sentencing or jury selection; and (2) Defendant waived his other alleged errors. View "Burns v. State" on Justia Law