Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, denying Defendant's subsequent motion to dismiss the charges against him, and entering a judgment of conviction based on Defendant's guilty plea, holding that the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.Defendant entered into a guilty plea agreement based on charges of robbery and ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and then suffered a mental breakdown. Defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea when he regained competency, alleging a violation of his right to a speedy trial and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court denied Defendant's motions and convicted him. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, holding that withdrawal was just and fair, and therefore, the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. View "Sunseri v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Appellant's judgment of conviction, holding that Appellant was entitled to have seventy days' credit for time served applied to his sentence in his second case.Appellant pleaded guilty in two criminal cases and was sentenced on different dates by different judges, with each sentence imposed to run concurrently. The first sentencing judge applied credit for Appellant's time served to the sentence in the first case, but the second sentencing judge declined to apply credit for time served to the sentence in the second case. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction, holding (1) where a defendant simultaneously serves time in presentence confinement for multiple cases and the resulting sentences are imposed concurrently, credit for time served must be applied to each corresponding sentence; and (2) Appellant was entitled to credit for time served applied to the sentence in his second criminal case. View "White-Hughley v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellant's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant overcame the procedural bars that applied to his postconviction habeas petition and that Appellant's sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.Appellant was convicted of first degree murder. Due to a single aggravating circumstance - a New York conviction for a felony invoking the use or threat of violence to another person - Appellant was sentenced to death. Later, a New York court vacated Appellant's New York conviction. Appellant subsequently filed his habeas petition, arguing that his death sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment because the prior-violent-felony-conviction aggravating circumstance was invalid in light of the vacatur of his New York conviction. The district court denied the petition, concluding that it was procedurally barred and barred by statutory latches. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Appellant's petition and that Appellant's sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. View "Howard v. State" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition requesting a genetic market analysis and a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in denying the petition requesting genetic marker analysis and that the decision regarding the habeas petition must be vacated.Defendant was convicted of multiple crimes related to a fifteen-year-old girl's sexual assault and sentenced in 2011 to twenty-five years to life. In 2019, Defendant learned that a rape kit collected from the alleged victim and not tested prior to trial revealed a DNA match to a man other than Defendant. Defendant subsequently filed a postconviction motion requesting a genetic marker analysis and a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied both petitions. The Supreme Court remanded both matters for further proceedings, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that a CODIS match would have been inadmissible and in denying Defendant's petition requesting a genetic marker analysis on this basis; and (2) because the court erred in denying the genetic marker analysis petition, the court's decision regarding the habeas petition must be vacated. View "James v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellant's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.810(1)(a) does not bar a claim that a petition received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated stalking. The district court sentenced Defendant to three consecutive prison terms of sixty-two to 156 months. Defendant filed a timely postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that trial counsel was ineffective because the State breached the plea agreement and counsel did not object. The district court denied the petition, concluding that any issues regarding Defendant's sentence were outside the scope of section 34.810(1)(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 34.810 does not bar claims that counsel was ineffective at sentencing; and (2) the State materially breached its promise to recommend concurrent sentences, and counsel's failure to object prejudiced Defendant. View "Gonzales v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the State's motion for leave to proceed by information and this case and the judgment of the conviction, holding that a preliminary hearing transcript can satisfy Nev. Rev. Stat. 173.035(2)'s affidavit requirement.Section 173.035(2) allows the State to seek and obtain leave to proceed against an accused by information filed in district court upon a showing that the justice court committed egregious error in dismissing the charges. To obtain that leave, the district attorney must file a motion upon affidavit. The State in this case filed a criminal complaint against Defendant. The justice of the peace sua sponte dismissed all charges against him. Thereafter, the State sought leave to proceed against Defendant by information in district court and supported its motion by attaching a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript from justice court. The district court granted the motion unopposed. Defendant was subsequently convicted of several offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State's motion for leave to proceed by information in district court was substantially compliant with section 173.035(2) and demonstrated that the justice court committed egregious error in dismissing the charges against Defendant; and (2) substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict. View "Bolden v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of two counts each of sexual assault of a minor under fourteen years of age and lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen, holding that the cumulative effect of serious errors violated Defendant's due process right to a fair trial.During trial, the State presented no physical evidence to prove that Defendant committed the offenses. Still, the jury found Defendant guilty of all counts, and he was sentenced to serve an aggregate prison term totaling thirty-five years to life. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding (1) a comment made by the district court undermining the presumption of innocence constituted judicial misconduct; (2) a juror committed misconduct by goggling the term "common sense," and prejudice resulted; (3) certain statements made by the prosecutor during the State's closing argument constituted misconduct; and (4) cumulative error warranted reversal. View "Gunera-Pastrana v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion for a new trial based on new DNA test results, holding that, consistent with Sunburn v. State, 812 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1991), new DNA test results are "favorable" under Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.09187(1) where they would make a different result reasonably probable upon retrial.Under section 176.09187(1), a party may move for a new trial at any time where DNA test results are "favorable" to the moving party. In 2001, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and two counts of robbery. Although substantial circumstantial and physical evidence linked Defendant with the killings, no physical evidence connected Defendant to the locations where the bodies were found. In 2018 and 2019, DNA testing excluded Defendant from several pieces of evidence and discovered other DNA profiles on some of that evidence. Based on these DNA results, Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the new results exculpated him and implicated an unknown person in the crimes. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the standard articulated today, the new DNA evidence did not make a different outcome reasonably probable and was not "favorable" to the defense as necessary to warrant a new trial. View "State v. Seka" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for fourth-degree arson, holding that although the district court clearly erred in rejecting Defendant's Batson objection to the State's use of a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective alternate juror based on gender, the error was harmless.Defendant was convicted of fourth-degree arson. At issue on appeal was whether a discriminatory peremptory challenge used to remove a prospective alternate juror constituted structural error requiring reversal if no alternate deliberated with the jury. The Supreme Court held (1) there were compelling reasons to apply harmless-error review under these circumstances; and (2) the district court's error in rejecting Defendant's Batson objection to the prospective alternative juror based on gender, but the error was harmless because no alternate deliberated with the jury. View "Dixon v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellant's petition to seal criminal records, holding that the district court misapplied the relevant statutes.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty to a felony sexual offense that falls under a category for which criminal records are not subject to sealing. After successfully completing probation, Appellant withdrew his guilty plea and instead entered a guilty plea to unlawful contact with a child, a gross misdemeanor. Appellant subsequently filed this petition to seal his criminal records. The district court denied the petition, concluding that both the crime Appellant initially pleaded guilty to and the later pleaded crime were not subject to sealing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a withdrawn guilty plea cannot justify the denial of a petition to seal criminal records after a subsequent guilty plea; (2) gross misdemeanor unlawful contact with a child is not a crime for which record sealing is precluded under Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.245(6); and (3) Appellant was entitled to the presumption in favor of sealing criminal records under Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.2445(1). View "Tiffee v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law