Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a Megan's Law registrant, R.S., who was convicted of sexually molesting his granddaughter. R.S. was sentenced to four years at the Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center at Avenel (Avenel) after a psychological examination concluded that his criminal sexual behavior was performed compulsively. In 2022, the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office sought to classify R.S. as a Tier Two offender (moderate risk of reoffense) and sought community notification with additional internet publication. R.S. challenged this proposal, arguing that he was never found to have engaged in “repetitive and compulsive” behavior by clear and convincing evidence as required for inclusion on the internet registry.The Megan’s Law judge ordered Tier Two community notification, including internet publication, stating that R.S. would not have been eligible to serve his sentence at Avenel if he was not found to be repetitive and compulsive. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, determining that the Megan’s Law judge correctly found, based on clear and convincing evidence, that R.S.’s conduct was compulsive and repetitive.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(b)(2), a Megan’s Law registrant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if the registrant demonstrates that there exists a genuine issue of material fact about whether the registrant’s conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior. The State may rely on an earlier psychological report that had been prepared pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3, but the independent findings by a Megan’s Law judge as to compulsivity and repetitiveness must be based on clear and convincing evidence. The judgment of the Appellate Division was vacated as to the single issue before the Court and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Registrant R.S." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Andrew Higginbotham, who was charged with sixteen counts of endangering the welfare of a child under a specific subsection of New Jersey law. This law makes it a crime to depict a child in a sexually suggestive manner for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification, where the depiction lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The charges arose from photographs Higginbotham had distributed of a five-year-old girl, over which he superimposed sexually explicit, obscene text. Higginbotham moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the law was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.The trial court denied Higginbotham's motion, but the Appellate Division reversed the decision, holding that the definitions of "portray a child in a sexually suggestive manner" were unconstitutionally overbroad because they criminalized images that were neither child pornography nor obscenity. The case was then brought to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the specific subsection of the law under which Higginbotham was charged was unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalized a large amount of material that was neither obscenity nor child pornography. The court did not reach a decision on whether the law was also unconstitutionally vague. The court did not comment on the validity of other subsections of the law, as Higginbotham was not charged under those subsections and did not challenge them. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision as modified and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "State of New Jersey v. Higginbotham" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Kalil Cooper, who was charged with promoting organized street crime, among other offenses, after a wiretap investigation into a local gang's activities. He was charged with twelve separate counts, including two counts of racketeering and conspiracy to commit racketeering, and one count of promoting organized street crime. The promoting count charged that Cooper "purposefully conspire[d] with others... to commit a continuing series of crimes which constitute a pattern of racketeering activity." However, Cooper objected to this count, arguing that the "pattern of racketeering activity" was not a predicate offense under the promoting statute.The trial court agreed with Cooper's argument but instead of striking the charge, it amended the indictment to incorporate other offenses relevant to the racketeering charge as predicate offenses to the promoting charge. The jury found Cooper guilty of four counts, including the promoting charge, with conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) found as the predicate offense for promoting.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that conspiracy to distribute CDS is not a listed predicate offense under the promoting statute, and as such, Cooper's conviction for a crime that does not exist must be vacated. The court reasoned that the jury instruction in this case erroneously departed from the list of permissible predicate offenses in the promoting statute, leading the jury to convict Cooper for a crime that does not exist. This was deemed a manifest injustice. Hence, the court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and vacated the jury's verdict on the promoting count without a remand. View "State v. Cooper" on Justia Law

In this case, an eight-year-old child disclosed during an interview with a detective in 2016 that her music teacher, defendant Donnie E. Harrell, had touched her inappropriately on multiple occasions during school hours. In 2019, a grand jury indicted Harrell on charges of sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child, with additional official misconduct charges added in a superseding indictment later that year. In 2021, the trial court approved the admission of the child's entire recorded statement under the "tender years" hearsay exception. However, while preparing for trial in 2022, the child could not recall most of the events she had originally reported.The trial court decided to limit her trial testimony to the one incident she recalled, ruling that her lack of memory rendered her unavailable for cross-examination on the incidents she could not recall, which would violate the defendant's right of confrontation. The Appellate Division reversed this decision, stating that the defendant's right of confrontation was not dependent on the child's ability to recall the details, but on the defendant's opportunity to probe her lack of recollection on cross-examination.The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division, holding that the admission of the child's entire video-recorded statement does not violate the Confrontation Clause as long as the child testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination, even if she doesn't recall all the details. The court also emphasized that it is essential for the State to act expeditiously in investigating and prosecuting matters that rely heavily on a young child's ability to recall events, to avoid memory decay over time. View "State v. Harrell" on Justia Law

In 2017, defendant Shlawrence Ross was indicted for attempted murder and other offenses following an alleged exchange of gunfire with police officers. During the incident, he was wounded and a bullet lodged in his abdomen. In 2022, on advice of his counsel, he underwent elective surgery to remove the bullet. The state applied for a search warrant to obtain the removed bullet from the hospital and sought all medical records regarding the defendant’s treatment. The trial court denied the applications, reasoning that the bullet was shielded from the State’s access as it resulted from defence counsel’s “conscious litigation choice”. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision, stating that the Fourth Amendment, concerning search and seizure, rather than the Sixth Amendment and reciprocal discovery rules, was the appropriate legal framework.The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment. It held that the proper analysis for determining whether the State can obtain this physical evidence rests within the principles of search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Amendment would preclude issuing a valid search warrant for the bullet in this case, and the trial court should have determined whether there exists probable cause on which to issue such a warrant. The case was remanded back to the trial court for a determination of probable cause. View "State v. Ross" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in its decision, examined whether the State can obtain from defense counsel an affidavit that is physical evidence of a crime, under New Jersey discovery rules. The case revolves around a murder where two witnesses identified the defendant, Isaiah J. Knight, as the shooter. Later, one of the witnesses was allegedly kidnapped and forced to write an affidavit recanting his original statement. The prosecution believed the defendant's alleged co-conspirators gave this affidavit to the defense counsel. The State filed a motion to compel discovery of this document, which was granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Appellate Division.The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the sought-after affidavit is physical evidence of the crimes of witness tampering and kidnapping for which the defendant and others have been charged. Therefore, it is subject to reciprocal discovery under Rule 3:3-13(b)(2)(B) and (D). The Court reasoned that the affidavit, allegedly the outcome of a kidnapping and witness intimidation plot, is not the product of the defense investigation or attorney work product and hence does not fall within the exception to the discovery obligations. The Court found that compelling defense counsel to turn over an item in his possession that is physical evidence of a crime does not trigger the same Sixth Amendment concerns. The Court also rejected the defendant's argument that compelling the discovery of this affidavit violates his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. View "State v. Knight" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that the State's witness tampering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a), is not unconstitutionally overbroad, but it may have been unconstitutionally applied to the defendant, William Hill, in this case. Hill was initially convicted of first-degree carjacking and third-degree witness tampering. While detained awaiting trial, Hill sent a letter to the carjacking victim, A.Z., asserting his innocence and asking her to reconsider her identification of him as the perpetrator. A.Z. reported the letter to the police, resulting in a charge of witness tampering. The court concluded that Hill's letter did not explicitly ask A.Z. to testify falsely or withhold testimony, leading the Supreme Court of New Jersey to rule that it may have been unconstitutionally applied in Hill's case. The court vacated Hill's witness tampering conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on that charge, but did not vacate his carjacking conviction. View "State v. Hill" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant Curtis Gartrell fled from police near Newark Penn Station, leaving behind a suitcase containing handguns, ammunition, illegal narcotics, and cash. Gartrell was later apprehended and charged with possessory offenses and resisting arrest. He filed a motion to suppress evidence recovered from the warrantless search of the suitcase, arguing that he did not abandon the suitcase and therefore maintained standing to challenge the search. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that Gartrell's flight did not indicate an intention to abandon the suitcase. The State appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, holding that Gartrell had abandoned the suitcase.The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court applied the three-factor test from State v. Carvajal, which assesses (1) whether a person has control or dominion over the property, (2) whether the person knowingly and voluntarily relinquishes any possessory or ownership interest in the property, and (3) whether there are other apparent or known owners of the property. The court found that Gartrell's flight from police and deliberate abandonment of the suitcase in a public place indicated a clear intent to relinquish his possessory interest in the bag. Furthermore, there was no evidence of anyone else's interest in the suitcase, including the person Gartrell referred to as "Spoon," who remained unidentified. Therefore, the court concluded that Gartrell lacked standing to challenge the seizure and search of the suitcase. View "State v. Gartrell" on Justia Law

In the case State v. Calvin Fair, the Supreme Court of New Jersey had to decide whether a prosecution for terroristic threats under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), based on a mens rea of recklessness, is constitutional. The defendant, Calvin Fair, following a conflict with the police, had made threatening statements on Facebook, including knowledge of where the police officers lived and what cars they drove. He was charged under a statute which made it a crime to threaten to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.The court held that a mental state of recklessness is constitutionally sufficient for a “true threats” prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), as defined in this context as “morally culpable conduct, involving a ‘deliberate decision to endanger another.’” The state must also prove that a reasonable person similarly situated to the victim would have viewed the message as threatening violence. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanded the case for a new trial.The court also held that the jury must unanimously agree on whether the defendant violated N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), (b), or both. This was because the terroristic threats statute listed in the disjunctive two separately enumerated, alternative crimes of terroristic threats. View "State v. Fair" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered whether the safeguards relating to eyewitness identification evidence should apply when lawyers meet with witnesses to prepare for trial. The case involved Brandon Washington, who was charged with two counts of attempted murder after shooting two people at a "Ladies Night" event. During the initial investigation, several witnesses selected Washington's picture from a photo array. Later, during trial preparation, an assistant prosecutor showed some witnesses the same photo array they had seen before or a single photo of Washington from Facebook. The witnesses later identified Washington in court. One witness identified Washington for the first time at trial.The Supreme Court held that witnesses who have made a prior identification should not be shown photos of the defendant during trial preparation, neither new photos of the defendant for the first time nor, absent good reason, the same photos they previously reviewed. If a party can demonstrate a good reason to show witnesses a photo of the defendant they previously identified, the party must prepare and disclose a written record of what occurred. If, however, a witness has not previously identified a suspect, investigators can conduct an identification procedure during pretrial preparation in accordance with the principles set forth in State v. Henderson. In this case, the court remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a hearing under United States v. Wade to determine the admissibility of the identification evidence. View "State v. Washington" on Justia Law