Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jose Medina was tried and convicted for offenses related to a non-fatal slashing that occurred outside of a bar in the Township of Belleville, New Jersey. Although no physical evidence linked defendant to the crime, surveillance footage captured the incident, and the victim selected defendant’s picture from a photo array. A woman who witnessed the attack identified defendant as the attacker to police but was unwilling to give a formal statement or testify. At defendant’s trial, the prosecutor referenced the anonymous woman, after which an officer testified that, based on the “evidence . . . collected,” he included defendant’s picture in the photo array. Relying on New Jersey v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263 (1973), New Jersey v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427 (1989), and New Jersey v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338 (2005), the Appellate Division found that this testimony violated the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause by suggesting that the anonymous woman -- a non-testifying witness -- implicated defendant in the crime. Viewing the trial record in its entirety, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the officer’s testimony did not generate such an inference. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Appellate Division. View "New Jersey v. Medina" on Justia Law

The trial court excused and replaced a juror who had a preplanned vacation and who had been part of deliberations after the jury announced that they had reached a partial verdict. The judge did not have the jury return a partial verdict. Instead, the court excused the juror and reconstituted the jury with a replacement juror. The court denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial and defendant’s request to voir dire the jury to determine its ability to begin anew with the replacement juror. The jury reached a unanimous verdict three days later. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. The Supreme Court found that in light of the defendant facing charges of murder, attempted murder, and weapons possession offenses, "we cannot know whether the jury will 'start anew' with the entry of a substitute juror and discard their views simply because there is a new juror amongst them. Nor can we know if the new juror will exercise independence or simply go along with the opinions of the existing jurors. We cannot know or speculate whether the replacement juror was a 'full participant[] in the mutual exchange of ideas.' The safest and fairest course is to take a partial verdict, declare a mistrial, and constitute a new jury to hear the remaining counts." View "New Jersey v. Horton" on Justia Law

Defendant Rahsjahn Courtney agreed to a negotiated plea agreement with the State, in which he pled guilty to a first-degree possession of heroin and a distribution charge in exchange for a fourteen-year prison sentence with a sixty-three-month period of parole ineligibility. As a part of the plea agreement, the State agreed not to request a mandatory extended-term sentence for which defendant was eligible under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f). The State alerted the court and defendant that defendant qualified for a mandatory extended term, but it agreed to defense counsel’s offered sentence. Defendant entered a guilty plea under the terms of the negotiated plea agreement. The court imposed the agreed-upon sentence. Defense counsel and defendant both acknowledged their understanding of the terms of the guilty plea and raised no objections regarding defendant’s eligibility for an extended term; the plea form and supplemental plea form reflected that agreement. Defendant, defense counsel, and the prosecutor signed both forms. Despite acknowledging the plea agreement, defense counsel requested a reduced sentence. The sentencing judge denied the request. The Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting defendant’s argument that the sentencing court had discretion to lower his sentence because the State failed to file a formal application requesting the extended mandatory term. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, finding that N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 did not require a formal application when a prosecutor agrees not to request a mandatory extended-term sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) yet seeks the benefit of a Section 12 plea agreement. Given the importance of ensuring consistency and accuracy in sentencing, the Court provided guidance for future cases where the State agrees not to request an extended term but still seeks the benefit of a negotiated waiver of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987's mandatory sentencing requirements under Section 12. View "New Jersey v. Courtney" on Justia Law

The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant facing the same charges as a cooperating witness should have been barred from exploring that adverse witness’s sentencing exposure. Tiffany Taylor, Javon Clarke, and defendant Michael A. Jackson were apprehended and charged with participating in a burglary. Clarke accepted a cooperating plea offer in which he agreed to provide testimony inculpating defendant and Taylor in exchange for a three-year sentence. The trial judge urged modification of the plea agreement, suggesting Clarke’s sentencing exposure be lowered to 180 days in county jail, and probation. The new deal was accepted; Clarke testified that defendant and Taylor participated in the burglary. In an effort to demonstrate Clarke’s bias in favor of the prosecution, counsel for Jackson sought to elicit during cross-examination the sentencing range of three to five years’ imprisonment that Clarke would have faced had he not accepted a plea offer in exchange for agreeing to testify against defendant. The trial court barred defense counsel’s line of questioning regarding Clarke’s maximum sentencing exposure, explaining that such information could improperly prejudice the jury if they heard Clarke’s maximum sentencing exposure on the same crimes as defendant. The trial court permitted defense counsel to elicit testimony regarding only the initial plea offer of three years’ imprisonment and the final plea agreement, in which Clarke accepted 180 days’ imprisonment in county jail, plus probation.Under the circumstances here, the Supreme Court found defendant was deprived of his right to confrontation and denied a fair trial. Judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, and defendant's conviction was vacated. The matter was remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Office of the Public Defender and the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) applied directly to the New Jersey Supreme Court for relief relating to the spread of the novel coronavirus in state prison and juvenile facility settings. They essentially asked the Judiciary to order a framework for the early release of several groups. Under the proposed framework, judges or court-appointed special masters would decide whether to grant release or a furlough in individual cases. Two days after the Public Defender and ACLU wrote to the Court, the New Jersey Governor issued Executive Order 124 creating a mechanism to identify inmates in state prison to be considered for parole or a medical furlough. The Supreme Court determined Executive Order 124 created a sufficient expectation of eligibility for release through a furlough program to call for certain due process protections. Inmates may challenge the DOC’s action, a final agency decision, by seeking review before the Appellate Division. The agency’s decision is entitled to deference on appeal. Individual inmates may also seek relief independently under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2). They do not have to exhaust the remedies available under the Executive Order before they may file a motion in court. As to sentences imposed on juveniles who are in the custody of the Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC), those individuals may seek relief from the court on an individual basis. To the extent the opinion called for trial judges to rule on motions and the Appellate Division to review agency decisions, the Supreme Court exercised its supervisory authority to require that applications be heard and decided in a matter of days and urged the Commissioner and the Parole Board to act as expeditiously as possible. View "An Order to Show Cause to Address the Release of Certain Individuals Serving Sentences in State Prisons and Juvenile Facilities" on Justia Law

Defendant Isaiah Bell was arrested after James Kargbo died from stab wounds apparently inflicted during an altercation that occurred when defendant and his partner arrived at Kargbo’s house to pick up her son. A Somerset County prosecutor asked a grand jury to consider two charges against defendant: murder, a crime of the first degree, and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. The prosecutor explained the counts and elements of the offenses. A grand juror twice asked whether murder had different degrees, and the prosecutor explained that grand jurors do not determine degrees, only whether the facts presented “fit the elements of the crime.” After several witnesses testified and answered questions, the same grand juror asked, “is there such a thing as second-degree murder?” The prosecutor responded by discussing the grand jury’s responsibilities regarding “lesser included lower offenses,” and the elements of murder. The grand juror asked, “[T]here’s no part of the . . . statute that speaks to premeditation?” The prosecutor confirmed that there was not and read the model jury charge for murder. The grand jury indicted defendant on both counts. The issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether the prosecutor's failure to instruct the grand jury on lesser-included offense for murder in response to questions posed by the grand juror constituted an abuse of prosecutorial discretion that warranted dismissal of defendant's indictment for first-degree murder and weapons charges. The Supreme Court determined the prosecutor did not impermissibly interfere with the grand jury's investigative function. View "New Jersey v. Bell" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned consolidated putative class actions brought by plaintiffs whose vehicles were towed at the direction of local police and without plaintiffs’ consent. Each plaintiff was charged for the non-consensual tow by a privately owned towing company that had a contract with the respective local government to perform that towing service. Plaintiffs brought suit challenging those charges in three class actions with common legal claims. Plaintiffs alleged that the fees imposed by the private companies violated the New Jersey Predatory Towing Prevention Act (Towing Act), the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), and the New Jersey Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA). One class action was dismissed on summary judgment and the other was allowed to proceed only as an individual case. Plaintiffs appealed. The Appellate Division reversed in a consolidated opinion. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined 2018 legislation amending the Towing Act did not have retroactive effect, and agreed with the Appellate Division’s construction of the pre-2018 Act. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision as to exhaustion of administrative remedies, derivative immunity, and the remand as to the Towing Act and CFA claims, all substantially for the same reasons. Separately, the Supreme Court addressed whether plaintiffs could pursue claims under the TCCWNA and found they were unable to state a claim under that statute. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division on that issue but affirmed as to all others. View "Pisack v. BC Towing, Inc." on Justia Law

Police took a DNA sample from blue gloves discarded near the scene of a March 2015 burglary, and the sample was uploaded into CODIS. J.P. was later convicted of an unrelated felony, and a routine sample of his DNA was mailed to the Forensics Office. The Forensics Office confirmed a preliminary match between the DNA sample found on the blue gloves and J.P.’s routine offender sample. The notification requested that the local officials submit a follow-up sample to prove the match. As a result of that request, the State applied for J.P.’s investigative detention under Rule 3:5A-1 to obtain a new DNA sample. The court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the State had not shown that the physical characteristics sought could not otherwise practicably be obtained. At issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether, under Rule 3:5A-1 and Rule 3:5A-4(d), the State should have been permitted to obtain a follow-up buccal swab from J.P. so as to be able to prove in court a preliminary match between his DNA and a DNA specimen taken from the scene of the unsolved burglary. The Supreme Court held that in light of the federal and state requirements to obtain a follow-up sample, the State has shown that the physical characteristics sought in this case could not practicably be obtained by any means other than investigative detention pursuant to Rule 3:5A-1. The Court therefore reversed the Appellate Division. View "In the Matter of the Investigation of Burglary & Theft" on Justia Law

Defendant Roger Covil was convicted of first-degree possession with intent to distribute five ounces or more of cocaine. The Appellate Division reversed defendant’s conviction, and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted cross-petitions for certification filed by the State and defendant. This appeal presented two issues for the Supreme Court's review: (1) defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s admission of the opinions of the State’s drug expert witnesses; and (2) defendant’s argument that the trial court violated his constitutional rights and principles of fundamental fairness when it admitted into evidence a notice of motion for a writ of replevin and supporting certification that he served in a civil forfeiture action that had been stayed at his attorney’s request. Two years after defendant’s trial, the Court decided New Jersey v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410 (2016), and New Jersey v. Simms, 224 N.J. 393 (2016). Those decisions limited the State’s use of hypothetical questions in the presentation of drug expert testimony in criminal trials. Reversing defendant’s conviction in this case, the Appellate Division retroactively applied Cain and Simms, and held that the trial court committed error when it admitted the testimony of the State’s expert witnesses. The Supreme Court determined Cain and Sims were intended to apply prospectively to guide future trials, not retroactively conducted prior to those decisions. At the time of defendant’s trial, the governing law authorized the use of hypothetical questions such as the questions posed to the State’s experts in this case. And the Supreme Court concluded there was no error in the trial court’s admission of defendant’s notice of motion for a writ of replevin and certification. View "New Jersey v. Covil" on Justia Law

The victim and his friend “Craig” had previously purchased oxycodone from a supplier, “John.” On this occasion, John had no supplies, but referred the victim to defendant Earnest Williams. When Craig and the victim arrived at the appointed location, the victim took $900 in cash and followed defendant into the building. Craig heard gun shots and called the police, who found the victim dead from gunshots to his abdomen and to the back of his head, with $500 on his body. On the night of the shooting, defendant made a series of admissions to several of his cohorts: he never had any drugs to sell because his intent was to rob the victim; he carried the gun to the transaction; a scuffle ensued when he attempted to rob the victim; and he shot the victim in the leg, then in the head, took some of his money, and then ran. At issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether the trial court properly excluded evidence proffered by Williams at trial: he sought to buttress his defense with evidence of the victim’s prior, unrelated drug deal with another individual to establish the victim brought a handgun to the July 2012 transaction. The trial court precluded defendant from presenting such evidence. The jury ultimately convicted defendant of aggravated manslaughter and felony murder. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the trial court erred by not permitting defendant to present evidence of the victim’s prior drug purchase in a public place. Having remanded the case for a new trial, the Appellate Division did not address defendant’s sentencing issues. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division, finding defendant’s proffered evidence failed to meet the threshold requirement of admissibility: relevancy. View "New Jersey v. Williams" on Justia Law