Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Police detectives observed defendant DeShaun Wilson engage in the apparent sale of crack cocaine in a public park in Elizabeth. Wilson was charged with third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute, and second-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute in or within 500 feet of a public park. During trial, the State sought to admit into evidence three related documents: a map of the park with a legend noting that the map was certified in 1998 by a Union County Engineer ; an affidavit by an assistant Union County prosecutor stating that he had personally worked with the Engineer in contracting a third party to produce maps depicting each 500-foot zone within the county; and Resolution No. 1513-99, passed by the Union County Board of Chosen Freeholders, depicting the 500-foot areas for the purposed of introducing the map as evidence of the locations and boundaries of those areas within Union County in criminal prosecutions under N.J.S.A.2C:35-7.1. Wilson objected to the admission of the three documents, arguing that the map had not been properly authenticated and that the affidavit was inadmissible hearsay. Wilson emphasized that he never had an opportunity to cross-examine the Union County prosecutor. The trial court disagreed and admitted the documents into evidence. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, and the court declared a mistrial. When the State moved to enter the map at the retrial, defense counsel objected that the map was inadmissible. The trial court admitted all three documents into evidence. Wilson was convicted of all charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the map was nontestimonial and that its admission did not violate Wilson’s confrontation rights. The Supreme Court agreed that the map was nontestimonial and its admission therefore did not violate Wilson’s confrontation rights. Further, such maps are admissible, if properly authenticated and as public records. However, the Court found the map was not properly authenticated and the Supreme Court felt constrained to reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment that the map was properly admitted into evidence at trial. The matter was remanded for a new trial because defendant’s conviction depended on the map. View "New Jersey v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The defendants in these appeals committed very serious, violent crimes when they were juveniles. One was serving a sentence of 110 years imprisonment and would not be eligible for parole until he spent 55 years in jail. At that time, he would be about 72 years old. The second was serving a 75-year term and was ineligible for parole until he served 68 years and 3 months in jail. He would then be 85 years old. The United States Supreme Court recognized the mitigating qualities of youth and directed that judges in those cases consider a number of factors at sentencing, including immaturity and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; family and home environment; family and peer pressures; an inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors or the juvenile s own attorney; and the possibility of rehabilitation. The New Jersey Court found the same concerns applied to sentences that were the practical equivalent of life without parole, like the ones in these appeals. "The proper focus belongs on the amount of real time a juvenile will spend in jail and not on the formal label attached to his sentence. To satisfy the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 12 of the State Constitution, which both prohibit cruel and unusual punishment, we direct that defendants be resentenced and that the 'Miller' factors be addressed at that time. [. . .] In short, judges should exercise a heightened level of care before they impose multiple consecutive sentences on juveniles which would result in lengthy jail terms." Both cases were remanded for resentencing. View "New Jersey v. Zuber" on Justia Law

Defendant J.R. was convicted for several sexual offenses against his step-granddaughter, who was between ten and twelve years old when the alleged offenses took place. The child did not disclose defendant's conduct to any adult; she told only her brothers, one of whom revealed the allegations to their mother almost two years after the abuse began. At defendant’s trial, the State proffered the testimony of a Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) expert to opine that child victims of sexual offenses sometimes delay reporting sexual abuse and to explain other aspects of victims' behavior. The trial court denied defendant's motion to bar the testimony. Testifying as the State’s first witness, the expert properly refrained from discussing the specific victim in this case. She told the jury, however, that studies of confirmed child victims of sexual abuse have reported a broad array of behaviors, ranging from a cooperative demeanor and academic success to disruptive and sadistic conduct, including in that broad description behaviors exhibited by the alleged victim in this case. The expert also invoked a highly publicized child sexual abuse scandal in her testimony. Defendant testified on his own behalf. He was convicted of all charges. Defendant appealed his conviction, raising the CSAAS expert’s opinion as his primary issue on appeal. An Appellate Division panel reversed his conviction on the ground that the CSAAS expert exceeded the bounds of proper expert opinion on that subject. The panel remanded for a new trial. After its review, the Supreme Court concurred with the Appellate Division panel that the expert's testimony did not entirely conform to the limitations placed on CSAAS evidence in prior New Jersey Supreme Court holdings. However, the Court concluded that the error was harmless: "[v]iewed in the context of all of the trial evidence heard by the jury, the CSAAS expert's improper statements were not clearly capable of producing an unjust result and do not warrant a new trial." Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for the Appellate Division panel to consider issues raised by defendant that the panel did not reach. View "New Jersey v. J.R." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review was whether a trial court that found a defendant competent to stand trial on criminal charges could compel her to assert an insanity defense, based on the evidence presented, where she has refused to do so. Through persistent efforts over more than a decade, defendant June Gorthy attempted to commence a relationship with C.L., a mental health therapist residing in New Jersey whom she met only briefly in 1998 at a conference in California. Defendant would ultimately be charged under a superseding indictment with stalking and weapons offenses. After reviewing defendant's medical records and mental health evaluation, and questioning defendant, the trial court concluded that she was competent to stand trial. Defendant declined to raise the insanity defense, over the objection of her attorney. The trial court concluded that defendant's delusional condition had limited her ability to knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily determine whether to raise the defense, and then asserted the defense on her behalf on the stalking charge. Defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity on that charge, and convicted on the weapons charges. The court entered an order of civil commitment on the stalking charge, and probation on the weapons convictions. Defendant appealed her conviction, challenging the trial court's decision to assert the insanity defense on her behalf, and also raising several trial errors. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's judgment on the insanity defense, and remanded for a bifurcated hearing on the insanity defense and the substantive defenses. The Supreme Court summarily remanded for reconsideration as to the insanity defense in light of the Court's disapproval of bifurcated proceedings where an insanity defense was raised. On the remand, another panel of the Appellate Division, in a published opinion, affirmed the trial court's judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity on the stalking charge. The panel rejected defendant's contention that because she was found competent to stand trial, the court should have permitted her to decline to raise the insanity defense, holding that a defendant's determination not to raise a defense was subject to a higher standard than that set by the competency statute. The Supreme Court held that in light of the trial court's finding that defendant was competent to stand trial, and the court's detailed explanation of the potential benefits and risks of the insanity defense in a colloquy with defendant, the trial court should have permitted defendant to decide whether or not to assert the defense. "However unwise defendant's strategy may have been, it constituted a competent defendant's decision about the conduct of her defense." Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity on the stalking charge. The case was remanded for a new competency determination and, if appropriate, a new trial on that charge. Because defendant's delusion was unrelated to her conviction for the two weapons offenses, and the trial errors that she alleged did not deprive her of a fair trial, the Supreme Court affirmed her conviction for those offenses. View "New Jersey v. Gorthy" on Justia Law

What began as a fight between two students, C.W. and D.W., ended in the death of one of them. N.H., who was seventeen years old at the time, attended the fight to support his friend, D.W. N.H. allegedly grabbed a handgun from another individual and shot C.W. four times, including once in the back of the head. A video captured parts of the incident, and several witnesses made statements to the police that implicated N.H. N.H. also spoke to the police and said that he had shot only at the ground. At oral argument before the New Jersey Supreme Court, the State explained that it had not disclosed certain items in its possession which it did not intend to rely on at the waiver hearing. Those materials included additional witness statements, other police reports, and other videos of the event taken from different angles. N.H. moved for full discovery before the waiver hearing, and the trial court granted the request. The court analogized the filing of a juvenile complaint to the filing of a criminal indictment, which would trigger full discovery under Rule 3:13-3(b). The trial court stayed its order pending the outcome of the State's motion for leave to appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's order. The issue raised by the State's appeal in this matter was whether a juvenile was entitled to full discovery when the State sought to waive jurisdiction and transfer a case from juvenile to adult court. The Supreme Court held the State is indeed required to disclose all discovery in its possession when it seeks to waive jurisdiction and transfer a case from juvenile to adult court. View "New Jersey in the Interest of N.H." on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Cushing was indicted on five counts: first-degree maintaining a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) production facility (count one); second-degree possession of marijuana with intent to distribute ten or more but less than fifty marijuana plants (count two); second-degree possession of marijuana with intent to distribute within 500 feet of a public park (count three); third-degree possession of marijuana with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property (count four); and fourth-degree failure to notify law enforcement of a change of employment as required under Megan's Law (count five). Lisa Mylroie called police to have defendant removed from the home of her 85-year-old mother, Betty Cushing. Ms. Cushing was not at home when police answered the call and arrived at her home; Mylroie invited the responding officer inside, and led the officer to defendant's bedroom where the marijuana was. After seeing the bedroom, the responding officer called the station to obtain a search warrant. In executing the search warrant, police seized from defendant's bedroom sixteen marijuana plants, several five-gallon buckets used to hold the plants, ventilation units, and drug paraphernalia. Officers also seized a Ziploc bag of marijuana that was discovered in a backyard shed. After the trial court conducted a hearing and denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his bedroom in his grandmother's home where he resided, defendant negotiated a plea agreement. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to counts two through five in exchange for the dismissal of count one. The trial court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed on the issue of suppression. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification on the validity of the third-party consent to search. The State argued that Betty Cushing had actual authority to consent to the search of defendant's room, which flowed to Mylroie through her power of attorney. The State also contended that Mylroie had apparent authority as well, on which the police reasonably relied under the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed: the record contained "ample evidence" to support the Appellate Division's conclusion that Betty Cushing did not have actual authority to consent to the search of defendant's room, and Betty could not have conferred through any power of attorney an authority that she did not possess herself. In addition, it was not objectively reasonable for the responding officer to rely on an apparent authority by Mylroie as the basis for valid third-party consent to his initial search of defendant's bedroom. View "New Jersey v. Cushing" on Justia Law

The police arrested defendant Gary Lunsford after they executed a search warrant at his home based on suspected criminal activity involving transactions in controlled dangerous substances (CDS). As part of its continuing investigation, the Monmouth County Grand Jury issued a subpoena duces tecum to a wireless telephone service provider requesting subscriber information associated with defendant's cell phone number, which was the contact for the controlled drug buys that led to defendant's arrest. Defendant filed a motion to quash, which the trial court granted, stating that a communications data warrant (CDW - the equivalent of a search warrant), was needed to obtain telephone billing records. The Attorney General, who superseded the Monmouth County Prosecutor s Office to litigate the constitutional question raised by the trial court's decision, sought leave to appeal, which the Appellate Division denied. On appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Attorney General did not dispute that telephone billing records were entitled to protection under the State Constitution. He argued instead that a grand jury subpoena, based on a relevancy standard rather than probable cause, was sufficient to safeguard the privacy rights at stake here. "Using a cell phone to determine the location of its owner can be far more revealing than acquiring toll billing, bank, or Internet subscriber records. It is akin to using a tracking device and can function as a substitute for 24/7 surveillance without police having to confront the limits of their resources. It also involves a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not anticipate." Here, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of the motion to quash, noting that the State could apply for a court order to obtain defendant's cell phone records consistent with the Court's discussion of protected privacy interests in this opinion. View "New Jersey v. Lunsford" on Justia Law

Officer Cohen observed a vehicle approaching from about a quarter-mile away. The vehicle was traveling with its high beams on at a normal speed in a well-lit, residential area. The vehicle obeyed the stop sign at the intersection of New York Avenue and Adams Street. Using the strobe light attachment on his flashlight, Officer Cohen signaled to the driver to pull over. Officer Cohen intended to educate the driver on the proper use of high beams. As Officer Cohen approached the driver's side of the vehicle, and instead of a warning to turn off her high beams, instructed her to produce her license, registration, and insurance cards. With the driver's-side window down, Officer Cohen could smell burnt marijuana. He then walked around the vehicle, asked defendant, the front passenger, to roll down the window, and detected a stronger odor of burnt marijuana. Officer Cohen asked defendant and the rear passenger whether they had any controlled dangerous substance on them, and both replied, No. While engaged in this exchange, Officer Cohen noticed inside the vehicle a hollowed-out cigar, which, from his experience and training, he knew was used as a receptacle for marijuana. Based on this observation, Officer Cohen told defendant to step out of the car. In response, defendant indicated that he had a gun under his jacket. The officer ordered defendant to keep his hands up while he retrieved the weapon. Defendant was placed under arrest, and the driver was later issued a ticket for a violation of the high-beam statute. Defendant was later charged with unlawful possession of a .40 caliber handgun, receiving stolen property (the handgun), possession of hollow-nose bullets, and possession of a large-capacity magazine. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the handgun, the bullets, and the magazine on the ground that the police did not have a constitutionally permissible basis for stopping the car in which he was a passenger. The court granted the motion, observing that the high-beam statute presupposed that the offending driver's high beams were on when his vehicle approaches an oncoming vehicle. Here, Officer Cohen testified that he did not observe any other vehicle traveling in the opposite direction toward defendant's vehicle. The court also concluded that the stop could not be justified based on the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the State appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed both the trial court's and Appellate Division's judgments. View "New Jersey v. Scriven" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Stein was charged with DWI and careless driving after a motor vehicle accident in Wayne Township. The municipal court found defendant guilty of DWI and careless driving. The court based its DWI finding on breathalyzer readings and the arresting officers' observations of defendant at the time of his traffic stop. The court sentenced defendant, as a third-time DWI offender, to incarceration for a term of 180 days in the county jail and loss of his license for a period of ten years. After a trial de novo on the record, the Law Division also convicted defendant of DWI and careless driving, based on the breathalyzer readings and, separately, on observational evidence. The court imposed the same sentence as did the municipal court. Additionally, the Law Division ruled that the municipal prosecutor was not required to provide discovery of the names of the neighboring police officers or the videotapes that defendant requested. The Appellate Division affirmed. Defendant appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. In accordance with Rule 7:7-7(b), the municipal prosecutor was required to provide defendant with the names of the police officers from the adjacent jurisdiction who were present at the DWI accident scene. Defendant, however, did not seek relief from the court pursuant to Rule 7:7-7(j). Here, the discovery issue was never truly placed before the municipal court. The court could not grant relief on an issue of which it was unaware. Defendant could not raise the purported discovery violation for the first time on appeal and therefore the issue was waived. Furthermore, the Court held that pursuant to Rule 7:7-7(b), the municipal prosecutor was required to provide the requested videotapes that may have recorded defendant's appearance, behavior, and motor skills. Such information, if available, was clearly relevant to a DWI defense. The Court could not determine from the record whether any such videotape ever existed or existed at the time of defendant's discovery request. Therefore, the case was remanded to the Law Division to conduct a hearing to address that issue. View "New Jersey v. Stein" on Justia Law

Defendant Stephen Scharf was convicted of first-degree purposeful and knowing murder of his wife Jody, who fell to her death off a cliff at the Palisades. Defendant defended the charge by claiming the death was an accident. At trial, the court allowed the State to present, in rebuttal to the defense of accident, hearsay statements, under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3) and (c)(4), from Jody s friends and her therapist. The witnesses claimed that Jody repeatedly told them of her fear of defendant, particularly after she had served him with a divorce complaint, and told them that she had declined defendant's request to go to the Palisades cliffs with him shortly before her death. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction, concluding that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statements. The State appealed, raising the issue of whether the trial court erred in admitting the statements, and if the evidence was admissible, whether the evidence, cumulatively, constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion that caused defendant's trial to be unjust. Finding that the Appellate Division erred in reversing the trial court's judgment of conviction, the Supreme Court reversed, and the matter remanded for consideration of defendant's unaddressed appellate arguments. View "New Jersey v. Scharf" on Justia Law