Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

An Ohio State Highway Patrol trooper, C.G., was directing traffic at an intersection where the traffic light was out, wearing a reflective vest and visible during daylight hours. Edward Balmert, while driving, struck C.G. as she was directing traffic, causing her serious injuries. At the scene, Balmert provided a urine sample, which showed marijuana metabolite levels far exceeding the legal limit. Balmert admitted regular use of hemp products, including that morning, and failed field sobriety tests administered by certified drug-recognition experts.The case proceeded as a bench trial in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. Balmert was charged with four counts, including aggravated vehicular assault and operating a vehicle with a prohibited concentration of marijuana metabolites. The trial court denied his motion for acquittal and found him guilty of aggravated vehicular assault and operating with a prohibited metabolite concentration but acquitted him on other charges. He was sentenced to prison. On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the aggravated vehicular assault conviction, holding that sufficient evidence supported the finding of proximate causation between Balmert’s violation and C.G.’s injuries.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether proximate cause is a separate required element in aggravated vehicular assault cases based on driving with a prohibited concentration of marijuana metabolites, and whether the evidence supported such a finding here. The court held that proximate cause is a distinct element that must be proven beyond a mere violation of the statute. Here, the evidence—viewed favorably to the prosecution—showed that causing injury was a foreseeable consequence of driving with excessive marijuana metabolites. Thus, the court affirmed the conviction and the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals. The appellant’s other propositions of law were dismissed as improvidently accepted. View "State v. Balmert" on Justia Law

A man was involved in an altercation in a McDonald’s parking lot, during which he struck and shot another individual. Surveillance footage captured the incident, and the state charged him with two counts of felonious assault, each carrying firearm specifications. Prior to trial, his attorney requested a jury instruction on self-defense. The trial judge, after viewing the video, indicated skepticism about granting the instruction, telling the defendant that he likely would not qualify for a self-defense instruction because the evidence suggested he may have initiated the altercation. The defendant expressed concern that without the instruction, a fair trial would not be possible, but the judge repeatedly allowed him opportunities to consult with counsel and emphasized that the decision to plead guilty was his alone.Subsequently, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to a reduced charge of aggravated assault with a firearm specification, in exchange for dismissal of the second count and a recommended aggregate sentence of four years. During the plea colloquy, the defendant again voiced his desire for the self-defense instruction and his sense of being “put in a box,” but ultimately confirmed to the court that his plea was voluntary.The First District Court of Appeals reviewed the case after the defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court’s misstatements regarding Ohio’s self-defense statute and its premature indication it would not give the self-defense instruction rendered his plea involuntary and unknowing. The appellate court held that these errors did not invalidate an otherwise valid plea.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed, holding that when a trial court complies with Ohio Criminal Rule 11 requirements, even erroneous legal statements or pretrial rulings on ancillary matters do not render a guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary. The court found no violation of Rule 11 and thus upheld the conviction. View "State v. Gowdy" on Justia Law

After a shooting incident outside a restaurant in 2003, the defendant was convicted by a jury of felonious assault, attempted murder, and related firearm offenses, as well as having weapons while under disability. The prosecution presented eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant as the shooter. The defense suggested that another individual, who was at the scene and arrested shortly after the shooting, was the actual perpetrator. The defendant was found guilty on all counts and received consecutive prison sentences.The defendant’s convictions were affirmed by the Eighth District Court of Appeals, although the case was remanded for resentencing due to the trial court’s failure to state facts supporting the consecutive sentences. Nearly two decades later, the defendant discovered a previously undisclosed police report indicating that the victim initially identified the other individual as the shooter. The defendant filed for leave to move for a new trial based on this newly discovered evidence. The trial court granted leave, but ultimately denied the motion for a new trial without holding an oral hearing. The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion without an oral hearing.The Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether a trial court must conduct an oral hearing on a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence under Crim.R. 33(A)(6). The court held that while an evidentiary hearing is required—meaning the court must consider affidavits or sworn statements—there is no requirement that this hearing be oral. The decision to hold an oral hearing is left to the trial court’s discretion. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. View "State v. Bostick" on Justia Law

Elwood Jones was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of the aggravated felony murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery of Rhoda Nathan, and sentenced to death. At trial, evidence included the discovery of a pendant similar to Nathan’s in Jones’s vehicle and a hand injury Jones sustained on the day of the murder, which became infected with a bacteria consistent with a fist-to-mouth injury. Nathan’s tooth had been knocked out during the assault. Jones’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal and postconviction relief was denied, including claims that the State suppressed material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. Subsequent efforts for federal habeas corpus relief were also unsuccessful.In 2019, Jones moved for a new trial, citing newly discovered evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. The trial court granted him leave and, after an evidentiary hearing, concluded that the State had suppressed material evidence about an alternate suspect and about the uniqueness of Nathan’s pendant. The court also found newly discovered scientific evidence warranted a new trial. The State sought leave to appeal this decision to the First District Court of Appeals, challenging only the Brady violation findings. The appellate court denied leave, reasoning that because the State did not challenge the independent ground of newly discovered scientific evidence, any appeal would be futile.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to determine whether the appellate court applied the correct legal standard in ruling on the State’s motion for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court erred by failing to determine whether the State had shown a high enough probability of trial-court error to warrant a discretionary appeal, as required by App.R. 5(C). The judgment denying leave to appeal was reversed, and the case was remanded for the appellate court to apply the proper standard. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

A woman was killed in her Cincinnati apartment on July 31, 2019, after returning home with groceries and a purse. She was attacked in the entryway and strangled with her purse strap. Later that day, her son was stopped by law enforcement in Indiana while driving her car and found in possession of her wallet, which contained her identification, credit cards, and a recent grocery receipt. The son had left his aunt’s home in Georgia days earlier without permission, taking her car, which was later found near the victim’s apartment. Evidence showed the son had traveled from Georgia to Ohio, and surveillance footage placed him near the victim’s home the night before the murder. The victim had been trying to locate her son, believing he was still in Georgia.The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas convicted the son of two counts of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, tampering with evidence, and receiving stolen property. The trial court suppressed some of the son’s custodial statements but admitted others, as well as testimony about his prior acts. The First District Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred by admitting certain custodial statements and other-acts evidence, and held these errors were not harmless. It reversed the convictions for aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and tampering with evidence, finding insufficient evidence for tampering and barring retrial on that count, but allowed retrial on the other charges.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that, even after removing the erroneously admitted evidence, the remaining evidence overwhelmingly established the son’s guilt for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found the trial court’s errors harmless and reversed the appellate court’s judgment, reinstating the convictions for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery. The court also concluded that the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. View "State v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, on two counts of rape and one count of sexual battery involving a coworker. After a night out, the alleged victim claimed that she awoke in the defendant’s home to find him having intercourse with her. At trial, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state had failed to prove the offenses occurred in Cuyahoga County, thus failing to establish venue. The trial court granted the motion based on insufficient evidence of venue and entered a judgment of acquittal.The State of Ohio appealed the trial court’s decision to the Eighth District Court of Appeals both as of right and by seeking leave to appeal. The defendant argued that, under the Supreme Court of Ohio’s prior decision in State v. Hampton, the state could not appeal a judgment of acquittal based on lack of venue. The Eighth District dismissed both appeals in brief entries, relying on Hampton.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and overruled its prior decision in State v. Hampton. The court held that venue is not an element of a criminal offense, and a judgment terminating a prosecution based on insufficient evidence of venue is not a judgment of acquittal but rather a dismissal of the indictment, complaint, or information. Therefore, under R.C. 2945.67(A), the state has a right to appeal such a dismissal as of right. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Eighth District’s judgment dismissing the state’s appeal as of right and remanded the case for further consideration. The court affirmed the dismissal of the state’s discretionary appeal as unnecessary. View "State v. Musarra" on Justia Law

A prisoner who was serving a sentence for multiple felony offenses believed that the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction had miscalculated the length of his prison term. Initially, the department determined his sentence to be 11 years, but before his anticipated release, it recalculated the sentence as 13 years. After his original release date passed, the prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that his maximum sentence had expired and he was being unlawfully held. The trial court found the sentencing entry ambiguous regarding the sentence length, resolved the ambiguity in the prisoner’s favor, and ordered his immediate release.The warden requested a stay of the trial court’s order, which was denied. The warden then appealed to the Ninth District Court of Appeals and again sought a stay, but the appellate court denied the request due to a procedural deficiency. Without addressing the merits of the appeal, the Ninth District dismissed the case as moot, reasoning that the prisoner’s release and the warden’s failure to secure a stay rendered the appeal moot.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to determine whether the prisoner’s release rendered the warden’s appeal moot. The court held that the appeal was not moot because, if the warden prevailed, the prisoner could be returned to custody to serve the remainder of his sentence. The court explained that an actual controversy remained, as effective relief could still be granted. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of the warden’s appeal. View "Maurent v. Spatny" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted by a jury of multiple sexual offenses, including rape, against his young daughter. The central issue on appeal relates to the jury selection process, specifically whether the defendant’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to challenge a particular juror, referred to as Juror McCarthy, for cause. During voir dire, Juror McCarthy expressed some initial uncertainty about his ability to be impartial in a case involving a child witness and indicated discomfort with the presumption of innocence, but also participated in group responses affirming his willingness to be fair and follow the law.After conviction, the defendant appealed to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, arguing that his counsel’s failure to challenge Juror McCarthy deprived him of a fair trial. The appellate court reviewed the voir dire transcript and concluded that Juror McCarthy’s statements reflected an internal struggle common to many jurors faced with difficult subject matter, rather than actual bias against the defendant. The court also noted that Juror McCarthy, through group responses and direct questioning, indicated he could be fair and impartial. The appellate court therefore rejected the ineffective assistance claim and affirmed the convictions.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case, focusing on whether a reviewing court may consider group answers during voir dire when determining actual juror bias, and whether a juror who expresses partiality can be rehabilitated through such group responses. The court held that, in assessing actual bias, the entire voir dire record—including group answers—must be considered. The court found that the defendant failed to demonstrate that Juror McCarthy was actually biased, and thus did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was charged with multiple counts of rape and gross sexual imposition involving a minor. He pleaded guilty to several counts, after which his defense counsel withdrew and new counsel was appointed. Despite being represented, the defendant filed several motions on his own, including a motion to withdraw his pleas and a motion to represent himself. The trial court allowed him to represent himself but denied his motion to withdraw his pleas. Before sentencing, he requested and was granted new counsel, and was ultimately sentenced to concurrent prison terms.The defendant appealed to the Ninth District Court of Appeals, arguing, among other things, that the trial court failed to obtain a proper waiver of counsel. The appellate court agreed, finding that the trial court erred in accepting the waiver and failed to comply with procedural requirements, so it reversed and remanded. On remand, the trial court determined that the guilty pleas remained valid and resentenced the defendant. The defendant appealed again, but the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. He then filed an application to reopen his appeal under Ohio Appellate Rule 26(B), claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Ninth District granted the application but later confirmed its prior judgment, finding that the defendant had not adequately addressed how his prior appellate counsel was deficient or how he was prejudiced by that deficiency.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether an appellate court may presume ineffective assistance of counsel in a reopened appeal when the appellant fails to specifically argue counsel’s deficiency and resulting prejudice, as required by App.R. 26(B)(7). The court held that the requirements of App.R. 26(B)(7) are mandatory: an appellant must address both the deficiency of prior appellate counsel and the resulting prejudice in their brief. Because the defendant failed to do so, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

A city filed a criminal complaint against a property owner, alleging that his property was in violation of certain provisions of the International Property Maintenance Code (IPMC), which the city had adopted by ordinance. The complaint stated that the property’s residence lacked water service, had holes in the roof, and that a break wall was collapsing into a river. It also alleged the presence of various items described as “debris,” such as barrels, lawn mowers, boats, trailers, propane tanks, and overgrown vegetation. The city claimed these conditions violated IPMC sections requiring properties to be maintained in a “clean,” “safe,” and “sanitary” condition.The property owner moved to dismiss the charges in the Huron Municipal Court, arguing that the IPMC provisions were unconstitutionally vague because the terms “clean,” “safe,” and “sanitary” were undefined. The trial court agreed, relying on a prior decision from the Seventh District Court of Appeals, State v. ACV Realty, which had found similar IPMC language void for vagueness. As a result, the trial court dismissed the relevant counts. The city appealed, and the Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the terms in question should be given their ordinary meanings and were sufficiently clear to inform property owners of the prohibited conduct.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to resolve a conflict between appellate districts. The court held that a defendant cannot successfully challenge a law as void for vagueness if his conduct clearly falls within the activities the law prohibits. Because the alleged conditions of the property—such as lack of water, structural decay, and accumulation of debris—clearly violated the IPMC provisions, the property owner’s vagueness challenge failed. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s judgment and remanded the case to the municipal court for further proceedings. View "Huron v. Kisil" on Justia Law