Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A husband and wife met at a religious conference, began a relationship, and married after the wife made clear she would not have sex before marriage. After moving to Ohio, the husband began demanding sex more frequently than the wife desired, insisting she submit regardless of her wishes. The wife described a recurring pattern during their marriage in which “date nights” would end with consensual sex, followed by the husband engaging in nonconsensual vaginal intercourse or oral sex while she was asleep or otherwise unwilling. This pattern continued for several years, leading to the wife’s departure, her obtaining a protection order, and the husband’s indictment on three counts of rape, each tied to specific time periods.The case was tried before a jury in the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, which convicted the husband on all three counts. On appeal, the Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and vacated them, finding the evidence insufficient to prove “sexual conduct” as defined by Ohio law for the charged periods. The appellate court reasoned that while the wife’s testimony about “date nights” included explicit descriptions of penetration, her testimony regarding the specific periods in the indictment did not explicitly describe penetration, and the use of phrases like “have sex” was deemed too vague to establish the statutory element.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the wife’s testimony, including her explicit descriptions of vaginal intercourse and her use of the phrase “have sex,” was sufficient to support the element of “sexual conduct” under Ohio’s rape statute when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The court concluded that the appellate court erred by refusing to draw reasonable inferences in favor of the State and reversed the judgment, remanding the case for consideration of the husband’s remaining appellate arguments. View "State v. Coker" on Justia Law

Aarin Clinkscale was indicted in 2014 for his involvement in an armed robbery that resulted in two deaths. He pled guilty to aggravated robbery with a firearm specification and two counts of involuntary manslaughter. In 2016, the trial court sentenced him to a total of 14 years in prison, including a mandatory three-year term for the firearm specification. Clinkscale received 762 days of jail-time credit for time served prior to sentencing.Clinkscale filed his first motion for judicial release in June 2020, which the trial court denied, stating he would be eligible for release in October 2022. He filed a second motion for judicial release in October 2022. The State objected, arguing that Clinkscale was not eligible until November 2024, as he needed to serve the mandatory term and then wait five years. The trial court granted Clinkscale’s motion, and the State appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that Clinkscale’s jail-time credit shortened the waiting period for judicial release.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and disagreed with the Tenth District’s conclusion. The court held that jail-time credit does not reduce the required five-year waiting period following the expiration of mandatory prison terms under R.C. 2929.20(C)(1)(d). The court emphasized that the five-year waiting period is fixed and begins only after the mandatory term is completed. Consequently, Clinkscale’s motion for judicial release was premature. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of Clinkscale’s equal-protection argument. View "State v. Clinkscale" on Justia Law

Ricardo Dodson is serving prison sentences for convictions in two separate cases. In the first case, Dodson was indicted on multiple counts of rape, attempted rape, and kidnapping. The jury returned guilty verdicts, but the jury-verdict forms mistakenly listed his surname as Jackson instead of Dodson. The trial-court judge read the wrong name into the record and sentenced Dodson to consecutive prison terms for each count. In the second case, Dodson was indicted on another count of rape and kidnapping. He was found guilty and sentenced to serve this sentence consecutively to the sentences from the first case, even though he had not yet started serving those sentences.Dodson petitioned the Seventh District Court of Appeals for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the mistyping of his surname on the jury-verdict forms stripped the trial court of jurisdiction and that the sentences imposed were ambiguous. He claimed that the sentence in the first case should be considered concurrent due to the lack of specificity in the sentencing entry and that the sentence in the second case was ambiguous because it referred to a sentence "already being served" when he had not yet started serving the first sentence.The Seventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Dodson’s petition, determining that his claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus. The court found that the alleged errors did not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction and that Dodson had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law through direct appeal. Dodson appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Seventh District’s judgment, holding that the trial court had jurisdiction over Dodson’s case and that the sentencing entries were not ambiguous. The court concluded that Dodson’s arguments could have been addressed through direct appeal and did not warrant habeas corpus relief. View "State ex rel. Dodson v. Smith" on Justia Law

Jadyn Logan was convicted of aggravated robbery in January 2018, a first-degree felony that prohibited her from possessing a firearm under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). Later, a Cuyahoga County grand jury indicted her for having weapons while under a disability, improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, and carrying a concealed weapon. Logan pleaded guilty to attempting to have weapons while under a disability with a one-year firearm specification, and the other charges were dismissed. The trial court sentenced her to one year for the firearm specification and two years of community control for the attempt offense.The State appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, arguing that R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) required a prison term for the attempt offense. The Eighth District affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the statute required a prison sentence only for the firearm specification, not the underlying felony offense. The State sought en banc consideration, which was denied, and the Eighth District maintained its position.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) mandates a prison sentence for any felony offense with a corresponding firearm specification. The court clarified that a firearm specification is a sentencing enhancement, not a separate offense, and that the statute's language requires a prison term for the underlying felony offense when a firearm specification is attached. The court reversed the Eighth District's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this interpretation. View "State v. Logan" on Justia Law

James P. Ellis, an inmate at Marion Correctional Institution, has been incarcerated since his 1995 convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated murder. He contends that the Ohio Adult Parole Authority unlawfully corrected an error in his sentencing entry and has been using this correction in his parole hearings. Ellis sought a writ of prohibition from the Tenth District Court of Appeals to prevent the parole authority from conducting future parole screenings and to compel it to contact the sentencing court for corrective procedures.The Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissed Ellis's complaint. The court reasoned that Ellis did not sufficiently demonstrate that the parole authority lacked jurisdiction or relied on erroneous information. Additionally, the court noted that compelling the parole authority to contact a court is beyond the scope of relief provided by a writ of prohibition.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Tenth District's dismissal. The court held that the parole authority has jurisdiction to hold parole proceedings for all parole-eligible inmates, including Ellis. The court found that Ellis's parole eligibility is determined by statute, and the parole authority's actions were authorized by law. Consequently, Ellis failed to prove the elements required for a writ of prohibition. The court also noted that Ellis's request to compel the parole authority to contact the sentencing court was not appropriate for a writ of prohibition, which is typically used to prevent unauthorized actions rather than to compel specific actions. View "State ex rel. Ellis v. Adult Parole Auth." on Justia Law

Niquan M. Dunn was indicted on six counts in the Geauga County Common Pleas Court, including drug-related crimes and possession of criminal tools. Counts 2 and 4, relevant to this appeal, charged Dunn with aggravated trafficking in drugs and trafficking in cocaine, respectively, with enhancements for committing the crimes "in the vicinity of a juvenile." The case proceeded to trial, where the State presented evidence including testimony from detectives and a controlled buy operation. Drugs and drug paraphernalia were found in a house where Dunn was staying, and a four-month-old child was present in the home.The trial court denied Dunn's motion for acquittal on Counts 1 through 5 and the jury found him guilty on those counts. Dunn was sentenced to a total of 36 months in prison. On appeal, the Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed the convictions in part, finding insufficient evidence that Dunn committed the crimes in the vicinity of a juvenile, as required for the enhancement. The appellate court focused on the lack of direct evidence that the child was present during the drug activities and distinguished the case from prior decisions.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the evidence was sufficient to support the "in the vicinity of a juvenile" enhancement. The court emphasized that circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could lead a reasonable juror to conclude that the child was present when Dunn prepared the drugs for distribution. The court reversed the Eleventh District's judgment, reinstating the enhancement on Count 2. View "State v. Dunn" on Justia Law

Thomas Reese, the petitioner, sought a writ of habeas corpus for his release from Trumbull Correctional Institution, arguing that he had completed his sentence. Reese was convicted in 2002 on multiple charges, including felonious assault and attempted murder, and was sentenced to a total of 25 years in prison. However, the sentencing entry contained errors, including an incorrect calculation of the total sentence and the improper merging of counts.Reese did not raise these sentencing issues in his direct appeal, which focused solely on the trial court's alleged failure to comply with statutory requirements before accepting his jury trial waiver. The court of appeals reversed his convictions, but the Supreme Court of Ohio reinstated them. In 2023, Reese attempted to correct the sentencing entry through a motion, which was denied by the trial court. The court of appeals affirmed the denial, acknowledging the errors but stating they were voidable and could have been addressed on direct appeal. The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to accept Reese's jurisdictional appeal.Reese filed for habeas corpus in 2024, arguing that his sentence should be calculated as 23 years, considering the errors in the sentencing entry and his jail-time credit. The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with Reese, noting that the sentencing entry indicated a 23-year sentence, and Reese had served this time. The court found that Reese was entitled to immediate release, rejecting the warden's arguments that the claim was barred by res judicata and that sentencing errors were not jurisdictional. The court granted the writ of habeas corpus, ordering Reese's release. View "Reese v. Davis" on Justia Law

In 1980, Delmar Hickman was arrested for the murder of his parents and later pled not guilty by reason of insanity. He was committed to a mental-health facility and has been continuously hospitalized since then. Recently, the managing officer of his current facility recommended that Hickman be granted conditional release to a nonsecured group home. The Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas disapproved this recommendation.The Eleventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Hickman appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, arguing that a trial court has no discretion to deny a change in commitment in the absence of clear and convincing evidence indicating that the level change should not be granted.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that under R.C. 2945.401, a trial court must use its discretion to approve, disapprove, or modify a recommendation for a change to nonsecured status or termination of commitment after considering all relevant factors, including those listed in R.C. 2945.401(E)(1) through (6). The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disapproving the recommendation for Hickman’s conditional release, given his history of severe violence and the potential threat to public safety if he were released to a nonsecured environment. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals. View "State v. Hickman" on Justia Law

Jaidee Miree and Desmond Duncan were charged with murder, involuntary manslaughter, felonious assault, and other offenses related to the death of Ramses Hurley on June 16, 2019. The incident occurred during an attempted robbery where Hurley was picked up under the pretense of a drug deal. A struggle ensued, shots were fired, and Hurley was ejected from the moving vehicle, resulting in his death from blunt-force trauma. At trial, conflicting testimonies were presented regarding who initiated the violence and whether Hurley had a gun.The trial commenced in June 2021, and the trial court instructed the jury on self-defense using the preamendment version of R.C. 2901.09, which included a duty to retreat. Miree and Duncan were found guilty of felony murder, felonious assault, and other charges, and were sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. They appealed, arguing that the trial court should have applied the amended version of R.C. 2901.09, effective April 6, 2021, which eliminated the duty to retreat.The Eighth District Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, ruling that the amendment to R.C. 2901.09 was substantive and could not be applied retroactively to offenses committed before its effective date. A dissenting judge argued that the amendment should apply to all trials after its effective date.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Eighth District's decision. The court held that the amendment to R.C. 2901.09, which eliminated the duty to retreat, did not apply retroactively to acts of self-defense that occurred before the amendment's effective date. The court concluded that the trial court correctly applied the former version of the statute, and the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "State v. Miree" on Justia Law

Chelsie Kennedy pled guilty to robbery charges in three different cases in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. She received an aggregate nine-year sentence in one case, a five-year sentence in another case to be served consecutively to the first, and a six-year sentence in a third case to be served concurrently with the second but consecutively to the first. Kennedy filed motions for judicial release in the latter two cases, arguing she was eligible based on the aggregate of her sentences.The trial court granted Kennedy's motions for judicial release in the two cases, finding her to be an eligible offender under R.C. 2929.20(B) and (C)(4) and (5). The court noted that Kennedy had served more than eight years in prison and considered her conduct in prison and the seriousness and recidivism factors. The court suspended her sentences in the two cases and placed her on community control for three years, to begin after completing her sentence in the first case. The State appealed, arguing that Kennedy had not completed her nine-year sentence in the first case and that judicial release eligibility should be determined separately for each stated prison term.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and concluded that judicial-release eligibility is determined separately for each stated prison term, informed by the aggregate of all nonmandatory prison terms imposed. The court found that the lower courts did not conduct a complete inquiry into whether Kennedy had served the requisite amount of her stated prison terms before filing her motion for judicial release. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether Kennedy completed the prescribed waiting period. View "State v. Kennedy" on Justia Law