Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Tommy Glover committed a series of armed robberies and kidnappings in May and June 2020, resulting in his convictions for 11 first-degree felonies and six gun specifications. Glover's crimes involved holding victims at gunpoint, forcing them to withdraw money from ATMs, and causing significant emotional trauma. The trial court sentenced Glover to an aggregate term of 60 years in prison, with some sentences running consecutively and others concurrently.The First District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's sentence, finding it disproportionate to Glover's criminal history, the danger he posed, and the offenses committed. The appellate court modified Glover's sentences to run concurrently, resulting in a reduced aggregate sentence of 25 years. The court of appeals based its decision on the lack of physical harm to the victims and compared Glover's sentence to those in other cases involving both physical and emotional harm.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that the appellate court erred in its analysis. The Supreme Court emphasized that the appellate-review statute limits the appellate court's review to whether the trial court's findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) are clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's findings were supported by substantial evidence, including the severe emotional harm inflicted on the victims and Glover's lack of remorse. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the trial court's original sentence of 60 years. View "State v. Glover" on Justia Law

Two men opened fire at a party, killing one person and wounding eight others. James Echols was identified as one of the shooters. While in jail awaiting trial, Echols allegedly threatened the State’s principal witness and wrote a letter suggesting harm to the witness’s wife. The trial court admitted evidence of these acts at Echols’s trial, along with other evidence of his participation in the crime. Echols was convicted.The First District Court of Appeals affirmed Echols’s conviction, finding that the witness-intimidation evidence was properly admitted to show Echols’s consciousness of guilt. Echols argued that the trial court should have analyzed the evidence as “other acts” evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) and followed the analytical framework outlined in State v. Hartman. The appellate court did not explicitly perform an Evid.R. 404(B) analysis but concluded that the evidence was admissible.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and agreed that the witness-intimidation evidence constituted other-acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B). The court found no error in the admission of this evidence, as it was relevant for a nonpropensity purpose—showing Echols’s consciousness of guilt. The court also determined that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury. The court affirmed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals. View "State v. Echols" on Justia Law

Plain-clothes detectives from the Central Ohio Drug Enforcement Task Force observed Terrance Cunningham, a known suspected drug trafficker, driving a minivan. They relayed this information to Detective Benjamin Martens, who confirmed that Cunningham did not have a valid driver’s license. Detective Martens located the minivan in a convenience store parking lot, where Cunningham was standing next to the vehicle and Katrina Hale, the passenger, was exiting the store. When questioned, Cunningham claimed Hale was the driver. Hale, appearing nervous, was detained by Detective Martens, who subsequently searched her purses and found methamphetamines.The Licking County Common Pleas Court found that Hale was no longer a passenger when detained and granted her motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop, including her statements and the contents of her purses. The court reasoned that since Hale was not in the vehicle at the time of the stop, the detention was unjustified. However, the court did not address whether the search of Hale’s purses was justified independently of her detention.The Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, concluding that Hale remained a passenger and could be detained for the duration of the stop. The appellate court found that the evolving circumstances justified extending the stop and that the search of Hale’s purses was valid under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s decision, holding that Detective Martens had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Hale as part of the investigatory stop. The court found that Hale’s actions and admissions during the stop provided sufficient grounds for her detention. However, the court did not address the constitutionality of the search of Hale’s purses, as Hale did not develop this argument in her appeal. View "State v. Hale" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped a car because the car’s owner had a suspended driver’s license. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer realized the driver was not the owner but asked the driver for his license anyway. The driver, who also did not have a valid license, was found with an illegal firearm in the vehicle, leading to the arrest of both the driver and a passenger.The trial court denied the defendants' motions to suppress the evidence found in the car, leading to their no-contest pleas. The Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, ruling that the officer had no reasonable suspicion to continue the stop after realizing the driver was not the car’s owner. The court held that the evidence obtained from the continued detention should be suppressed.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Eleventh District’s decision. The court held that under United States Supreme Court precedent, specifically Rodriguez v. United States, an officer who has lawfully initiated a traffic stop may make ordinary inquiries necessary to complete the mission of the stop, including confirming that the driver has a valid driver’s license. The court concluded that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment by asking the driver for his license after realizing the driver was not the car’s owner. The judgments of the trial court were reinstated. View "State v. Dunlap" on Justia Law

Mark Gasper was indicted on seven counts of rape under Ohio law, specifically for engaging in sexual conduct with a person whose ability to resist or consent was substantially impaired due to a mental or physical condition. The charges stemmed from a long-term sexual relationship between Gasper and K.W., a 32-year-old woman with cerebral palsy and intellectual disabilities. Gasper was employed as an in-home nurse for K.W.'s siblings, and the incidents occurred in the home where he worked. The state focused on K.W.'s mental impairment, not her physical condition, to argue that she could not consent to sexual conduct.The trial court provided the jury with a standard instruction defining "substantial impairment" as a present reduction in the victim's ability to appraise or control their conduct. During deliberations, the jury asked if medication could be considered when evaluating mental condition, to which the court referred them back to the original instructions. The jury found Gasper guilty on one count and not guilty on the other six. Gasper's motion for acquittal or a new trial, arguing that the court's response to the jury's question changed the state's theory midtrial, was denied.The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Gasper's motion. The appellate court held that the trial court's response did not alter the state's theory and that sufficient evidence supported the conviction, including expert testimony on K.W.'s mental impairment and Gasper's awareness of it.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether the jury instruction on "substantial impairment" applied to permanent mental conditions. The court held that the instruction, based on the precedent set in State v. Zeh, does include permanent mental conditions. The court found no plain error in the trial court's instructions and affirmed the First District's judgment. View "State v. Gasper" on Justia Law

In November 1991, a ten-year-old child was kidnapped from her home in Harrison, Ohio, and her body was found days later in Bright, Indiana. Jeffrey Wogenstahl was convicted in 1993 of kidnapping and murdering the child and was sentenced to death by the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. The First District Court of Appeals upheld his conviction and sentence, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Wogenstahl's subsequent petitions for postconviction relief and delayed new-trial motions were denied.Wogenstahl filed a delayed application to reopen his direct appeal nearly 30 years after the original judgment, arguing that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging the trial court's jurisdiction and the constitutionality of R.C. 2901.11(D). The First District Court of Appeals denied the application, concluding that Wogenstahl failed to show good cause for the delay and that his claims were barred by res judicata.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Wogenstahl did not demonstrate good cause for the nearly 30-year delay in filing his application to reopen. The court also noted that even if good cause had been shown, Wogenstahl's claims were barred by res judicata, as the issue of the trial court's jurisdiction had already been litigated and decided in previous proceedings. The court emphasized that principles of res judicata apply to jurisdictional determinations and that Wogenstahl had ample opportunity to raise his constitutional challenge earlier. View "State v. Wogenstahl" on Justia Law

The appellant, Mario D. Mays, was charged with multiple offenses, including violating a protection order under Ohio Revised Code (R.C.) 2919.27(A) and (B), a fifth-degree felony. The trial evidence showed that Mays had a prior conviction for violating a protection order. The jury found Mays guilty, and the verdict form specified the violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) and (B)(3). Mays did not object to the verdict form, which, due to his prior conviction, elevated the offense to a fifth-degree felony under R.C. 2919.27(B)(3).The Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed Mays’s conviction and sentence. Mays argued on appeal that the verdict form was insufficient to convict him of a fifth-degree felony because it did not reference the offense level or any aggravating factors, as required by R.C. 2945.75(A)(2). The appellate court, relying on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Pelfrey, concluded that a statutory reference within the verdict form is sufficient to comply with R.C. 2945.75(A)(2). The court noted that the statutory reference provided adequate notice of the offense degree.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to determine if a verdict form’s reference to the statutory section mandating a higher-level offense complies with R.C. 2945.75(A)(2). The court held that such a reference does satisfy the statutory requirement. The court concluded that the verdict form’s citation to R.C. 2919.27(B)(3) was sufficient to state the degree of the offense, thus complying with R.C. 2945.75(A)(2). Additionally, the court applied plain-error review, as Mays did not object to the verdict form at trial, and found no plain error affecting Mays’s substantial rights. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals. View "State v. Mays" on Justia Law

In January 2020, Sontez Sheckles was indicted in Hamilton County Common Pleas Court for attempted murder, felonious assault, and having a weapon while under a disability, stemming from an alleged shooting at a bar. The prosecution intended to call a former federal prosecutor, Zachary Kessler, as a witness and present an edited video of the incident. However, the trial court excluded Kessler's testimony due to the absence of a Touhy letter authorizing him to testify and excluded the video because the bar owner could not authenticate it.The State appealed these rulings to the First District Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court's decisions had weakened its case to the point of destroying any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution. The First District affirmed the trial court's rulings, agreeing that the absence of a Touhy letter justified excluding Kessler's testimony and that the video could not be authenticated by the bar owner.The State then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which reviewed whether the Touhy regulations should have been used to prevent Kessler from testifying and whether the trial court's pretrial evidentiary rulings should have been considered preliminary. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Touhy regulations do not create rights for criminal defendants and cannot be used to exclude testimony from a willing and authorized federal employee. The court reversed the First District's judgment on the Touhy issue and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The court did not address the finality of the trial court's pretrial evidentiary rulings, vacating that portion of the First District's judgment. View "State v. Sheckles" on Justia Law

In 1976, Prince Charles Cotten Sr. was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. The conviction included specifications for killing a police officer while attempting to escape apprehension. Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lockett v. Ohio, which declared Ohio's death-penalty statute unconstitutional, the Ohio Supreme Court commuted Cotten's sentence to life imprisonment.Cotten filed a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus in the Third District Court of Appeals in July 2023, arguing that his conviction and life sentence were invalid because they were based on an unconstitutional statute. The warden moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that Cotten's life sentence had not expired and that the sentencing court had jurisdiction. The court of appeals granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Cotten was imprisoned under a valid judgment from a court with proper jurisdiction and that his life sentence had not expired.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals' dismissal. The court held that Cotten's life sentence was valid and that his arguments regarding the unconstitutionality of his original death sentence and the need for resentencing by a three-judge trial court were without merit. The court also denied Cotten's motion to strike documents attached to the warden's merit brief, which included a 2003 habeas corpus petition filed by Cotten that advanced similar arguments. The court concluded that Cotten's claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus and that the sentencing errors he alleged were not jurisdictional. View "Cotten v. Frederick" on Justia Law

Michael Jones was convicted by a jury of ten drug-trafficking and drug-possession charges. Before the trial, Jones filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from a safe in a house, arguing that the consent to search was invalid and the search warrant for the safe was insufficient. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Jones to an aggregate prison term of 22 to 24.5 years.Jones appealed to the First District Court of Appeals, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for not challenging the evidence as coerced and the protective sweep as unconstitutional. The appellate court agreed, finding that Jones's trial counsel had a reasonable basis to challenge the consent and the protective sweep. The court concluded that the failure to raise these arguments constituted deficient performance and prejudiced Jones. The appellate court ordered a limited remand for Jones to file a new motion to suppress and for the trial court to hold a suppression hearing, staying the consideration of Jones’s remaining assignments of error.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that it had jurisdiction under Article IV, Section 2(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2505.03(A). The court found that the First District did not comply with App.R. 12(A)(1)(a) and (c) because it did not affirm, modify, or reverse the trial court’s judgment and did not decide all assignments of error. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the First District, vacated its entry ordering limited remand, and remanded the case to the First District to enter a judgment that complies with App.R. 12. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law