Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ dismissal of Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed against the warden of the correctional facility where Appellant was incarcerated.Appellant claimed that he was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because he had served more than sixteen years’ imprisonment on a fifteen-year prison sentence. Specifically, Appellant claimed that the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction unilaterally extended his sentence by running his two prison terms consecutively without judicial sanction. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant’s sentences ran consecutively by operation of statute, and therefore, the Department did not change Appellant’s sentence or aggregate his sentences on its own initiative. View "State ex rel. Smith v. Schweitzer" on Justia Law

A social worker’s statutory duty to cooperate and share information with law enforcement regarding a child abuse investigation does not render the social worker an agent of law enforcement for purposes of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution if the social worker interviews an alleged perpetrator unless the evidence demonstrates that the social worker acted at the direction or under the control of law enforcement.Defendant was convicted of kidnapping, gross sexual imposition, and two counts of rape. Social worker and child advocate Holly Mack interviewed Defendant after he was arrested. During trial, defense counsel objected to Mack’s testimony about the statements Jackson had made to her because she questioned him “as an agent of the State and law enforcement” and failed to notify Defendant of his Miranda rights. The trial court allowed Mack to testify. The appellate court reversed the convictions, holding that Mack acted as an agent of law enforcement when she interrogated Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no evidence indicated that Mack acted at the direction or under the control of law enforcement when she interviewed Jackson. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ to Relator, who filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the common pleas court to enforce its 2013 order sealing the record in a criminal case against Relator and to rule on his 2017 motion to reseal the record.Relator alleged that after the records at issue were sealed the court of appeals made his appellate records public again. Relator then filed an emergency motion for an order resealing his records. When no action was taken to enforce the order to seal or ruling on the motion to reseal Relator filed his complaint for a writ of mandamus. The common pleas court filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss, sue sponte converted Relator’s complaint to a request for a writ of procedendo, granted a writ ordering the common pleas court to rule on Relator’s motion to reseal, and granted Relator’s motion to seal the pleadings filed in this original action. View "State ex rel. Doe v. Gallia County Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the two courts of appeals dismissing Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and Appellant’s petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus.Appellant was convicted in two separate common pleas cases, one involving the murder and robbery of Christine Kozak (the Kozak case) and the other case involving the robberies of David Sotka and the Lawson Milk Company (the Sotka case). In both of his petitions, Appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the general division of the common pleas court in both the Kozak case and the Sotka case. Both petitions alleged that there was an allegedly defective transfer from the juvenile division. The Supreme Court held (1) the court of appeals correctly dismissed Appellant’s habeas petition for failure to state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus; and (2) Appellant had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to challenge the validity of the bindover, and therefore, Appellant’s request for writs of prohibition and mandamus were properly dismissed. View "Johnson v. Sloan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ of habeas corpus sought by Tyrone Oliver and commanded Oliver’s immediate release from incarceration.In 1993, Oliver was sentenced to an indeterminate prison sentence of eight to twenty-five years for involuntary manslaughter. The Bureau of Sentence Computation calculated his maximum-sentence release date as January 9, 2018. Oliver received parole release in July 2003. In February 2005 he pleaded guilty to a domestic violence charge and received a two year sentence. On January 26, 2018, Oliver filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was entitled to immediate release. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Oliver’s 2005 sentence for domestic violence was to be served concurrently with, not consecutively to, his 1993 sentence for involuntary manslaughter, and therefore, Oliver had served his maximum sentence and was entitled to immediate release. View "State ex rel. Oliver v. Turner" on Justia Law

At issue was whether a trial court must inform an offender at the time of sentencing that the commission of a felony during a period of post-release control permits a trial court to impose a new prison term for the violation to be served consecutively with any prison term for the new felony.Defendant was convicted of rape of victims less than thirteen years of age and three counts of gross sexual imposition regarding victims less than thirteen years of age. At sentencing the trial court imposed the mandatory term of postrelease control and informed Defendant that if he were convicted of a new felony offense while on post-release controversy, the sentencing court could impose a prison term for the new felony offense, along with an additional consecutive prison term for the post-release control violation. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed plain error when it sentenced him without properly giving him all of the required notifications as required by Ohio Rev. Code 2929.19(B)(4) and concerning post-release control. The court of appeals rejected the argument. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 2929.19(B)(2)(e) does not require that a trial court notify an offender at his or her initial sentencing hearing of the penalty provisions contained in Ohio Rev. Code 2929.141(A)(1) and (2). View "State v. Gordon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of aggravated murder with a death specification, felony-murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and other crimes and the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty.On appeal, Defendant presented eighteen propositions of law. The Supreme Court examined each of Defendant’s claims and found that none had merit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence of death, holding that there was no reversible error committed in the proceedings below and that Defendant was not entitled to relief. View "State v. Myers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions for aggravated murder and two counts of attempted murder and Appellant’s sentence of death, imposed after a jury trial. The Court held (1) the prosecutor had no obligation to present allegedly exculpatory evidence to the grand jury; (2) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct before the grand jury or during various phases of the proceedings; (3) the trial court did not err by excusing a Spanish-speaking prospective juror; (4) courtroom closures during individual voir dire and the penalty-phase instructions did not violate Appellant’s constitutional rights to a public trial; (5) the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in its evidentiary rulings; (6) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that Appellant be placed in restraints; (7) the trial court properly instructed the jury on transferred intent, aggravated murder, and lesser included offenses; (8) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (9) defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; and (10) Appellant’s sentence was appropriate and proportional. View "State v. Wilks" on Justia Law

In these two consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the court of appeals denying Appellant’s complaints for a writ of mandamus against Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Shannon M. Gallagher.The two appeals here arose out of the same underlying facts. Defendant was convicted on multiple charges. The court of appeals remanded the case several times to correct sentencing errors. After the court of appeals had decided Cowan IV, Defendant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the trial court had failed to comply with the appellate court’s mandate in Cowan II. The court of appeals granted Judge Gallagher’s motion for summary judgment and denied the requested writ. In the second complaint, Defendant alleged that before his initial sentencing the trial court failed to consider whether some of the charged offenses were allied offenses of similar import. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for Judge Gallagher and denied the requested writ based on res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed in both cases, holding that the court of appeals did not err in its judgments. View "State ex rel. Cowan v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ohio’s death-penalty scheme does not violate the right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.Appellant was sentenced to death. The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for a new penalty-phase trial. On remand, Appellant moved to dismiss the capital specification from his indictment, arguing that Ohio’s death-penalty scheme is unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, __ U.S. __ (2016). Hurst invalidated Florida’s former capital-sentencing scheme because it “required the judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance.” The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Ohio law requires the critical jury findings that were not required by the law at issue in Hurst, Ohio’s death-penalty scheme does not violate a defendant’s right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. View "State v. Mason" on Justia Law