Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2004, McKinney was convicted of five counts arising from a single event: robbery, aggravated theft, receiving stolen property, and two counts of failing to comply with a police officer’s order. He was sentenced to consecutive prison terms totaling 20.5 years. The Third District rejected arguments that the robbery and theft counts and the two failing-to-comply counts were allied offenses of similar import but reversed his conviction for receiving stolen property and remanded for resentencing. He was resentenced to consecutive prison terms totaling 18.5 years. Ten years later, McKinney moved to “Correct Void Allied Convictions/Sentences” and for a resentencing hearing, then filed a mandamus petition, seeking to compel the trial judge to merge the convictions that he claimed were for allied offenses and arguing that until the judge does so, there is no final, appealable order. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Third District’s dismissal of the petition. McKinney has unsuccessfully litigated whether he was improperly convicted of duplicative charges, so his effort to collaterally attack his convictions as allied offenses is barred by res judicata. When “a plain and adequate remedy at law has been unsuccessfully invoked, a writ of mandamus will not lie to relitigate the same issue.” View "McKinney v. Schmenk" on Justia Law

Inmates, sentenced to indeterminate prison terms for crimes committed before 1996 sentencing reforms, alleged that the parole board has an unwritten policy of denying parole to old-law offenders, noting statements by board members that all inmates likely to be paroled following the reforms have been released. The complaint alleged that the board wastes $119 million annually by failing to give inmates meaningful parole consideration. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Tenth District's dismissal of their mandamus petition. Prior denials do not equate to failure to give meaningful consideration. The Adult Parole Authority has “wide-ranging discretion in parole matters,” subject to an inherent expectation “that a criminal offender will receive meaningful consideration for parole.” The inmates did not establish that officials have already predetermined that the seriousness of their offenses outweighs all other factors. They committed aggravated murder in the course of a robbery, first-degree murder, complicity to commit aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder, and crimes involving a minor. The board has not held them to account for offenses more serious than they actually committed nor based its decision on factually inaccurate information. Weighing the seriousness of the crimes, as compared to whatever evidence of rehabilitation the inmates presented is the point at which the parole board exercises its discretion. The court also rejected requests for a declaration that the parole board members were guilty of public corruption and for sanctions for alleged “public corruption” and “dereliction of duty.” View "Bailey v. Parole Board" on Justia Law

Martin was convicted in Cleveland Heights Municipal Court of receiving stolen property and other charges. The Eighth District Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal for lack of a final order. Martin sought a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Buchanan to issue a final, appealable order. The Eighth District denied the petition because Judge Buchanan had set the matter for a hearing to address the finality of the judgment, so Martin had an adequate remedy at law. Martin’s petition also sought a writ of prohibition against the clerk of courts, alleging that a third party had posted his bail in an unrelated case and that the clerk had fraudulently applied those sums to the fines and costs assessed in this case. The Eighth District also denied that writ, finding that the depositor had consented to that disposition of funds. While his appeal was pending, Judge Buchanan issued a judgment entry. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Martin’s mandamus petition was moot. Three elements are necessary for a writ of prohibition: the exercise of judicial power, lack of authority to exercise that power, and lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The clerk’s action did not constitute the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial authority. View "Martin v. Buchanan" on Justia Law

Swain sought a writ of mandamus in the Tenth District Court of Appeals to compel the Ohio Adult Parole Authority to expunge its records of allegedly inaccurate information and to provide him with a “meaningful opportunity for parole based upon accurate factual findings.” The Tenth District dismissed for failure to attach to his affidavit of indigency a certified statement from the institutional cashier. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. When an inmate files a civil action or appeal against a government entity or employee in a court of common pleas, court of appeals, county court, or municipal court, he must comply with R.C. 2969.25's procedural requirements, including, for a waiver of the filing fee, submission of an affidavit of indigency and a statement showing the balance in his inmate account for each of the preceding six months, certified by the institutional cashier. Noncompliance warrants dismissal. In the Tenth District, Swain also moved to proceed in forma pauperis, attaching the required affidavit and stating that a statement of his prison account was attached; no statement was filed. He subsequently filed another affidavit with a statement of the running balance in his prison account. Swain’s belated attempt to comply with R.C. 2969.25(C) “does not excuse his noncompliance” and the statement was not certified by the institutional cashier. View "Swain v. Adult Parole Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus to compel Judge David L. Johnson to vacate Appellant’s aggravated murder conviction and issue a final appealable order disposing of one count of having a weapon while under disability that was charged in the same criminal case.At the time of this appeal, Appellant had been imprisoned for more than fifteen years, his conviction and sentence had been upheld on direct appeal, and his collateral attack on the finality of his conviction had been rejected by the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that Appellant’s appeal from the denial of his motion to vacate his judgment of conviction was an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and accordingly, Appellant’s complaint was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. View "State ex rel. Peoples v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling the trial court to issue a final, appealable order for his 1986 convictions and sentence. In his petition, Appellant argued that the 1986 judgment entry was unsigned and therefore void. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court’s 1986 judgment was a final judgment and dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even accepting as true Appellant’s assertion that the entry was unsigned, res judicata barred Appellant from raising his claim that the entry did not comply with Ohio R. Crim. P. 32. View "State ex rel. Woods v. Dinkelacker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ denial of Appellant’s petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition. In his original action for writs of mandamus and prohibition, Appellant alleged, among other things, that the judge who presided over his 1981 jury trial had never pronounced judgment or sentenced him. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for Defendants and denied the requested writs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) with one possible exception, the claims Appellant was making were barred by res judicata; and (2) summary judgment was proper on the only allegation that Appellant raised in the present case that may not have already been litigated. View "State ex rel. Jackson v. Ambrose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus. Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to an indefinite term of a minimum of fifteen years to life, to be served consecutively to the sentence he was then serving on federal charges. Appellant later filed this action against the Bureau of Sentence Computation (BSC) requesting a writ of mandamus to compel BSC to calculate his term served under his state sentence as if the sentence were being served concurrently with, and not consecutively to, the federal sentence. The court of appeals dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s arguments on appeal were unavailing. View "State ex rel. Sanford v. Bureau of Sentence Computation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking an order releasing him on bond and suspending execution of his sentence pending appeal. Petitioner, who was convicted of aggravated possession of drugs, appealed, seeking the reversal of his conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for bail pending appeal, and the court of appeals denied a similar motion filed by Petitioner. The Supreme Court held that Petitioner failed to show that the court of appeals abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion for bond pending appeal and thus denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and denied as moot his motion for an expedited ruling. View "Small v. Hooks" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting judgment in favor of Michael Clay in this action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the release of autopsy records by the Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner’s Office’s (ME) under Ohio Rev. Code 313.10(C)(1). On appeal, the ME argued, among other things, that the court should use the in pari material rule of statutory construction in determining the meaning of section 313.10(C)(1), which governs access to records held by a coroner’s office. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the in pari material rule of statutory construction and the absurdity exception to the plain-language rule of statutory construction are not applicable to section 313.10(C)(1); and (2) because section 313.10(C)(1) is plain and unambiguous, it is applied as written. View "State ex rel. Clay v. Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner's Office" on Justia Law