Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with burglary. Before Defendant’s trial was to begin, the court confirmed that Defendant had been offered and rejected a plea offer. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty. Following a sentencing hearing, the court imposed a six-year term of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court vindictively imposed a sentence in retaliation for the exercise of his right to a jury trial in violation of his due process rights. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there is no presumption of vindictiveness when, after trial, a court sentences a defendant to a longer term than was offered by the state in plea negotiations; (2) an appellate court may reverse a sentence for vindictiveness only if, upon its examination of the entire record, it clearly and convincingly finds the sentence was based on actual vindictiveness; and (3) applying this standard, the trial court did not vindictively sentence Defendant. View "State v. Rahab" on Justia Law

The Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted five individuals with two misdemeanor counts of dereliction of duty. Thereafter, the city of East Cleveland filed an identical dereliction-of-duty charge against each of the defendants in the East Cleveland Municipal Court. The defendants filed a complaint requesting a writ of prohibition, seeking to prohibit Judge William L. Dawson of the municipal court from exercising jurisdiction over the identical dereliction-of-duty charges against each of the defendants. Thereafter, the county prosecutor moved to dismiss the indictments pending in the common pleas court. The common pleas court found that the duplicate charges filed in the municipal court constituted good cause for dismissal. The defendants amended their complaint in prohibition arguing that Judge Dawson and the municipal court lacked jurisdiction over their cases, that the common pleas court inappropriate dismissed the charges previously filed in that court, and that they could not appeal from those dismissals. The court of appeals granted the requested writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Judge Dawson did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to consider the indictments filed against the defendants in the municipal court and that the defendants had an adequate remedy at law in the form of appeal. View "State ex rel. Dailey v. Dawson" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling Appellee, a Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton county judge, to vacate his sentence as void and to resentencing him “according to the verdict returned by the jury.” The court of appeals dismissed Appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus. Appellant appealed and also filed a motion for reversal of judgment under S. Ct. Prac. R. 16.07(B) claiming that he was entitled to judgment in his favor because the judge failed to file a brief in this appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied Appellant’s motion, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly dismissed Appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus; and (2) Appellant’s brief did not reasonably appear to sustain reversal. View "State ex rel. Bradford v. Dinkelacker" on Justia Law

Appellant was an inmate at the London Correctional Institution, where he was serving the remainder of an indeterminate sentence since the Adult Parole Authority (APA) revoked his parole in 2014. In 2015, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus against Warden Terry Tibbals and the APA. Appellant requested an order requiring Tibbals to immediately release him from prison under the same conditions of his original parole; alternatively, an order compelling the APA to credit his time served from 2001 to 2011; and an order compelling the APA to grant him a new mitigation/revocation hearing with the appointment of counsel. The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of Tibbals and the APA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant had not served his maximum sentence and failed to show that he was being held unlawfully, the court of appeals correctly denied Appellant’s request for a writ of habeas corpus; and (2) Appellant failed to prove his entitlement to a writ of mandamus by clear and convincing evidence. View "State ex rel. Marsh v. Tibbals" on Justia Law

In State v. Gonzales (Gonzales I), the Supreme Court determined that, in prosecuting cocaine-possession offenses under Ohio Rev. Code 2925.11(C)(4)(b) through (f) involving mixed substances, the State must prove that the weight of the actual cocaine, excluding the weight of any filler materials, meets the statutory threshold. The State filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that Gonzalez I was based on inconsistent application of the principles of statutory construction. The Supreme Court granted the motion for reconsideration, vacated its decision in Gonzalez I, and held that the entire mixture or compound, including any fillers that are part of the usable drug, must be considered for the purpose of determining the appropriate penalty for cocaine possession under section 2925.11(C)(4). View "State v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

In 1986, Appellant pleaded guilty to five counts of rape and six counts of complicity to rape. The trial court sentenced Appellant to four terms of life imprisonment and ordered that Appellant serve each of the life sentences consecutively. In 2015, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that the trial court acted outside its jurisdiction and improperly imposed the life terms because of errors in the sentencing entry. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s habeas petition was properly dismissed because Appellant did not set forth a valid challenge to the jurisdiction of the sentencing court and because Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to raise his sentencing errors. View "Dunkle v. Department of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with operating a vehicle while under the influence (OVI) of a drug of abuse. After a trial, Defendant was convicted. The court of appeals vacated the trial court’s judgment, finding that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s OVI conviction because there was no evidence to connect Defendant’s use of hydrocodone, a widely known drug of abuse, with his impairment. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that expert testimony was necessary to support the OVI conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the OVI conviction and that no expert testimony was required to link the ingestion of hydrocodone with Defendant’s impairment. View "State v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with three counts of violating Ohio Rev. Code 2923.13. The statute makes it illegal for a person to possess firearms when the person is under indictment for or has been convicted of certain felonies. During trial, Defendant sought to limit how much the jury could learn about his underlying offenses upon which the weapons charges were based. A jury returned a guilty verdict on all three counts. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it did not require the State to stipulate to Defendant’s indictment and prior convictions and by admitting the full record of his prior offenses. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in refusing Defendant’s stipulation offer, and the error was not harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing Defendant to stipulate to his prior convictions and indictment. View "State v. Creech" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging three civil claims brought under Ohio Rev. Code 2307.60. Plaintiff sought recovery for damages arising out of Defendants’ alleged violation of a criminal statute. The trial court dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, ruling that civil actions for damages may not be predicated upon an alleged violation of a criminal statute. The Ninth District Court of Appeals then certified a question to the Supreme Court as to whether the current version of Ohio Rev. Code 2307.60 independently authorizes a civil action for damages caused by criminal acts unless otherwise prohibited by law. The Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "Jacobson v. Kaforey" on Justia Law

As part of an independent investigation into the murder conviction of Adam Saleh, Donald Caster, an Ohio attorney engaged by the Ohio Innocence Project, requested police records related to the arrest and investigation of Saleh. The Division of Police of the City of Columbus rejected the request, stating that no records could be produced until the “completion” of Saleh’s criminal case. By the time Caster made his request for public records, Saleh’s direct appeals had been exhausted for more than four years. Caster then filed this original action in mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ, holding that the specific-investigatory-work-product exception from required disclosure of public records set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(A)(2)(c) does not extend beyond the completion of the trial of the underlying criminal case at issue. View "State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus" on Justia Law