Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Paul Bunting sought a writ of mandamus ordering Tuscarawas County Prosecuting Attorney Ryan Styer to prosecute Thomas Weaver for theft of a motorcycle. The court of appeals sua sponte dismissed the complaint after the prosecutor untimely filed a motion to dismiss. Bunting appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint because Styer’s failure to prosecute in this case was not an abuse of discretion, and therefore, Bunting did not have a clear legal right to a writ. View "State ex rel. Bunting v. Styer" on Justia Law

Appellant sought a writ of procedendo requiring Judge Kelly Cottrill to rule on his motion to vacate or set aside the judgment of his conviction. Judge Cottrill had ruled on Appellant’s motion but failed to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant’s petition, finding that the petition was moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a writ of procedendo was inappropriate because Judge Cottrill did not refuse to enter judgment but, rather, Appellant was dissatisfied with the entry that she issued. View "State ex rel. Poulton v. Cottrill" on Justia Law

In 2016, Defendant was indicted of several offenses. Before trial, the prosecuting attorney obtained a second indictment. The trial court subsequently granted the State’s motion to dismiss the first indictment. Defendant then pleaded guilty to five counts of gross sexual imposition charged in the second indictment. Defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that the doctrine of res judicata precluded his convictions because his first indictment was dismissed with prejudice and included the same charges and was based on the same facts and circumstances as the second indictment. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that Defendant’s argument was a double jeopardy claim and that double jeopardy claims are not cognizable in habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the first indictment was dismissed not on the merits but to prevent a double jeopardy violation, the doctrine of res judicata did not preclude Defendant’s convictions. View "State ex rel. Steele v. Eppinger" on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant was indicted for murder. After a series of mistrials that were declared in Defendant’s case during the fourteen years since his arrest, Defendant moved to dismiss his indictment, alleging a violation of the Due Process and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that a mistrial or hung jury does not bar retrial or retrials. Defendant appealed, arguing that yet another trial would violate the “fair play” guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a double jeopardy challenge to the retrial of a defendant following a mistrial is analyzed under the Double Jeopardy Clause rather than the Due Process Clause; and (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a defendant’s retrial after several mistrials have been properly declared. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and aggravated murder. After the mitigation phase and the jury recommendation, the trial court sentenced Defendant to death for the aggravated murder. Defendant appealed, raising twenty-one propositions of law. The Supreme Court rejected each of Defendant’s propositions and affirmed his convictions and sentence of death, holding (1) no prejudicial error occurred during the pretrial phase; (2) there was no prejudicial error in the trial court’s evidentiary rulings; (3) the jury instructions and verdict forms did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights; (4) cumulative prosecutorial conduct did not violate Defendant’s due process rights; (5) trial counsel provided effective assistance; (6) nothing in the record supported Defendant’s claim of trial court bias; and (7) Defendant’s death sentence was proportionate and appropriate. View "State v. McKelton" on Justia Law

Following a mistrial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated burglary and rape. Judge Ethna Cooper presided over the mistrial and the retrial. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Appellant later filed a motion to issue a final appealable order and to vacate a void judgment. Judge Cooper denied the motion. Appellant then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals was correct in dismissing Appellant’s petition because Appellant had available an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. View "State ex rel. Bevins v. Cooper" on Justia Law

In 1995, Jeffrey Keith was found guilty of arson and grand theft. In 2015, after a long procedural history, Keith petitioned the Court of Appeals to order the original judge in his case, Judge Gaul, to rule on his motion for leave to file a delayed motion for a new trial. When Keith filed his motion in 2002, Judge Gaul had been assigned to the case, but the case was later assigned to Judge Russo. Judge Russo filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court of appeals granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because a ruling on Keith’s 2002 motion would be constrained by the law-of-the-case doctrine, issuing a writ ordering such a ruling would be a “vain act.” View "State ex rel. Keith v. Gaul" on Justia Law

In 2014, Defendant was convicted of first-degree-felony rape and kidnapping for offenses he committed in 1993. The trial court sentenced Defendant in accordance with the sentencing law in effect at the time of the 1993 offenses. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that he should have been sentenced under the law in effect at the time of his 2014 sentencing. The law in effect in 2014 reduced the potential prison sentences for Defendant’s offenses as compared with the potential prison sentences for those offenses under the law in effect in 1993. The Court of Appeals agreed with Defendant, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was entitled to the benefit of the shorter potential sentences under the law in effect at the time of sentencing. Remanded. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Hand entered no-contest pleas in Montgomery County to first-degree felonies (aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping) and two second-degree counts of felonious assault. Each count had a three-year firearm specification attached, to which Hand also entered no-contest pleas. During the plea hearing, the parties agreed to a total six-year prison term with three of the years being mandatory because they are related to the merged firearm specifications, R.C. 2929.14 and 2941.145. The parties disputed whether the three years for the other offenses was also a mandatory term, based on whether Hand’s prior juvenile adjudication for aggravated robbery under R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) should operate as a first-degree felony conviction to enhance his sentence. The court ruled that Hand’s prior juvenile adjudication required imposition of mandatory prison terms under R.C. 2929.13(F). The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed. Treating a juvenile adjudication as an adult conviction to enhance a sentence for a later crime is inconsistent with Ohio’s system for juveniles, which is predicated on the fact that children are not as culpable for their acts as adults and should be rehabilitated rather than punished. In addition, juveniles are not afforded the right to a jury trial. View "State v. Hand" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder with two death-penalty specifications. The trial court sentenced Appellant to death. On appeal, the court of appeals vacated the death sentence, concluding that the trial judge’s use of the assistant prosecutor to assist in preparation of the sentencing opinion was improper. On remand, the trial court again sentenced Appellant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) in regards to the trial court’s resentencing of Appellant, the court in the sentencing opinion improperly failed to consider Appellant’s allocution, but the error was harmless; and (2) there was no other prejudicial error. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law