Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant, an inmate, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence him because of several alleged errors. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that Appellant had adequate remedies at law. Appellant appealed and filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment, holding that the claims or which Appellant sought relief were not cognizable in habeas corpus and Appellant had, and has used, adequate remedies at law to assert those claims; and (2) denied Appellant’s motion for an evidentiary hearing as moot. View "State ex rel. Gibson v. Sloan" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery and was sentenced to nineteen years in prison. Appellant later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging several claims of error. The court of appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the form of an appeal and a postconviction motion for relief. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the claims for which Appellant sought relief were not cognizable in habeas corpus and that Appellant possessed an alternative remedy at law to assert those claims. View "State ex rel. Rackley v. Sloan" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of gross sexual imposition and was sentenced to eighteen months in prison. After serving his prison sentence, Appellant was released but was still subject to the reporting requirements that were imposed because he was adjudicated a sexual predator. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of appeals seeking an order striking his reclassification as a sexual predator applied under Megan’s Law and the AWA Act. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant was not in prison or otherwise restrained of his liberty, he was not eligible for habeas corpus relief. View "Cook v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that the court of appeals order the trial court in his underlying criminal case to rule on motions that were allegedly pending. The court’s magistrate recommended that the court dismiss the case for Appellant’s failure to satisfy the requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25. The court of appeals accepted and adopted the magistrate’s decision and recommendation and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals was correct to dismiss the case on the basis recommended by the magistrate. View "State ex rel. Davenport v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging several claims of error, including ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court dismissed Appellant’s petition because he had or has adequate remedies at law to raise these claims. Appellant appealed, challenging the appellate court’s dismissal of his habeas action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Appellant’s habeas case because Appellant had or has adequate remedies at law in the form of direct appeal and postconviction relief to raise his claims. View "Kneuss v. Sloan" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a complaint for a writ prohibiting the chief of the collections enforcement section of the Ohio attorney general’s office from enforcing a demand for Appellant to reimburse the state for money paid out of the Crime Victims Reparations Fund. The magistrate recommended dismissing the writ on grounds that Appellant failed to comply with the mandatory filing requirements for seeking a waiver of prepaying full filing fees. The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in dismissing Appellant’s complaint for noncompliance with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C)(1); and (2) Appellant waived all but plain error and failed to preserve his sole argument. View "State ex rel. Ralios v. Iannotta" on Justia Law

A complaint was filed in juvenile court alleging that A.G. was delinquent for engaging in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted aggravated robbery and kidnapping, with firearms specifications as to each. A.G. admitted to the allegations in the complaint. The juvenile court found the allegations proved beyond a reasonable doubt and ordered that A.G. be committed to the Department of Youth Services for minimum terms of one year for each of the aggravated robbery and kidnapping adjudications. A.G. appealed, arguing that the juvenile court erred in failing to merge his adjudications for aggravated robbery and kidnapping as “allied offenses of similar import” and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the allied-offenses issue. The Court of Appeals denied relief, concluding that the aggravated robbery and kidnapping would constituted allied offenses of similar import under Ohio Rev. Code 2941.25 if committed by an adult but that criminal statutes do not apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that juvenile courts must conduct the same double-jeopardy analysis in delinquency proceedings that other courts apply in adult criminal proceedings to protect a child’s right against double jeopardy. View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

Appellant, convicted of kidnapping, felonious assault, and two counts of rape, challenged the dismissal of his petition for habeas relief, contending that he was not served with an arrest warrant or initial charging papers prior to his allegedly unlawful arrest and thus, that the Erie County Court of Common Pleas had no jurisdiction to convict and sentence him. The court affirmed the judgment because a challenge to the sufficiency or validity of an indictment is not cognizable in habeas corpus. Furthermore, appellant was charged with the criminal offenses of which he was convicted by an indictment, and he had an adequate remedy at law by way of direct appeal to challenge his convictions by raising the sufficiency of that indictment. View "Jury v. Miller" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. A majority of this court affirmed the conviction but vacated the death sentence. Before that decision was released, appellant filed an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen his direct appeal in the Seventh District Court of Appeals, which was denied. Appellant then filed an appeal of right with this court. At issue is whether appellant was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. Based on State v. Maxwell, the court held that failure to challenge the state expert forensic pathologist's testimony or the autopsy report was not ineffective representation, because any such challenge would have failed as a matter of law. The court rejected the following six claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel: failure to object to the court's questioning of the state witnesses; failure to object to prejudicial comments made by a witness for the state; failure to make a record; failure to object to the removal of prospective juror Nos. 11 and 31; failure to present expert psychological testimony during the mitigation phase; and failure to object to the autopsy report or the testimony of the pathologist. Finally, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant. The court affirmed the judgment. View "State v. Adams" on Justia Law

In 1997, Aaron Von was convicted in Colorado of sexual assault of a child and sexual assault in the third degree. In 2011, Von moved to Ohio and registered as a sex offender. Von later moved to terminate his duty to comply with sex offender registration laws pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2950.15. The trial court denied Von’s motion to terminate his duty to comply with sex offender registration laws because, at the time of his convictions, Megan’s Law was in effect in Ohio, and it contained no provision to terminate one’s status as a registered sex offender post-conviction. The court further concluded that later amendments were not retroactive. The appellate court reversed, concluding that offenders classified under Megan’s Law may avail themselves of the privilege legislatively granted to Adam Walsh Act offenders to terminate their registration obligations. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the registration termination procedure delineated in section 2950.15 does not apply to sex offenders who committed their offenses prior to January 1, 2008; and (2) the appellate court properly remanded this matter for a determination of Von’s sex offender classification pursuant to Megan’s Law. Remanded. View "In re Von" on Justia Law