Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

On December 3, 2017, Yuguang Lin and Ruan “Katie” Wenting were robbed by three masked men who took their belongings and forced entry into their apartment, stealing money, cigarettes, and cigars. The police tracked Lin’s stolen cell phone to a vehicle where they found Shaquan Lewis and Raheem Stevenson (Appellant) along with the stolen items. Appellant was charged with robbery, burglary, and criminal conspiracy.The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County held a jury trial where Appellant decided to testify. Before he took the stand, his counsel made an oral motion in limine to exclude a 2005 burglary conviction, arguing its remoteness. The trial court denied the motion, ruling the conviction admissible. Appellant then preemptively disclosed the conviction during his testimony. The jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to eight to sixteen years of incarceration followed by ten years of probation. Appellant’s post-sentence motion challenging the admissibility ruling was denied, and he appealed to the Superior Court.The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Appellant forfeited his right to challenge the admissibility of the prior conviction by introducing it himself. The court relied on Commonwealth v. Conner and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ohler v. United States, which held that a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction cannot claim error on appeal.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and disagreed with the Superior Court. It held that a defendant does not waive the right to appeal a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction by preemptively introducing the evidence following an adverse in limine ruling. The court reversed the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

The appellant, Michael John Parrish, was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and received two death sentences. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed his judgment of sentence in 2013. In 2014, Parrish filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County. The PCRA court denied Parrish’s petition twice, and on both occasions, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania remanded the case back to the PCRA court for further proceedings.The PCRA court denied Parrish's petition for a third time. Parrish appealed again, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania remanded the case back to the PCRA court once more. Parrish then decided to withdraw his claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to consult with him about his direct appeal rights. The PCRA court granted Parrish's request to withdraw the claim and dismissed it. Parrish appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the PCRA court's directive to Parrish to file another Rule 1925(b) statement was superfluous. The court also found that the Commonwealth and the court itself were significantly hampered in their ability to assess Parrish’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel due to the lack of a PCRA court record or ruling on these claims. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania remanded the case back to the PCRA court to further develop the record and consider Parrish’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Parrish" on Justia Law

The case involves Rashaan Londale Greer, who was convicted of first-degree murder and carrying a firearm without a license. After his conviction was affirmed by the Superior Court and his appeal denied by the Supreme Court, Greer filed a Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed several amended petitions before withdrawing her appearance. Greer's second PCRA counsel, Anthony J. Tambourino, filed another amended PCRA petition. After a hearing, the PCRA court denied the amended petition. Tambourino filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the PCRA court’s order to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.Before the establishment of a briefing schedule, Tambourino filed an application for remand, asserting that Greer had sent him a letter requesting a remand to allow Greer to raise claims of Tambourino’s ineffectiveness. The Superior Court deferred the application for remand to the merits panel and directed Tambourino to file a brief. The Superior Court, in an unpublished memorandum opinion, vacated the PCRA court’s order and remanded the case to the PCRA court. The Superior Court directed the PCRA court to appoint new counsel to develop a record and address any issues Greer had with Tambourino’s stewardship.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court's order and remanded to that Court for proceedings consistent with its opinion. The Supreme Court held that when a represented petitioner seeks to raise claims against his current counsel while his petition is pending on appeal, an appellate court must remand the case to the PCRA court to have an on-the-record colloquy with the petitioner about his right to counsel, his inability to proceed through hybrid representation, and how he wishes to proceed. The Supreme Court found that the Superior Court erred in ordering a remand without directing the PCRA court to have such an on-the-record discussion. View "Commonwealth v. Greer" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, challenged the Chester County Court of Common Pleas' ruling that the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) was unconstitutional. The appellee, George Torsilieri, had been convicted of sexual offenses and was subject to SORNA's registration and notification requirements. Torsilieri argued that SORNA's presumption that individuals who commit sexual offenses pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses was an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption violating due process. He also contended that SORNA's requirements constituted criminal punishment, which served as the basis for various constitutional challenges.The lower court agreed with Torsilieri, finding that the presumption was not universally true and that the registration and notification requirements were punitive. The court declared Subchapter H of SORNA unconstitutional, and the Commonwealth appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the lower court's decision. The court held that Torsilieri failed to establish that SORNA's irrebuttable presumption was constitutionally infirm. The court also concluded that Torsilieri failed to demonstrate that SORNA constituted criminal punishment. Therefore, the court rejected Torsilieri's subsidiary constitutional challenges and reinstated his duty to comply with SORNA. View "Commonwealth v. Torsilieri" on Justia Law

The case involves Marcus Womack, who was arrested in 2017 following a search warrant executed at a residence in Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania. The search revealed that Womack had been selling drugs from the location, and he was found in possession of a large sum of money, drugs, and a stolen firearm. On the same day, a criminal complaint was filed against Womack, charging him with nine offenses. Unable to post bail, Womack remained in custody. Subsequent investigations revealed that Womack's drug enterprise extended beyond Huntingdon County, leading to the involvement of the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) and a statewide investigating grand jury. In 2018, a second criminal complaint was filed against Womack, charging him with twenty-eight offenses based on evidence gathered during the grand jury investigation.The trial court denied Womack's motion to dismiss the second complaint under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1), which requires a trial to commence within 365 days from the date the complaint is filed. Womack's motion to dismiss the first complaint on the same grounds was granted. Womack was found guilty of several offenses in a bench trial on the second complaint and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 39 to 90 years’ imprisonment. He appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that the computation of time for Rule 600 purposes should have been based on the filing date of the first complaint. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Superior Court’s order denying relief. The court applied the test from Commonwealth v. Meadius, which requires the Commonwealth to demonstrate due diligence between the period in which the complaints were filed, establish that the filing of the second complaint was necessitated by factors beyond its control, and show that its actions were not an attempt to circumvent or manipulate the speedy trial requirements. The court found that the Commonwealth met these requirements, and therefore, the Rule 600 clock began when the second complaint was filed. View "Commonwealth v. Womack" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed a case involving Kevin Dowling, who was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Dowling was initially charged with robbery, indecent assault, and attempted rape of Jennifer Myers, who identified him as her assailant. Two days before his trial, Myers was found dead in her art gallery. Dowling was subsequently charged with her murder. At trial, the prosecution argued that Dowling killed Myers to prevent her from testifying against him. The prosecution presented evidence including a video of Dowling’s fabricated alibi, a letter in which he confessed to attacking Myers, and testimony from several witnesses. Dowling was convicted and sentenced to death.Dowling later filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the accuracy of a receipt from a store where a witness claimed to have seen him on the day of the murder. He also claimed that the prosecution violated his due process rights by not disclosing cash register journals from the store, which would have shown that the time on the receipt was correct. The PCRA court granted Dowling a new trial, but the Commonwealth appealed.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the PCRA court's decision, concluding that Dowling failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had his counsel conducted further investigation or had the prosecution disclosed the register journals. The court also found that the false testimony of a police officer about the time on the receipt could not have affected the judgment of the jury, given the substantial independent evidence incriminating Dowling in Myers’ murder. View "Commonwealth v. Dowling" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was asked to clarify the use of hearsay evidence in establishing a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing. The case involved Ronald Harris, who was charged with multiple crimes, including attempted murder. The victim did not appear at the preliminary hearings, and the Commonwealth proceeded with the testimony of two police officers who relayed the victim's out-of-court statements. Harris's counsel objected to the use of hearsay evidence, but the trial court overruled the objections and bound all charges over for trial.Harris filed a motion to quash the charges, arguing that the Commonwealth's case was established solely through hearsay, which he claimed was not legally competent evidence. The trial court granted the motion, and the Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the decision. The Superior Court held that all material elements of a criminal offense need to be proved at a preliminary hearing by non-hearsay evidence to avoid violating a defendant's constitutional rights to due process.The Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, arguing that the Superior Court's ruling was too broad and that hearsay evidence could be used to establish some elements of the crimes charged. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision but disapproved of its rationale. The Supreme Court held that while hearsay evidence could be used to establish a prima facie case that an offense has been committed, it could not be used alone to prove a prima facie case as to the defendant's identity. The court clarified that the Commonwealth must produce some non-hearsay or admissible hearsay evidence to sustain its prima facie burden as to the defendant's identity. View "Commonwealth v. Harris" on Justia Law

The case involves Lamarcus Eugene Drayton, who was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault against his nephew. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where Drayton was found guilty on all charges and sentenced to an aggregate term of 10 to 20 years' imprisonment, followed by five years' probation. Drayton appealed, asserting that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and that the trial court erred when it excluded an alleged prior inconsistent statement by the victim. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and Drayton did not seek further review.Drayton later filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the court sent written instructions to the jury in violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 646, and for failing to call three witnesses whom Drayton claimed would have testified that he had no opportunity to commit the sexual offenses. The PCRA court dismissed Drayton’s petition, and the Superior Court affirmed the dismissal.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted review to consider whether trial counsel’s failure to object, when a trial court provides certain written instructions to the jury during deliberations in contravention of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 646, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel per se such that a PCRA petitioner need not establish prejudice in order to obtain relief. The court held that counsel’s failure to object to a Rule 646 violation is not one of the limited bases establishing ineffectiveness per se. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the lower courts. View "Commonwealth v. Drayton" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was tasked with interpreting the definition of “nudity” as used in 18 Pa.C.S. § 6321. The case involved a minor, T.Q.B., who encouraged another minor, A.D., to lift her shirt during an Instagram live video. A.D., who has an intellectual disability, exposed the bottom portion of her breasts below the nipple area. The rest of A.D.’s breasts, including the nipple, were covered by a bra. T.Q.B. was charged with transmission of sexually explicit images by a minor, a second-degree misdemeanor under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6321(c). T.Q.B. argued that the nudity element of the statute had not been established because the nipple was not exposed.The trial court adjudicated T.Q.B. delinquent, interpreting the statute to cover the exposure of any part of the breast below the nipple. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed, determining that the term "nudity" in the statute does not require that the nipple must be exposed for the offense to be committed.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the language of Section 6321(g) does not require exposure of the nipple to establish the element of nudity. The court held that nudity is sufficiently established where any area below the top of the nipple is visible. The court concluded that the clear language of the statute and the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing established the nudity requirement, and affirmed the Superior Court’s dispositional order finding the evidence sufficient to support T.Q.B.’s adjudication of delinquency. View "In the Int of: T.Q.B., a Minor; Apl of: T.Q.B." on Justia Law

The primary issue in this complex case concerned a man, Ronnie Lehman, who was residing at a residential program called the Renewal Center as a condition of his parole. While there, he was discovered unresponsive due to a drug overdose, and a search revealed possession of illegal drugs. He was charged under Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code, which prohibits a prisoner or inmate from unlawfully possessing a controlled substance. Lehman's legal team argued that he didn't qualify as an "inmate" under this law because he was on parole and voluntarily living at the Renewal Center.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disagreed, concluding that Lehman did qualify as an "inmate" under Section 5123(a.2), (e) of the Crimes Code at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance. The court reasoned that the term "committed to" in the statute didn't necessarily imply forceful or involuntary commitment, and could encompass Lehman's situation where he agreed to reside at the Renewal Center as a part of his parole conditions. Therefore, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Lehman's conviction under Section 5123(a.2), and reversed the judgment of the Superior Court which had granted Lehman post-conviction relief. View "Commonwealth v. Lehman" on Justia Law