Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A defendant was arrested on drug charges and initially held on high bail, which was later reduced. A bail bondsman posted the reduced bail, agreeing to be liable if the defendant failed to appear in court. The court scheduled a pretrial conference, but due to administrative errors, the defendant and his counsel were misinformed about the date. As a result, they missed the proceeding, leading the trial court to issue a bench warrant and revoke bail. Days later, when the defendant appeared for what he believed was the correct date, the court vacated the bench warrant and reinstated bail, relying on the defense counsel’s oral representation that the bondsman consented to continue as surety, but did not obtain written consent.Months later, the defendant failed to appear for trial, resulting in another bail revocation and notice of intent to forfeit the bond. The bondsman, after being notified of the impending forfeiture, filed a petition to strike or set aside the forfeiture, arguing that the court had failed to obtain his written consent when bail was previously reinstated. The Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas denied the petition. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, reasoning that written consent was not required because the initial bail revocation was due to court error, not the defendant’s fault.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine whether the statutory requirement for written consent from a bail bondsman applies when bail is reinstated after a revocation caused by court error. The court held that the statute requires written consent from the bail bondsman whenever bail is reinstated after a defendant’s failure to appear, regardless of whether the failure was due to a breakdown in court administration. However, the court found that the bondsman was not entitled to relief because he failed to timely appeal the order reinstating bail. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s result, but on different grounds. View "Commonwealth v. Rondon" on Justia Law

A woman, identified as the victim, lived with her mother and infant sister. The mother’s boyfriend, the appellant, would babysit the children at night. The victim testified that, starting at age 10, the appellant repeatedly entered her bedroom and sexually assaulted her. She disclosed the abuse to family members and a doctor, and later to a teacher, which led to police involvement. The appellant was charged with multiple sexual offenses, including rape of a child and related crimes.Before trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, the Commonwealth proposed a voir dire question to potential jurors, asking if they could follow the legal principle that the testimony of an alleged victim alone, if believed, is sufficient to convict in a sexual assault case. The appellant objected, arguing the question was improper and misstated the law. The trial court denied the objection, and the jury convicted the appellant on all charges, resulting in a lengthy prison sentence. The appellant’s post-sentence motion was denied, and he appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, arguing, among other things, that the voir dire question was improper. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment, finding the question proper and consistent with Pennsylvania law and jury instructions.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the trial court erred in allowing the voir dire question. The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. It found the question was designed to ensure jurors could follow the law that a victim’s uncorroborated testimony, if believed, can be sufficient for conviction in sexual assault cases. The Court concluded that such a question is permissible to identify jurors with fixed beliefs contrary to this legal principle. The judgment of sentence was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Walker" on Justia Law

A police officer observed a vehicle committing multiple traffic violations and initiated a stop. The officer discovered the vehicle was registered to someone other than the driver, George Anderson, and that Anderson's license was suspended. During the stop, the officer smelled marijuana and observed Anderson acting nervously. A protective search revealed a firearm and marijuana in the vehicle. Anderson was arrested and charged with various offenses, including firearm and drug possession.The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas denied Anderson's motion to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle, ruling that Anderson did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car because it was not registered to him. Anderson was convicted of carrying a firearm without a license and sentenced to 42 to 84 months in prison. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that Anderson failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine whether the Commonwealth met its initial burden of production to show Anderson lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy by presenting evidence that the car was registered to someone else. The court held that the mere fact that the vehicle was registered to another person was insufficient to meet the Commonwealth's burden. The court emphasized that ownership is not a prerequisite for a reasonable expectation of privacy and that lawful possession or control can also establish such an expectation. The court reversed the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider the totality of the circumstances and whether the Commonwealth met its burden based on all the evidence presented. View "Commonwealth v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In 2012, the appellant was charged with DUI and resolved the charge through acceptance into an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program. In 2020, he was again charged with DUI and convicted based on a guilty plea. The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) received notice of his conviction and suspended his license for one year under Section 3804(e) of the Vehicle Code, which mandates a suspension for DUI convictions unless the individual has no prior offenses, including ARD acceptances within the past ten years.The appellant appealed the suspension to the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas, which upheld the suspension despite the Superior Court's ruling in Commonwealth v. Chichkin, which disapproved of enhanced criminal sentencing based on an earlier ARD. The county court reasoned that the license suspension was a civil penalty and did not implicate the constitutional safeguards applicable in criminal matters. The Commonwealth Court affirmed this decision, agreeing that the suspension was a civil consequence and should be upheld as long as PennDOT acted in accordance with the law.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine whether the license suspension violated due process, given that the appellant's prior ARD acceptance was not a criminal conviction. The court held that the suspension did not violate due process. It reasoned that the suspension was based on the 2020 DUI conviction, not the prior ARD acceptance, and that the legislative scheme was rationally related to the state's interest in deterring drunk driving and ensuring public safety. The court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's order, upholding the one-year license suspension. View "Ferguson v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Willie James Hardy, was convicted of first-degree murder in 1993 and again in 1996 after being granted a new trial. Hardy has consistently maintained his innocence. In 2020, Hardy filed a petition for post-conviction DNA testing under Pennsylvania's Section 9543.1, seeking to test evidence from his case using modern DNA technology that was not available at the time of his trials. The evidence against Hardy was circumstantial, and previous DNA testing excluded him as a contributor.The Court of Common Pleas of Erie County denied Hardy's petition, reasoning that the request was untimely based on the precedent set by Commonwealth v. Edmiston, and that further testing would not provide substantially more accurate or probative results. The Superior Court affirmed this decision, emphasizing the delay in Hardy's request and the strength of the circumstantial evidence against him.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case, focusing on three main issues: the timeliness of Hardy's request, the applicability of Section 9543.1(a)(2) regarding previously tested and untested evidence, and whether Hardy presented a prima facie case that DNA testing would establish his actual innocence. The court noted that the 2018 amendments to Section 9543.1 allow for DNA testing "at any time" and authorize retesting with newer technology.The Supreme Court held that Hardy's petition was timely, as the statute permits requests for DNA testing at any time and there was no indication that Hardy's request was intended to cause delay. The court also found that the lower courts erred in their interpretation of Section 9543.1(a)(2), as the statute allows for retesting with newer technology and does not preclude testing of previously untested evidence. Finally, the court concluded that Hardy met the prima facie burden by demonstrating a reasonable possibility that DNA testing could produce exculpatory evidence establishing his actual innocence.The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Hardy" on Justia Law

In 2012, George Thomas Shifflett was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) and accepted into an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program. In 2022, Shifflett was involved in another DUI incident and was charged as a second-time offender based on his previous ARD acceptance. Shifflett pled guilty to the 2022 DUI but contested the use of his 2012 ARD as a prior offense for sentencing purposes, arguing it was unconstitutional under Alleyne v. United States.The Adams County Court of Common Pleas granted Shifflett's motion to exclude evidence of his 2012 ARD and sentenced him as a first-time offender. The Commonwealth appealed, and the Superior Court vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing as a second-time offender, citing recent Superior Court decisions that overruled Commonwealth v. Chichkin, which had held that using ARD as a prior offense for sentencing was unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine if considering Shifflett's ARD as a prior offense for sentencing violated Alleyne. The Court held that ARD does not equate to a conviction because it lacks the procedural safeguards of a criminal trial, such as the right to a jury trial and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, using ARD as a prior offense for sentencing enhancement is unconstitutional under Alleyne.The Court concluded that Section 3806 of the Motor Vehicle Code, which includes ARD in the definition of a prior offense, is facially unconstitutional to the extent it allows ARD to be used for sentencing enhancement. The Court reversed the Superior Court's order and remanded the case for reinstatement of Shifflett's original sentence as a first-time offender. View "Commonwealth v. Shifflett" on Justia Law

On December 18, 2018, police responded to a report of check fraud at a bank involving two suspects. One suspect exited the bank and approached a Kia Soul before returning inside. Police located the vehicle with Rasheed Muhammad in the driver’s seat. Upon approaching, the officer detected marijuana and observed Muhammad searching the car’s center console and other areas. Muhammad provided a rental agreement for the car, which was in his name. After backup arrived, Muhammad was asked to exit the vehicle, and a search revealed a loaded firearm in the center console. Muhammad did not have a license to carry a firearm and was arrested after attempting to flee.The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas convicted Muhammad of carrying a firearm without a license and resisting arrest. Muhammad’s motion for acquittal was denied, and he was sentenced to 3 ½ to 7 years in prison for the firearm charge, followed by 2 years of probation for resisting arrest. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment, finding sufficient evidence to support the conviction based on the circumstances, including Muhammad’s proximity to the firearm and his behavior indicating knowledge and intent to conceal it.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the jury’s negative answer to a special interrogatory about Muhammad’s possession and control of the firearm rendered the evidence insufficient for his conviction. The court found no conflict between the jury’s answer and the conviction, noting that the interrogatory’s conjunctive phrasing did not negate the elements required for carrying a firearm without a license. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s order, upholding Muhammad’s judgment of sentence. View "Commonwealth v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Christopher Lynn Johnson, was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses for the shooting death of Officer David Grove, a Deputy Wildlife Conservation Officer. On the night of November 11, 2010, Officer Grove encountered Johnson and his friend Ryan Laumann spotlighting deer near Gettysburg National Military Park. After stopping Johnson's vehicle, a confrontation ensued, during which Johnson shot Officer Grove multiple times, resulting in his death. Johnson fled the scene but was apprehended the following morning.The Court of Common Pleas of Adams County denied Johnson's petition for relief from his death sentence under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Johnson raised multiple claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel, Brady violations, and improper victim impact evidence. The PCRA court held a five-day evidentiary hearing and ultimately found no merit in Johnson's claims. The court determined that Johnson failed to demonstrate prejudice from his counsel's actions and that there was no evidence of an agreement between the Commonwealth and Laumann regarding his testimony.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and affirmed the PCRA court's decision. The court found that Johnson's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel lacked merit, as his counsel conducted a thorough investigation and presented a robust mitigation defense during the penalty phase. The court also concluded that Johnson failed to prove any Brady or Napue violations, as there was no agreement between the Commonwealth and Laumann. Additionally, the court held that the victim impact evidence presented was permissible and did not violate Johnson's constitutional rights. Finally, the court determined that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors did not warrant relief. View "Commonwealth v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Dr. Omar Almusa, a licensed medical physician and surgeon in Pennsylvania, unlawfully distributed hydrocodone between 2014 and 2018. He pleaded guilty to unlawful dispensing and distributing a controlled substance, conspiracy to distribute, and health care fraud. In 2019, he was sentenced to 24 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. Consequently, the State Board of Medicine automatically suspended his medical license for at least ten years, effective August 15, 2019.Almusa did not appeal the suspension. In 2020, the General Assembly enacted Act 53, redefining how licensing boards consider criminal offenses, specifying that only drug trafficking offenses (involving at least 100 grams of a controlled substance) warrant automatic suspension. Almusa's offense did not meet this threshold. In 2021, Almusa petitioned for reinstatement of his license, arguing that Act 53 should apply to his case, allowing him to seek reinstatement without waiting ten years.The Board denied his petition, stating that Act 53 did not apply retroactively to suspensions imposed before its enactment. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Board's decision, interpreting the suspension and reinstatement as a single action requiring a ten-year suspension period.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision. It held that automatic suspension and reinstatement are separate actions under the Medical Practice Act. The Court found that Act 53, effective December 28, 2020, applies to reinstatement proceedings initiated after this date. Since Almusa's offense did not qualify as drug trafficking under Act 53, the ten-year waiting period did not apply to his reinstatement petition. The Court concluded that Almusa was entitled to have his reinstatement petition considered under the new law. View "Almusa v. State Board of Medicine" on Justia Law

In 2007, Richard Roland Laird was sentenced to death following his retrial for first-degree murder, having originally been convicted and sentenced to death in 1988 for the same offense. Laird's most recent appeal challenges the denial of his latest Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition as untimely. He requested the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to create an equitable exception to the PCRA’s time-bar, citing the decision in Commonwealth v. Bradley, and also argued that Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) precluded the dismissal of his petition as untimely.The Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County denied Laird’s PCRA petition, finding it untimely and not meeting any statutory exceptions. The court also rejected Laird’s claims on the merits, including ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims and an illegal sentencing claim. Laird’s appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed.The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that Bradley did not establish an equitable exception to the PCRA’s time-bar and that its rationale could not be extended to create one. The court emphasized that the PCRA’s time limitations are jurisdictional and not subject to equitable principles. Additionally, the court held that the ICCPR could not be invoked to circumvent the PCRA’s timeliness requirements, reaffirming that exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar are strictly limited to those set forth in the statute.Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Laird’s PCRA petition as untimely, concluding that neither Bradley nor the ICCPR provided a basis to bypass the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar. View "Commonwealth v. Laird" on Justia Law