Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Eric Frein was sentenced to death after he was convicted by jury of first-degree murder, first-degree criminal homicide of a law enforcement officer, criminal attempt to commit first-degree murder and criminal homicide of a law enforcement officer, assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, discharge of a firearm into an occupied structure, possessing instruments of crime, and recklessly endangering another person. These charges arose from the 2014 fatal shooting of one Blooming Grove (Pike County) state police corporal, and the injury of others when appellant opened fire upon the barracks and parking lot with a high-powered rifle. Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was automatic; finding no reversible error, the Court affirmed the sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Frein" on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Machicote argued his sentence was illegal because he was subject to a potential sentence of life without parole, and prior to imposing his sentence, the trial court did not consider the factors enumerated in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), as adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286 (Pa. 2013) (Batts I) and Commonwealth v. Batts (Batts II), 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017). In 2003, Appellant was 17 years old and a resident at George Junior Republic, a residential treatment facility for at-risk youth. Appellant and a co-resident, Jeremy Melvin, devised a plan to subdue a night supervisor at the facility in order to escape. Appellant called the night supervisor, Wayne Urey, Jr., to his room. Melvin, who was hiding, attacked Urey from behind, put him in a chokehold, and brought him to the ground. Appellant and Melvin bound and gagged Urey, and proceeded to steal his keys, wallet, and truck. Appellant and Melvin escaped, and Urey ultimately died of suffocation. Appellant and Melvin turned themselves in later that same day. Appellant was charged with homicide, robbery, and related offenses. Appellant pled guilty to second-degree murder and the remaining charges were dismissed. Appellant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Appellant did not appeal his sentence. The Superior Court concluded that Appellant’s challenge to his sentence was moot because he was ultimately not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court concluded the issue was not moot, and the trial court erred when it failed to consider the Miller factors on the record when it resentenced Appellant. View "Pennsylvania v. Machicote" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth Court dismissed appellant Bert Hudson's petition for review, in which he argued he was entitled to be considered for parole after having received a life sentence for second-degree murder. In 1978, Appellant burglarized a home and shot two individuals with a handgun, killing one of them. The court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment on the murder conviction, and a separate, consecutive sentence of fifteen-to-thirty years on the other convictions, to be served first. Appellant completed this latter sentence in 2009, and was serving his life sentence for second-degree murder. In 2017, Appellant applied for parole. The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the “Board”) denied his application on the basis that his life sentence had no minimum date. After exhausting administrative remedies, Appellant filed a petition for review in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction, contending that because the common pleas court had failed to specify a minimum sentence, he should be deemed to have an implied minimum of one day of confinement. Appellant thus asked the court to direct the Board to review him for parole. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the Board lacked the power to release on parole an inmate servicing a mandatory life sentence for second-degree murder. That being the case, the Commonwealth Court correctly sustained the Board’s demurrer and dismissed the petition for review. View "Hudson v. Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Pennsylvania State Police filed a criminal complaint against appellant Robert Gill, Jr., charging him with, inter alia, burglary, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and criminal trespass. The issue his appeal presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Superior Court properly applied the “abuse of discretion” standard of review when, in a published opinion, it reversed a trial court order that granted Gill's motion in limine to admit evidence of a subsequent similar crime committed by another individual. The Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court misapplied this standard of review. Consequently, it reversed in part and vacated in part the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded to the Superior Court with instructions. View "Pennsylvania v. Gill" on Justia Law

During a routine patrol, Officer James Falconio of the Pleasant Hills Police Department observed a white Dodge Dart enter a parking lot that served two closed businesses – a hobby store and a pizza shop – and drive behind the buildings. Believing that the vehicle may have made a wrong turn, Officer Falconio waited and watched for the vehicle to exit the parking lot. When it did not, the officer drove into the parking lot and behind the buildings to “simply check[] to see why a car drove behind two dark, closed businesses at [three] o’clock in the morning,” as he recognized the potential for “drug activity or an attempted burglary.” When he arrived behind the buildings, Officer Falconio observed a white Dodge Dart parked behind the pizza shop. Officer Falconio found the driver inside, appellant Edward Adams, observing the driver had glassy eyes and slurred speech. The officer requested that Adams perform several field sobriety tests, and although “argumentative,” Adams complied and failed the tests. Officer Falconio then placed Adams under arrest for suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. He transported Adams to Jefferson Regional Hospital, where Adams consented to a blood draw. Adams declined to provide the name of a person who could pick him up, and so he remained in jail until police believed he was sober enough to leave on his own, which occurred several hours later. This discretionary appeal presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review the the question of when an interaction between an ordinary citizen and a law enforcement official ripens from a mere encounter, requiring no level of suspicion, to an investigative detention, which must be supported by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The Court concluded, based on longstanding precedent, that the line is crossed when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, and that a detention effectuated by police in the interest of officer safety is impermissible in the absence of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The Court concluded Officer Falconio subjected Adams to an investigative detention unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The trial court erred by denying Adams’ suppression motion on that basis and the Superior Court erred in its affirmance of that decision. View "Pennsylvania v. Adams" on Justia Law

In 1998, Appellant Milton Montalvo, along with his brother, conspired to kill Appellant's wife Miriam Ascensio. At the time, the couple had recently separated. One neighbor observed broken glass on Ascensio’s porch, knocked on the door, and received no response. After looking into the window and observing a male lying on the floor, the neighbor instructed his wife to call the police. Upon their arrival, the police discovered the bodies of Ascensio and Lugo inside the residence: Ascensio’s neck was slashed several times, her skull fractured by a blunt object, and her eye punctured; Lugo’s body had a fatal stab wound to the chest, and a tube of lipstick was protruding from his teeth. Crime scene investigators collected a blood sample on a window blind hanging inside the broken pane of glass in Ascensio’s porch door and another blood sample on a cloth bag found on a sofa bed. Both samples were later determined to be Appellant’s blood. A witness who knew the brothers gave a tape-recorded statement to police, relaying what she heard at a grocery store. She further indicated that Appellant and his brother appeared at her home the morning after the murders and that Appellant stated, “We killed my wife.” Soto also told police that the men explained that Appellant killed Lugo and his brother killed Ascensio, and that they intended to flee to Florida or the Dominican Republic. More than eight months later, in January of 1999, police apprehended Appellant in Florida. In a recorded statement to police, Appellant denied any involvement in the murders. Pennsylvania charged Appellant with two counts of murder. He was convicted by jury; at issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was Appellant's appeal of post-conviction relief on grounds he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase of his trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed denial of relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Montalvo" on Justia Law

In 1997, Appellant Russell Cox was convicted of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, rape, and possessing an instrument of crime, in connection with his participation, along with co-defendant Percy Lee, in the February 27, 1986 brutal slayings of Evelyn Brown and her seventeen-year-old daughter, Tina. Petitioner was 18 years old at the time of the crimes and Lee was 17 years old. In the subsequent penalty phase, the jury found: (1) the killings were committed during the perpetration of a felony; (2) the killings were committed by means of torture; and (3) Appellant was convicted of another offense for which a life sentence could be imposed. The jury also found: (1) Appellant’s lack of a criminal record; (2) Appellant’s young age; and (3) other mitigation concerning Appellant’s character and the circumstances of the offense. Determining the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, the jury sentenced Appellant to death on each murder count. Appellant appealed dismissal of his second petition for post-conviction relief. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the PCRA court’s evaluation of the evidence in this case erroneously incorporated invalid and irrelevant considerations, tainting its conclusion. Because conflicts remained in the testimony, the Court remanded to the PCRA court to reconsider the existing record in this case in accordance with its opinion. The Court affirmed the PCRA court in all other respects. View "Pennsylvania v. Cox" on Justia Law

The issue presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court by this case was one of first impression: whether a woman’s use of opioids while pregnant, which results in a child born suffering from neonatal abstinence syndrome(“NAS”), constitutes “child abuse.” In 2016, A.A.R. (“Mother”), was released from incarceration, after which she relapsed into drug addiction, using opioids (pain pills) and marijuana. Mother subsequently learned that she was pregnant with L.J.B. (“Child”). She sought treatment for her addiction, first through a methadone maintenance program and then with subutex. Mother again relapsed, and in mid-January 2017 she tested positive for opiates, benzodiazepines and marijuana, none of which were prescribed for her. Mother gave birth to Child on January 27, 2017; at the time of Child’s birth, Mother tested positive for marijuana and subutex. By the third day of life, Child began exhibiting symptoms of NAS, including tremors, excessive suck, increased muscle tone and loose stools, which doctors treated with morphine. Mother reportedly left Child in the hospital and did not consistently check on her or stay with her (despite the availability of a room for her to do so). Hospital personnel communicated all of this information to the Clinton County Children and Youth Social Services Agency (“CYS”), which ultimately took emergency custody of the child. The Pennsylvania Child Protective Services Law (“CPSL”) defined “child abuse,” in relevant part, as “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly ... (1) [c]ausing bodily injury to a child through any recent act or failure to act,” or “(5) [c]reating a reasonable likelihood of bodily injury to a child through any recent act or failure to act.” The Supreme Court concluded,based on the relevant statutory language, that a mother cannot be found to be a perpetrator of child abuse against her newly born child for drug use while pregnant. The Court therefore reversed the decision of the Superior Court and remanded the matter for reinstatement of the trial court’s order. View "In the Interest of: L.J.B" on Justia Law

William Rivera appealed the death sentence he received for the 1995 carjacking and murder of Tae Hung Kang. The Post-Conviction Relief court limited his appeal to one issue — whether penalty phase counsel was ineffective for failing to present mental health and life history mitigation evidence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions that “no number of failed claims may collectively warrant relief i[f] they fail to do so individually.” However, the Court has also acknowledged that “‘if multiple instances of deficient performance are found, the assessment of prejudice properly may be premised upon cumulation.’” The Court found "the great majority" of appellant’s individual claims lacked merit, therefore the Court was satisfied appellant was not entitled to relief based on cumulative prejudice. Therefore, the PCR court properly dismissed appellant's petition for relief after having limited its hearing to one issue. View "Pennsylvania v. Rivera" on Justia Law

In this opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered a question left unanswered by its July 27, 2018 opinion. Specifically, the Court addressed what, if any, due process remedy was available to Petitioners, who were former and current priests in various Catholic Dioceses throughout Pennsylvania specifically condemned in Report 1 of the 40th Investigating Grand Jury (“Report 1”) as “predator priests,” to secure their constitutionally guaranteed right to reputation. The Court concluded that it could not employ any of the remedies offered by the parties, and, thus, the Court had to make permanent the redaction of Petitioners’ identifying information from Report 1, which was previously ordered as an interim measure, “as this is the only viable due process remedy we may now afford to Petitioners to protect their constitutional rights to reputation.” View "In Re: Fortieth Statewide Investigation Grand Jury" on Justia Law