Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Rashaan Londale Greer, who was convicted of first-degree murder and carrying a firearm without a license. After his conviction was affirmed by the Superior Court and his appeal denied by the Supreme Court, Greer filed a Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed several amended petitions before withdrawing her appearance. Greer's second PCRA counsel, Anthony J. Tambourino, filed another amended PCRA petition. After a hearing, the PCRA court denied the amended petition. Tambourino filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the PCRA court’s order to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.Before the establishment of a briefing schedule, Tambourino filed an application for remand, asserting that Greer had sent him a letter requesting a remand to allow Greer to raise claims of Tambourino’s ineffectiveness. The Superior Court deferred the application for remand to the merits panel and directed Tambourino to file a brief. The Superior Court, in an unpublished memorandum opinion, vacated the PCRA court’s order and remanded the case to the PCRA court. The Superior Court directed the PCRA court to appoint new counsel to develop a record and address any issues Greer had with Tambourino’s stewardship.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court's order and remanded to that Court for proceedings consistent with its opinion. The Supreme Court held that when a represented petitioner seeks to raise claims against his current counsel while his petition is pending on appeal, an appellate court must remand the case to the PCRA court to have an on-the-record colloquy with the petitioner about his right to counsel, his inability to proceed through hybrid representation, and how he wishes to proceed. The Supreme Court found that the Superior Court erred in ordering a remand without directing the PCRA court to have such an on-the-record discussion. View "Commonwealth v. Greer" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, challenged the Chester County Court of Common Pleas' ruling that the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) was unconstitutional. The appellee, George Torsilieri, had been convicted of sexual offenses and was subject to SORNA's registration and notification requirements. Torsilieri argued that SORNA's presumption that individuals who commit sexual offenses pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses was an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption violating due process. He also contended that SORNA's requirements constituted criminal punishment, which served as the basis for various constitutional challenges.The lower court agreed with Torsilieri, finding that the presumption was not universally true and that the registration and notification requirements were punitive. The court declared Subchapter H of SORNA unconstitutional, and the Commonwealth appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the lower court's decision. The court held that Torsilieri failed to establish that SORNA's irrebuttable presumption was constitutionally infirm. The court also concluded that Torsilieri failed to demonstrate that SORNA constituted criminal punishment. Therefore, the court rejected Torsilieri's subsidiary constitutional challenges and reinstated his duty to comply with SORNA. View "Commonwealth v. Torsilieri" on Justia Law

The case involves Marcus Womack, who was arrested in 2017 following a search warrant executed at a residence in Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania. The search revealed that Womack had been selling drugs from the location, and he was found in possession of a large sum of money, drugs, and a stolen firearm. On the same day, a criminal complaint was filed against Womack, charging him with nine offenses. Unable to post bail, Womack remained in custody. Subsequent investigations revealed that Womack's drug enterprise extended beyond Huntingdon County, leading to the involvement of the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) and a statewide investigating grand jury. In 2018, a second criminal complaint was filed against Womack, charging him with twenty-eight offenses based on evidence gathered during the grand jury investigation.The trial court denied Womack's motion to dismiss the second complaint under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1), which requires a trial to commence within 365 days from the date the complaint is filed. Womack's motion to dismiss the first complaint on the same grounds was granted. Womack was found guilty of several offenses in a bench trial on the second complaint and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 39 to 90 years’ imprisonment. He appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that the computation of time for Rule 600 purposes should have been based on the filing date of the first complaint. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Superior Court’s order denying relief. The court applied the test from Commonwealth v. Meadius, which requires the Commonwealth to demonstrate due diligence between the period in which the complaints were filed, establish that the filing of the second complaint was necessitated by factors beyond its control, and show that its actions were not an attempt to circumvent or manipulate the speedy trial requirements. The court found that the Commonwealth met these requirements, and therefore, the Rule 600 clock began when the second complaint was filed. View "Commonwealth v. Womack" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed a case involving Kevin Dowling, who was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Dowling was initially charged with robbery, indecent assault, and attempted rape of Jennifer Myers, who identified him as her assailant. Two days before his trial, Myers was found dead in her art gallery. Dowling was subsequently charged with her murder. At trial, the prosecution argued that Dowling killed Myers to prevent her from testifying against him. The prosecution presented evidence including a video of Dowling’s fabricated alibi, a letter in which he confessed to attacking Myers, and testimony from several witnesses. Dowling was convicted and sentenced to death.Dowling later filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the accuracy of a receipt from a store where a witness claimed to have seen him on the day of the murder. He also claimed that the prosecution violated his due process rights by not disclosing cash register journals from the store, which would have shown that the time on the receipt was correct. The PCRA court granted Dowling a new trial, but the Commonwealth appealed.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the PCRA court's decision, concluding that Dowling failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had his counsel conducted further investigation or had the prosecution disclosed the register journals. The court also found that the false testimony of a police officer about the time on the receipt could not have affected the judgment of the jury, given the substantial independent evidence incriminating Dowling in Myers’ murder. View "Commonwealth v. Dowling" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was asked to clarify the use of hearsay evidence in establishing a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing. The case involved Ronald Harris, who was charged with multiple crimes, including attempted murder. The victim did not appear at the preliminary hearings, and the Commonwealth proceeded with the testimony of two police officers who relayed the victim's out-of-court statements. Harris's counsel objected to the use of hearsay evidence, but the trial court overruled the objections and bound all charges over for trial.Harris filed a motion to quash the charges, arguing that the Commonwealth's case was established solely through hearsay, which he claimed was not legally competent evidence. The trial court granted the motion, and the Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the decision. The Superior Court held that all material elements of a criminal offense need to be proved at a preliminary hearing by non-hearsay evidence to avoid violating a defendant's constitutional rights to due process.The Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, arguing that the Superior Court's ruling was too broad and that hearsay evidence could be used to establish some elements of the crimes charged. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision but disapproved of its rationale. The Supreme Court held that while hearsay evidence could be used to establish a prima facie case that an offense has been committed, it could not be used alone to prove a prima facie case as to the defendant's identity. The court clarified that the Commonwealth must produce some non-hearsay or admissible hearsay evidence to sustain its prima facie burden as to the defendant's identity. View "Commonwealth v. Harris" on Justia Law

The case involves Lamarcus Eugene Drayton, who was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault against his nephew. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where Drayton was found guilty on all charges and sentenced to an aggregate term of 10 to 20 years' imprisonment, followed by five years' probation. Drayton appealed, asserting that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and that the trial court erred when it excluded an alleged prior inconsistent statement by the victim. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and Drayton did not seek further review.Drayton later filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the court sent written instructions to the jury in violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 646, and for failing to call three witnesses whom Drayton claimed would have testified that he had no opportunity to commit the sexual offenses. The PCRA court dismissed Drayton’s petition, and the Superior Court affirmed the dismissal.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted review to consider whether trial counsel’s failure to object, when a trial court provides certain written instructions to the jury during deliberations in contravention of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 646, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel per se such that a PCRA petitioner need not establish prejudice in order to obtain relief. The court held that counsel’s failure to object to a Rule 646 violation is not one of the limited bases establishing ineffectiveness per se. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the lower courts. View "Commonwealth v. Drayton" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was tasked with interpreting the definition of “nudity” as used in 18 Pa.C.S. § 6321. The case involved a minor, T.Q.B., who encouraged another minor, A.D., to lift her shirt during an Instagram live video. A.D., who has an intellectual disability, exposed the bottom portion of her breasts below the nipple area. The rest of A.D.’s breasts, including the nipple, were covered by a bra. T.Q.B. was charged with transmission of sexually explicit images by a minor, a second-degree misdemeanor under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6321(c). T.Q.B. argued that the nudity element of the statute had not been established because the nipple was not exposed.The trial court adjudicated T.Q.B. delinquent, interpreting the statute to cover the exposure of any part of the breast below the nipple. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed, determining that the term "nudity" in the statute does not require that the nipple must be exposed for the offense to be committed.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the language of Section 6321(g) does not require exposure of the nipple to establish the element of nudity. The court held that nudity is sufficiently established where any area below the top of the nipple is visible. The court concluded that the clear language of the statute and the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing established the nudity requirement, and affirmed the Superior Court’s dispositional order finding the evidence sufficient to support T.Q.B.’s adjudication of delinquency. View "In the Int of: T.Q.B., a Minor; Apl of: T.Q.B." on Justia Law

The primary issue in this complex case concerned a man, Ronnie Lehman, who was residing at a residential program called the Renewal Center as a condition of his parole. While there, he was discovered unresponsive due to a drug overdose, and a search revealed possession of illegal drugs. He was charged under Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code, which prohibits a prisoner or inmate from unlawfully possessing a controlled substance. Lehman's legal team argued that he didn't qualify as an "inmate" under this law because he was on parole and voluntarily living at the Renewal Center.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disagreed, concluding that Lehman did qualify as an "inmate" under Section 5123(a.2), (e) of the Crimes Code at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance. The court reasoned that the term "committed to" in the statute didn't necessarily imply forceful or involuntary commitment, and could encompass Lehman's situation where he agreed to reside at the Renewal Center as a part of his parole conditions. Therefore, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Lehman's conviction under Section 5123(a.2), and reversed the judgment of the Superior Court which had granted Lehman post-conviction relief. View "Commonwealth v. Lehman" on Justia Law

In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Daniel D. Chisebwe, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether the evidence was sufficient to support the summary convictions of Daniel Chisebwe for violating two provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code: 75 Pa.C.S. §1511 (Carrying and exhibiting driver’s license on demand) and 75 Pa.C.S. §1311 (Registration card to be signed and exhibited on demand). Chisebwe repeatedly refused to produce his driver’s license and registration card after being stopped for speeding and did so only about twenty-five minutes into the traffic stop, when the police were about to remove him from his car and take him to the police station.The Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The Court found that the phrase "upon demand" in the relevant statutory provisions required Chisebwe to produce his driver’s license and registration card immediately or nearly immediately when requested by a police officer. Chisebwe's delayed production of these documents, about twenty-five minutes into the traffic stop, was far from prompt and therefore did not satisfy the statutes.The Court also held that the safe-harbor provisions of the statutory provisions did not apply to Chisebwe. These provisions permit a driver to produce his license and registration card either at the office of the police officer or the office of the issuing authority, which did not happen in this case. Instead, Chisebwe produced the documents on the side of the road, which did not comport with the specific office-production requirements of the safe-harbor provisions. The Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court upholding Chisebwe’s judgment of sentence. View "Commonwealth v. Chisebwe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether a violation of a juvenile defendant's Fifth Amendment right is subject to appellate review for harmless error. The case involved Nazeer Taylor, who was charged with several serious felony offenses as a juvenile. The juvenile court transferred Taylor's case to adult criminal court, considering Taylor's refusal to admit guilt for his alleged offenses as a factor in its decision. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania previously held that such consideration violated Taylor's Fifth Amendment right. In this appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the violation constituted a structural error, not subject to a harmless error review. Given Taylor's current age of 27, neither the juvenile nor the adult criminal court had the statutory authority to conduct a new certification hearing. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court reversing Taylor's conviction and discharging him. View "Commonwealth v. Taylor" on Justia Law