Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Vernon Eugene Hannah was convicted of one felony count of forging a public record and one misdemeanor count of providing false information to a law enforcement officer. He was sentenced to five years of incarceration with two years suspended for the felony, and twelve months of incarceration with eight months suspended for the misdemeanor. The circuit court partially suspended Hannah’s sentences on the condition of good behavior, compliance with urine screens, payment of costs, and supervised probation. Despite these conditions, Hannah tested positive for controlled substances multiple times. As a result, Hannah’s probation officer requested that the circuit court issue a rule to show cause, which led to a probation revocation hearing.The circuit court found Hannah guilty of violating the terms of his probation on both the felony and misdemeanor convictions, revoked the suspended sentences for both, and resuspended the sentences for the same period of supervised probation, this time adding new special conditions. Hannah appealed the reimposition of his suspended sentence to the Court of Appeals on two grounds, challenging the circuit court’s jurisdiction to hold the probation revocation hearing, and challenging the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the circuit court’s May 2022 order revoking and resuspending Hannah’s sentence was not void ab initio under the 2021 statutory amendments. The court also held that the amended Code § 19.2-303.1 did not abrogate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction to decide Hannah’s revocation. Furthermore, the court found that Hannah’s challenges based on Code § 19.2-303.1 were waived under Rules 5A:18 and 5A:20, and that Hannah’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was barred by Rule 5A:18. View "Hannah v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Marcus Cleophus Holman, who was convicted for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Holman had initially pleaded guilty to this charge as part of a strategic move to avoid a conviction for aggravated malicious wounding. However, he later challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the firearm charge. The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed Holman's conviction, applying the "ends of justice" exception to Rule 5A:18 and stating that the approbate and reprobate doctrine did not apply.The Commonwealth of Virginia appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals, arguing that the approbate and reprobate doctrine should apply. This doctrine prevents a litigant from taking inconsistent positions in the course of litigation. The Commonwealth argued that Holman had approbated by pleading guilty to the firearm charge and then reprobated by later challenging it.The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Commonwealth. It held that Holman had indeed approbated and reprobated on the charge of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The Court noted that Holman's decision not to contest the firearm charge was a clear trial strategy. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment for the Commonwealth. View "Commonwealth v. Holman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case of Dwayne Lamont Sample, Jr., who was convicted of attempted robbery. Sample challenged his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress an out-of-court identification from a victim based on a single photo showup, which he deemed impermissibly suggestive and thus unreliable. Sample also contested the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the decision of the lower courts, agreeing that the single photo showup, while generally viewed with suspicion, was not impermissibly suggestive in this case. The court found that the police officer's comment before showing the photo did not make the identification virtually inevitable, and was more of an expression of suspicion than a definite assertion. In evaluating the case, the court applied the five factors from Neil v. Biggers to assess the likelihood of misidentification, and found that all five factors weighed in favor of the victim’s identification reliability.Sample also argued that the DNA evidence and the victim's identification were insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court disagreed, noting that the trial court had considered and rejected Sample's theory of secondary DNA transfer due to a lack of supporting evidence. The court concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found Sample guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, given the DNA evidence, eyewitness identifications, and Sample's proximity to the scene of the crime. The court affirmed Sample's conviction for attempted robbery. View "Sample v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this case, Andrew Schmuhl ("Schmuhl") appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. At his trial, Schmuhl had claimed he was involuntarily intoxicated due to prescription medications at the time of committing a home invasion, which resulted in several criminal charges. His trial counsel argued that Schmuhl's involuntary intoxication was a separate defense from an insanity defense, which they chose not to raise. However, the trial court ruled that without an insanity defense, Schmuhl could not present expert testimony about his mental state, effectively barring his involuntary intoxication defense. Schmuhl was found guilty on all counts. Schmuhl later filed a habeas corpus petition arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective due to misunderstanding the law regarding the admissibility of mental state evidence without an insanity defense. The habeas court ruled that trial counsel's performance was not deficient and that Schmuhl was not prejudiced by their performance. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the habeas court's decision, finding that Schmuhl's trial counsel's performance was objectively reasonable given the unclear state of the law at the time. The court noted that had trial counsel’s arguments been successful, they would have carried significant strategic benefits for Schmuhl, and that trial counsel's unsuccessful attempt to extend existing law for their client's benefit was not deficient. View "Schmuhl v. Clarke" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Virginia was asked to interpret Code § 19.2-306.1, a statute enacted in 2021 that addresses the range of punishment a court may impose upon the revocation of a suspended sentence. The defendant, Emily Katherine Delaune, was convicted of three drug offenses in 2019 and was sentenced to six years of incarceration, with four years suspended. After her release, she violated the terms of her probation by using drugs and absconding from supervision. The Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach revoked Delaune's suspended sentence based on these violations and ordered her to serve 60 days of active incarceration.Delaune appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, arguing that under Code § 19.2-306.1, the circuit court was prohibited from imposing more than 14 days of active incarceration based on her technical violations. The Attorney General asserted that Code § 19.2-306.1 did not retroactively apply to Delaune’s probation violations.The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Court of Appeals' ruling that the parties had implicitly agreed to proceed under Code § 19.2-306.1 during the probation revocation hearing, and that the Attorney General was bound by this agreement. The Supreme Court of Virginia also agreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Code § 19.2-306.1, stating that the circuit court could not impose a term of active incarceration based on Delaune’s drug use, which constituted a first technical violation under the statute, and could impose a maximum of 14 days of active incarceration for Delaune’s absconding violation, which was automatically classified as a second technical violation under the statute. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the circuit court erred when it ordered Delaune to serve 60 days of active incarceration. View "Commonwealth v. Delaune" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's sentence for malicious wounding, holding that the court of appeals erred by reversing the trial court's restitution order as violative of Va. Code 19.2-305.1.Defendant was convicted of the malicious wounding of Justin Hawks. As a condition of Defendant's probation and suspended sentence the trial court ordered Defendant to reimburse the Virginia Department of Medical Assistance Services (DMAS) for Hawks's medical expenses. The court of appeals reversed the restitution award to DMAS and remanded the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 19.2-305.1 authorized the trial court to order restitution as a condition of Defendant's probation and sentence and to order payment of that restitution to DMAS for the portion of the medical expenses incurred by Hawks that DMAS had paid. View "Commonwealth v. Puckett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions of three counts of aggravated sexual battery by a parent under Va. Code 18.2-67.3 and four counts of taking indecent liberties with a child under Va. Code 18.2-370.1 but vacated the portion of the court of appeals' opinion deciding that Laurie Lee's proffered testimony provided Defendant with an alibi, holding that the court erred in part.In affirming Defendant's convictions the court of appeals defined alibi as a defense based on the physical impossibility of committing a crime and held that Lee's proffered testimony served as an alibi because it placed Defendant outside of the room where the offenses occurred. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the opinion deciding that the proffered testimony provided Defendant with an alibi but affirmed the otherwise affirmed, holding that the court of appeals erred in ruling on the merits of this case because Defendant waived his challenge that the proffered testimony was offered for impeachment. View "Moison v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction, after a jury trial, of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, third or subsequent offense, and possession of heroin and Furanylfentanyl with the intent to distribute, third or subsequent offense, holding that Rule 3A:15 does not preclude a trial court from timely reconsidering a motion to strike.At issue in this appeal was whether Rule 3A:15 or the Double Jeopardy Clause restricts a trial court's authority to reconsider a motion to strike that the trial court granted in error. The court of appeals concluded that, once a court grants a motion to strike, the court is foreclosed from reconsidering its decision under Rule 3A:15, which requires the court to enter an order of acquittal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Rule 3A:15 does not prevent a court from reconsidering its ruling on a motion to strike; and (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause restricts a court's authority to reconsider a motion to strike, but those limitations were not implicated in this case. View "Commonwealth v. McBride" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) failed timely to release him from prison because it under-calculated his earned sentence credits (ESCs), holding that the circuit court did not err.In his habeas corpus petition, Appellant argued that he was entitled to enhanced ESCs under the General Assembly's 2020 amendments to Va. Code 53-1-202.3 as set forth in House Bill 5148 (HB 5148). The circuit court denied the petition, concluding that Appellant was not entitled to immediate release because he was precluded from earning enhanced ESCs for time served prior to July 1, 2022. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not eligible to receive enhanced ESCs under HB 5148. View "Anderson v. Clarke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus and issued the writ directed to the Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections ordering that Petitioner be released from custody, holding that Petitioner was entitled to relief on his claim that he was wrongfully denied earned sentence credits on his convictions for attempted murder that, if awarded, would result in his immediate release from incarceration.In his habeas corpus petition, Petitioner argued that he was wrongfully denied earned sentence credits on his convictions for attempted aggravated murder. Specifically, Petitioner argued that the Virginia Department of Corrections misinterpreted Va. Code 53.1-202.3(A) and, as a result, miscalculated his release date. The Supreme Court agreed, granted Petitioner's petition, and ordered that Petitioner be released from custody, holding that Petitioner established that he was entitled to relief. View "Prease v. Clarke" on Justia Law