Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Upon consideration of Darnell Phillips’ petition for a writ of actual innocence, Respondent’s motion to dismiss, and Phillips’ motion for a nonsuit, the Supreme Court decided that the writ of actual innocence will not issue, the motion for nonsuit will be denied, and the petition will be dismissed.Phillips challenged his convictions for abduction with intent to defile, rape, forcible sodomy, and malicious wounding. After testing conducted by a private laboratory and resulting report submitted by a forensic scientist, Phillips filed his current petition for a writ of actual innocence. Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided In re Brown, 295 Va. 202, 225 (Va. 2018). Because the holding was not favorable to Phillips, he moved to nonsuit his petition. The Supreme Court denied the motion for nonsuit and dismissed the petition for writ of actual innocence, holding (1) Phillips’ petition was not a civil action to which the nonsuit statute applies; and (2) the petition must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. View "In re Phillips" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed, without prejudice, Appellant’s appeal of the circuit court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for reconsideration of its prior order denying his second motion to dismiss his capital indictments, holding that the Court was without jurisdiction to consider this appeal.Appellant was indicted for two counts of capital murder. Eleven years after the circuit court determined that Appellant was incompetent to stand trial, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the capital indictments. The court denied the motion, finding that Appellant remained incompetent to stand trial, that his continued treatment was medically appropriate, and that he presented a danger to himself and others. Appellant then filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that Va. Code 19.2-169.3(F), which required the circuit court to do periodic evaluations of Appellant, violated his rights to due process, equal protection and a speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion and Appellant’s subsequent motion to reconsider. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that this appeal was from a purported judgment in a criminal case, and therefore, an appeal lay first with the court of appeals. View "Martinez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the circuit court’s judgment denying a motion for nonsuit, prospectively denying an inmate in forma pauperis status pursuant to Va. Code 8.01-692, and imposing a pre-service review with possible summary dismissal on the inmate’s future filings, holding one portion of the judgment was proper but the remainder must be vacated and remanded.Specifically, the Court held (1) because Appellant had at least three cases dismissed for failure to state a claim, the circuit court’s judgment denying him prospective in forma pauperis status was proper; (2) the portion of the judgment imposing pre-service review and summary dismissal on any future complaints Appellant might file in the Wise County Circuit Court must be vacated and remanded for the circuit court’s consideration of the four-factor test established in Adkins v. CP/IPERS Arlington Hotel LLC, 293 Va. 446, 452-53 (2017); and (3) the part of the judgment holding that the complaint was speculative and failed to establish irreparable harm and the lack of an adequate remedy at law must be vacated and remanded for entry of an order of nonsuit. View "Gordon v. Kiser" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding Defendant’s conviction for shooting at an occupied vehicle under Va. Code 18.2-154, holding that the plain language of the statute did not require the prosecution to prove that the shooter was located outside of the vehicle when he fired shots at an occupied vehicle.While inside a vehicle, Defendant shot one of the vehicle’s occupants. Among other things, Defendant was convicted of maliciously shooting at an occupied vehicle. On appeal, Defendant argued that he could not violate section 18.2-154 unless he was aiming in the direction of the car while standing outside of said car. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the plain language of the statute contains no requirement that the shooter who maliciously shoots at an occupied vehicle must be positioned outside of the vehicle. View "Jones v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court determining that Defendant’s dog was a “dangerous dog” within the meaning of Va. Code 3.2-6540(A), finding that Defendant was the custodian or harborer of the dog, and ordering Defendant to pay restitution for the injuries to another dog, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held (1) the circuit court did not err in finding that Defendant’s dog was a dangerous dog and that she was liable for restitution as the dog’s custodian; (2) the determination that Defendant was the custodian or harborer of the dog was not plainly wrong; and (3) based on the evidence, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution in the amount of $3,896.15. View "Frouz v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that multiple mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment, imposed for multiple convictions under Va. Code 18.2-308.2(A) are required to be served consecutively and vacated Defendant’s sentences because they were run concurrently.The circuit court sentenced Defendant to five years for two violations of section 18.2-308.2(A) and ordered that the sentences run concurrently. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in ordering that the sentences for Defendant’s two convictions run concurrently. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded this case for resentencing, holding (1) the court of appeals properly interpreted section 18.2-308.2(A); and (2) mandatory minimum terms of confinement ordered pursuant to 18.2-308.2(A) must run consecutively with any other sentence, including other mandatory minimum terms ordered pursuant to the statute. View "Botkin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying Defendant’s appeal from the circuit court’s order revoking twenty years of Defendant’s suspended sentence and resuspending fifteen years after finding that Defendant was in violation of the conditions of his probation, holding that the admission of hearsay evidence in the probation revocation proceeding did not violate Defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Defendant was convicted of rape. After he was released on probation, the circuit court issued a capias for Defendant’s arrest on the ground that he had violated the conditions of his probation. At a probation revocation hearing, the circuit court ruled that certain hearsay evidence was admissible. The circuit court ultimately determined Defendant to be in violation of the conditions of his probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not violate Defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s sentence of ten years in prison, three years suspended upon certain conditions, imposed in connection with Defendant’s conviction for felony child abuse and neglect, holding that the trial court’s sentencing order, as drafted, did not comply with Virginia law.On appeal, Defendant argued that the sentence imposed by the trial court did not conform to Va. Code 19.2-295 and 19.2-295.2 and improperly extended the maximum sentence fixed by the jury of seven years in prison. In reversing, the Supreme Court held that the court impermissibly lengthened the sentence fixed by the jury from seven years to ten years, which the Virginia Code does not authorize. View "Thomas v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of arson of an occupied dwelling and nine counts of attempted first-degree murder, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his confession and did not err in denying Defendant’s motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of his specific intent to commit murder.On appeal, Defendant argued that his confession, given after he was informed of his Miranda rights, was the product of an intentional and coercive interrogation technique proscribed in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) or was otherwise involuntary. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) Defendant’s post-Miranda warning inculpatory statements were voluntary, and thus admissible; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to establish Defendant’s specific intent to commit attempted first-degree murder. View "Secret v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding Defendant’s conviction for rape, holding that the circuit court’s finding that Defendant’s waiver of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was knowing and voluntary and that the court’s decision to admit into evidence a recording of Defendant’s interview with police officers was not in error.On appeal, Defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress statements he made during the police interrogation. Defendant argued that his statements made to police officers through an interpreter were obtained involuntarily and that he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights under Miranda. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme court also affirmed, holding (1) the record supported the circuit court’s finding that Defendant had the requisite level of Spanish comprehension to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that there was an adequate foundation to admit the recording of the interview into evidence. View "Tirado v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law