Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court dismissed Sherman Brown’s petition seeking a writ of actual innocence pursuant to Va. Code 19.2-327.1 to -327.6, which govern writs of actual innocence based on biological evidence, for two independent reasons.In 1970, Brown was found guilty of first-degree murder of a four-year-old child. In 2017, Brown filed his petition for a writ of actual innocence, asserting that he was “actually innocent” of the crime and that recent DNA testing by a private laboratory conclusively exonerated him with “clear and convincing evidence.” In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held (1) the findings of the Commonwealth’s Department of Forensic Science (DFS) did not support Brown’s claim of actual innocence; and (2) the evidence submitted by Brown in the writ proceeding did not provide, in the aggregate, clear and convincing proof that “no rational trier of fact would have found proof of guilt…beyond a reasonable doubt.” View "In re Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Sherman Brown’s petition seeking a writ of actual innocence pursuant to Va. Code 19.2-327.1 to -327.6, which govern writs of actual innocence based on biological evidence, for two independent reasons.In 1970, Brown was found guilty of first-degree murder of a four-year-old child. In 2017, Brown filed his petition for a writ of actual innocence, asserting that he was “actually innocent” of the crime and that recent DNA testing by a private laboratory conclusively exonerated him with “clear and convincing evidence.” In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held (1) the findings of the Commonwealth’s Department of Forensic Science (DFS) did not support Brown’s claim of actual innocence; and (2) the evidence submitted by Brown in the writ proceeding did not provide, in the aggregate, clear and convincing proof that “no rational trier of fact would have found proof of guilt…beyond a reasonable doubt.” View "In re Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant’s petition to expunge a felony arrest record, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the petition.The trial court declined the expunge the record on the basis that the existence of this record did not and may not cause Appellant a manifest injustice. The Supreme Court held (1) Appellant was eligible to seek expungement of the record at issue; and (2) Appellant’s unrebutted evidence established that the continued existence and possible dissemination of her arrest record could constitute a manifest injustice. View "A.R.A. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant’s petition to expunge a felony arrest record, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the petition.The trial court declined the expunge the record on the basis that the existence of this record did not and may not cause Appellant a manifest injustice. The Supreme Court held (1) Appellant was eligible to seek expungement of the record at issue; and (2) Appellant’s unrebutted evidence established that the continued existence and possible dissemination of her arrest record could constitute a manifest injustice. View "A.R.A. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for displaying a noose on a public place with the intent to intimidate and placing others in reasonable fear of death or personal injury, in violation of Va. Code 18.2-423.2, holding that, although the noose was located on Defendant’s own property, the noose display was on a public place under this court’s construction of the statute.Affirming Defendant’s conviction, the court of appeals rejected Defendant’s contention that privately owned property cannot constitute a public place for purposes of section 18.2-423.2(B) and that Defendant's noose display was therefore outside ether scope of this provision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the obvious and rational meaning of the term “public place” as used in the statute includes private property generally visible by the public from some other location, which was the case with the site of Defendant’s noose display in his front yard. View "Turner v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for displaying a noose on a public place with the intent to intimidate and placing others in reasonable fear of death or personal injury, in violation of Va. Code 18.2-423.2, holding that, although the noose was located on Defendant’s own property, the noose display was on a public place under this court’s construction of the statute.Affirming Defendant’s conviction, the court of appeals rejected Defendant’s contention that privately owned property cannot constitute a public place for purposes of section 18.2-423.2(B) and that Defendant's noose display was therefore outside ether scope of this provision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the obvious and rational meaning of the term “public place” as used in the statute includes private property generally visible by the public from some other location, which was the case with the site of Defendant’s noose display in his front yard. View "Turner v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Roy L. Watford’s petition for a writ of actual innocence based on biological evidence and vacated his conviction, holding that Watford proved, by clear and convincing evidence, all of the allegations required under Va. Code 19.2-327.3(A) and that no rational trier of fact would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.In 1978, Watford pled guilty to rape and was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, entirely suspended for a period of ten years. In 2010, several pieces of evidence in this case were subjected to DNA testing. In 2016, a buccal swab was obtained from Watford. Watford subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of actual innocence based on biological evidence pursuant to Va. Code 19.2-327.2 et seq. The circuit court returned its findings of fact to the Supreme Court following an evidentiary hearing, After considering Watford’s petition, the response of the Commonwealth, the records of the case, the DNA evidence and the circuit court’s findings of fact, the Supreme Court vacated Watford’s conviction, finding that it was highly unlikely that any rational fact-finder would have found Watford guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "In re Watford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Roy L. Watford’s petition for a writ of actual innocence based on biological evidence and vacated his conviction, holding that Watford proved, by clear and convincing evidence, all of the allegations required under Va. Code 19.2-327.3(A) and that no rational trier of fact would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.In 1978, Watford pled guilty to rape and was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, entirely suspended for a period of ten years. In 2010, several pieces of evidence in this case were subjected to DNA testing. In 2016, a buccal swab was obtained from Watford. Watford subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of actual innocence based on biological evidence pursuant to Va. Code 19.2-327.2 et seq. The circuit court returned its findings of fact to the Supreme Court following an evidentiary hearing, After considering Watford’s petition, the response of the Commonwealth, the records of the case, the DNA evidence and the circuit court’s findings of fact, the Supreme Court vacated Watford’s conviction, finding that it was highly unlikely that any rational fact-finder would have found Watford guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "In re Watford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court denying Appellant’s petition to change his name.Appellant, Brian Wendall Jordan, was serving a term of incarceration when he underwent a religious conversion. Appellant filed a petition to change his name to Abdul-Wakeel Mutawakkil Jordan, adding that he would not be hindered from the free exercise of his religion if not allowed to change his name. The circuit court found that Appellant’s application frustrated a legitimate law-enforcement purpose and, thus, the provisions of Va. Code 8.01-217(D) were not satisfied. Specifically, the court concluded that, due to the gravity and brutality of Defendant’s crimes, Defendant must retain his given name for the peace of mind of the victims and the victims’ families. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the basis articulated by the trial court for denying Appellant’s petition did not fall outside the scope of its broad discretion. View "Jordan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The circuit court erred in granting Defendant, who was charged with first-degree murder, pre-trial bail.Because Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, for which the maximum sentence was life imprisonment, the circuit court was required to presume, subject to rebuttal, that no condition or set of conditions will reasonably assure Defendant’s appearance or the safety of the public. Based on its findings, the circuit court granted Defendant’s motion for bail. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by (1) applying the doctrine of presumed innocence to a pre-trial bail hearing; (2) finding that the brutal and calculated circumstances of the murder were outweighed by the absence of any threat to any other individuals; (3) speculating that Defendant was “unlikely” to abscond because of his age; and (4) discounting and according no weight to Defendant’s prior history of mental health disorders. View "Commonwealth v. Duse" on Justia Law