Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Shin was arrested for DWI. Shin declined the arresting officer's demand that he provide a blood and breath sample. The officer then read Form DC-233, “Implied Consent Declaration” to Shin, Code 18.2-268.3(C), which stated: “You shall submit to a breath test. If the breath test is unavailable or you are physically unable to submit to the breath test, a blood test shall be given.” Shin refused to provide a sample and signed a “Declaration of Refusal,” stating that he had been advised of the law and the penalty for unreasonably refusing to provide samples. Shin was convicted of DWI - second offense, unreasonable refusal of a breath or blood test - first offense, and improper lane change. A jury subsequently acquitted Shin of DWI but convicted him of improper lane change. The circuit court found Shin’s refusal unreasonable, in violation of Code 18.2-268.3, and suspended Shin’s license for one year. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, rejecting Shin’s arguments that the implied consent law imposed an unconstitutional condition upon the privilege of driving, was unconstitutionally vague for lacking an objective definition of reasonable refusal, and violated Article I, section 8 of the Virginia Constitution by compelling him to provide the Commonwealth with potentially incriminatory evidence. View "Shin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2003, Rickman was convicted of five counts of aggravated sexual battery, two of forcible sodomy, one of abduction of a minor, one of object sexual penetration, one of taking indecent liberties with a minor, and one of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, arising from Rickman’s abuse of his biological and step-children over several years. He was sentenced to 75 years of imprisonment with 60 years suspended. In 2015, the Commonwealth sought to have Rickman civilly committed under the Sexually Violent Predators Act, Code 37.2-900 to -921 (SVPA), which calls for a hearing within 90 days to determine whether probable cause exists. The respondent may waive a hearing and either party may request a continuance. The deadline for Rickman's probable-cause hearing was November 26. The parties exchanged emails to find an available date for the assistant attorney general, the Commonwealth’s expert, Rickman’s counsel, and the court. They settled on January 8, 2016. In an email to the assistant attorney general and court docket clerk, Rickman’s counsel acknowledged that she was available that day, but “[would] need to note an objection. Neither party sought a continuance. After November 26, Rickman unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the SVPA petition. The circuit court civilly committed Rickman. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The requirement, even if violated, does not require dismissal of the SVPA petition. The options are orders: granting a conditional, temporary release, expediting the proceeding, and disallowing evidence at the hearing. The court should make its discretionary decision by balancing any prejudice to the respondent, the length of and reasons for the delay, and any bad faith. View "Rickman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Pijor was found guilty of perjury, Code 18.2-434, based on testimony Pijor gave during a larceny trial in which he was acquitted. Pijor, having testified that he had not taken his ex-girlfriend’s dog, was later found to be in possession of the dog. Pijor claimed he had found the dog after the trial. The Court of Appeals rejected Pijor’s arguments that the Commonwealth was collaterally estopped from indicting him for perjury due to his previous acquittal and that the evidence was insufficient to prove he committed perjury. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. Pijor failed to prove that the precise issue of fact he sought to preclude--that he had not seen and had no information about the dog-- was determined in the larceny trial. A rational factfinder could have found all of the necessary elements for the crime of perjury established beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Pijor v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue was whether evidence of a search must be suppressed under Va. Code 19.2-54 because a magistrate incorrectly faxed only portions of a search warrant to the clerk of the circuit court.Defendant was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the magistrate’s failure to properly fax the search warrant to the clerk’s office rendered the warrant invalid. The trial court agreed that the warrant was defective but denied the suppression motion on the ground that the search was justified by exigent circumstances. The court of appeals reversed, arguing that section 19.2-54 rendered the fruits of the search inadmissible as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court’s order of conviction, holding that, even assuming that the magistrate’s incomplete faxing rendered the search warrant invalid under section 19.2-54, the search was justified as a warrantless search under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. View "Commonwealth v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the determination of the trial court that Appellant, an inmate, could not proceed in forma pauperis with his petition for a writ of mandamus.Consistent with Va. Code 8.01-691, Appellant attached several documents to his petition for writ of mandamus that detailed the history of his inmate trust account. The court denied Appellant’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Department’s policies and procedures explain the “loans” and “deposits” that appear on inmate trust account documentation; (2) the value of services for photocopies and legal mail and the inmate’s obligation to repay the Department for the value of those services do not constitute a “deposit” within the plain meaning of that term; and (3) the “deposits” reflected in Appellant’s trust account documents were not “deposits” within the ordinary meaning of that term, and given the absence of actual “deposits,” the trial court erred in denying Appellant in forma pauperis status. View "Grethen v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals regarding its ruling on the law of the case doctrine but affirmed its judgment regarding its rulings on the admission of certain strip search evidence and Defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute.Defendant was indicted for possession with the intent to distribute. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence from a strip search. The circuit court granted the motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the strip search on the grounds that it violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court of appeals reversed the grant of the motion to suppress. After Defendant was convicted, he appealed. The court of appeals concluded (1) its review of its ruling on the motion to suppress and the constitutionality of the strip search was precluded by the law of the case doctrine; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to uphold Defendant’s conviction. Although the Supreme Court held (1) the court of appeals was authorized to reconsider the constitutionality of the strip search and the admissibility of the strip search evidence on direct appeal; and (2) the court of appeals’ did not err in its rulings on the admission of the strip search evidence and Defendant’s conviction. View "Cole v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, which vacated Defendant’s sentence for DUI, third offense, and remanded the case to the trial court for sentencing on DUI, second offense. The court of appeals determined that the Commonwealth was collaterally estopped from using a valid DUI conviction as a predicate offense for sentencing enhancement because, in an unrelated case, a general district court previously ruled that the Commonwealth could not use the same DUI conviction as a predicate offense for sentencing enhancement. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s order of conviction on DUI, third or subsequent offense, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied to preclude the Commonwealth from using the DUI conviction at issue as a predicate offense. View "Commonwealth v. Leonard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court insofar as it imposed a sentence upon Defendant exceeding the punishment authorized by the General Assembly in Va. Code 18.2-53.1. Graves was convicted of using a firearm in the commission of a felony, in violation of Va. Code 18.2-53.1, among other crimes. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to five years’ imprisonment with two years suspended for the crime of using a firearm in the commission of a felony. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court sentenced him in excess of the statutory maximum. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the two-year suspended sentence and remanded the case for entry of a new sentencing order, holding that the sentence exceeded the punishment authorized by the General Assembly in section 18.2-53.1. View "Graves v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals rejecting Defendant’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to prove she committed the offense of using a cell phone for “purposes of procuring or promoting” one of her eleven-year-old students for activity that would violate Va. Code 18.2-370 (taking indecent liberties with children). Defendant, an elementary school teacher, argued on appeal that the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to prove she committed the offense. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) no third-party communication is required for a violation of Va. Code 18.2-374.3(B); and (2) a rational fact-finder could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that, in violation of section 18.2-374.3(B), the purpose of Defendant’s communication was to move forward with a scheme of taking indecent liberties with the victim as proscribed under section 18.2-370. View "Dietz v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the circuit court sentencing Defendant to serve a prison term before beginning his involuntary civil commitment. Defendant pleaded guilty to an offense committed in July and not guilty by reason of insanity to offenses committed in August. The circuit court accepted Defendant’s pleas. The court sentenced Defendant to five years’ incarceration for the July offense and ordered that he be involuntary committed on the August offenses. The court sent Defendant to serve his prison term for the July offense before Defendant’s involuntary civil commitment for the August offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by sequencing Defendant’s prison term and involuntary civil commitment as it did. View "Williams v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law