Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for displaying a noose on a public place with the intent to intimidate and placing others in reasonable fear of death or personal injury, in violation of Va. Code 18.2-423.2, holding that, although the noose was located on Defendant’s own property, the noose display was on a public place under this court’s construction of the statute.Affirming Defendant’s conviction, the court of appeals rejected Defendant’s contention that privately owned property cannot constitute a public place for purposes of section 18.2-423.2(B) and that Defendant's noose display was therefore outside ether scope of this provision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the obvious and rational meaning of the term “public place” as used in the statute includes private property generally visible by the public from some other location, which was the case with the site of Defendant’s noose display in his front yard. View "Turner v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for displaying a noose on a public place with the intent to intimidate and placing others in reasonable fear of death or personal injury, in violation of Va. Code 18.2-423.2, holding that, although the noose was located on Defendant’s own property, the noose display was on a public place under this court’s construction of the statute.Affirming Defendant’s conviction, the court of appeals rejected Defendant’s contention that privately owned property cannot constitute a public place for purposes of section 18.2-423.2(B) and that Defendant's noose display was therefore outside ether scope of this provision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the obvious and rational meaning of the term “public place” as used in the statute includes private property generally visible by the public from some other location, which was the case with the site of Defendant’s noose display in his front yard. View "Turner v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Roy L. Watford’s petition for a writ of actual innocence based on biological evidence and vacated his conviction, holding that Watford proved, by clear and convincing evidence, all of the allegations required under Va. Code 19.2-327.3(A) and that no rational trier of fact would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.In 1978, Watford pled guilty to rape and was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, entirely suspended for a period of ten years. In 2010, several pieces of evidence in this case were subjected to DNA testing. In 2016, a buccal swab was obtained from Watford. Watford subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of actual innocence based on biological evidence pursuant to Va. Code 19.2-327.2 et seq. The circuit court returned its findings of fact to the Supreme Court following an evidentiary hearing, After considering Watford’s petition, the response of the Commonwealth, the records of the case, the DNA evidence and the circuit court’s findings of fact, the Supreme Court vacated Watford’s conviction, finding that it was highly unlikely that any rational fact-finder would have found Watford guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "In re Watford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Roy L. Watford’s petition for a writ of actual innocence based on biological evidence and vacated his conviction, holding that Watford proved, by clear and convincing evidence, all of the allegations required under Va. Code 19.2-327.3(A) and that no rational trier of fact would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.In 1978, Watford pled guilty to rape and was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, entirely suspended for a period of ten years. In 2010, several pieces of evidence in this case were subjected to DNA testing. In 2016, a buccal swab was obtained from Watford. Watford subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of actual innocence based on biological evidence pursuant to Va. Code 19.2-327.2 et seq. The circuit court returned its findings of fact to the Supreme Court following an evidentiary hearing, After considering Watford’s petition, the response of the Commonwealth, the records of the case, the DNA evidence and the circuit court’s findings of fact, the Supreme Court vacated Watford’s conviction, finding that it was highly unlikely that any rational fact-finder would have found Watford guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "In re Watford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court denying Appellant’s petition to change his name.Appellant, Brian Wendall Jordan, was serving a term of incarceration when he underwent a religious conversion. Appellant filed a petition to change his name to Abdul-Wakeel Mutawakkil Jordan, adding that he would not be hindered from the free exercise of his religion if not allowed to change his name. The circuit court found that Appellant’s application frustrated a legitimate law-enforcement purpose and, thus, the provisions of Va. Code 8.01-217(D) were not satisfied. Specifically, the court concluded that, due to the gravity and brutality of Defendant’s crimes, Defendant must retain his given name for the peace of mind of the victims and the victims’ families. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the basis articulated by the trial court for denying Appellant’s petition did not fall outside the scope of its broad discretion. View "Jordan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The circuit court erred in granting Defendant, who was charged with first-degree murder, pre-trial bail.Because Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, for which the maximum sentence was life imprisonment, the circuit court was required to presume, subject to rebuttal, that no condition or set of conditions will reasonably assure Defendant’s appearance or the safety of the public. Based on its findings, the circuit court granted Defendant’s motion for bail. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by (1) applying the doctrine of presumed innocence to a pre-trial bail hearing; (2) finding that the brutal and calculated circumstances of the murder were outweighed by the absence of any threat to any other individuals; (3) speculating that Defendant was “unlikely” to abscond because of his age; and (4) discounting and according no weight to Defendant’s prior history of mental health disorders. View "Commonwealth v. Duse" on Justia Law

Shin was arrested for DWI. Shin declined the arresting officer's demand that he provide a blood and breath sample. The officer then read Form DC-233, “Implied Consent Declaration” to Shin, Code 18.2-268.3(C), which stated: “You shall submit to a breath test. If the breath test is unavailable or you are physically unable to submit to the breath test, a blood test shall be given.” Shin refused to provide a sample and signed a “Declaration of Refusal,” stating that he had been advised of the law and the penalty for unreasonably refusing to provide samples. Shin was convicted of DWI - second offense, unreasonable refusal of a breath or blood test - first offense, and improper lane change. A jury subsequently acquitted Shin of DWI but convicted him of improper lane change. The circuit court found Shin’s refusal unreasonable, in violation of Code 18.2-268.3, and suspended Shin’s license for one year. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, rejecting Shin’s arguments that the implied consent law imposed an unconstitutional condition upon the privilege of driving, was unconstitutionally vague for lacking an objective definition of reasonable refusal, and violated Article I, section 8 of the Virginia Constitution by compelling him to provide the Commonwealth with potentially incriminatory evidence. View "Shin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2003, Rickman was convicted of five counts of aggravated sexual battery, two of forcible sodomy, one of abduction of a minor, one of object sexual penetration, one of taking indecent liberties with a minor, and one of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, arising from Rickman’s abuse of his biological and step-children over several years. He was sentenced to 75 years of imprisonment with 60 years suspended. In 2015, the Commonwealth sought to have Rickman civilly committed under the Sexually Violent Predators Act, Code 37.2-900 to -921 (SVPA), which calls for a hearing within 90 days to determine whether probable cause exists. The respondent may waive a hearing and either party may request a continuance. The deadline for Rickman's probable-cause hearing was November 26. The parties exchanged emails to find an available date for the assistant attorney general, the Commonwealth’s expert, Rickman’s counsel, and the court. They settled on January 8, 2016. In an email to the assistant attorney general and court docket clerk, Rickman’s counsel acknowledged that she was available that day, but “[would] need to note an objection. Neither party sought a continuance. After November 26, Rickman unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the SVPA petition. The circuit court civilly committed Rickman. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The requirement, even if violated, does not require dismissal of the SVPA petition. The options are orders: granting a conditional, temporary release, expediting the proceeding, and disallowing evidence at the hearing. The court should make its discretionary decision by balancing any prejudice to the respondent, the length of and reasons for the delay, and any bad faith. View "Rickman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Pijor was found guilty of perjury, Code 18.2-434, based on testimony Pijor gave during a larceny trial in which he was acquitted. Pijor, having testified that he had not taken his ex-girlfriend’s dog, was later found to be in possession of the dog. Pijor claimed he had found the dog after the trial. The Court of Appeals rejected Pijor’s arguments that the Commonwealth was collaterally estopped from indicting him for perjury due to his previous acquittal and that the evidence was insufficient to prove he committed perjury. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. Pijor failed to prove that the precise issue of fact he sought to preclude--that he had not seen and had no information about the dog-- was determined in the larceny trial. A rational factfinder could have found all of the necessary elements for the crime of perjury established beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Pijor v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue was whether evidence of a search must be suppressed under Va. Code 19.2-54 because a magistrate incorrectly faxed only portions of a search warrant to the clerk of the circuit court.Defendant was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the magistrate’s failure to properly fax the search warrant to the clerk’s office rendered the warrant invalid. The trial court agreed that the warrant was defective but denied the suppression motion on the ground that the search was justified by exigent circumstances. The court of appeals reversed, arguing that section 19.2-54 rendered the fruits of the search inadmissible as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court’s order of conviction, holding that, even assuming that the magistrate’s incomplete faxing rendered the search warrant invalid under section 19.2-54, the search was justified as a warrantless search under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. View "Commonwealth v. Campbell" on Justia Law