Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell or distribute a Schedule I or II controlled substance. The court of appeals upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to quash the indictment; (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to the speedy trial statute; (3) the record did not support Defendant’s assertion that the circuit court denied Defendant the right to represent himself at trial; and (4) the circuit court did not err in granting a continuance to the Commonwealth. View "Herrington v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to felony murder and distribution of a Schedule I controlled substance. Defendant later filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the felony-murder conviction and sentence. In his petition, Defendant claimed that her trial counsel failed to give her reasonable advice on whether to plead guilty to felony murder. The circuit court dismissed the habeas petition without taking evidence ore tenus or by affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances, the circuit court should have received additional evidence beyond the recorded matters to determine whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. View "Smith v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendants, two sixteen-year-old males, were convicted of multiple felonies for breaking into the townhouse of a college student and raping her at knifepoint. On appeal, Defendants challenged the constitutionality of their sentences and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions for breaking and entering while armed with a deadly weapon. The court of appeals denied the petitions regarding the issues before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases for appeal and affirmed, holding (1) the aggregate term-of-years sentences imposed on Defendants did not violate the Eighth Amendment; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that both Defendants committed the crime of breaking and entering while armed with a deadly weapon. View "Vasquez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to thirty-three counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. Defendant later filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to “prosecute” his appeal. After a hearing, the circuit court dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus, ruling that counsel was not deficient for failing to file a petition for appeal on Defendant’s behalf. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court’s finding was not plainly wrong or unsupported by credible evidence. View "Velasquez-Lopez v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Talmage Ricks was convicted of strangulation resulting in bodily injury in violation of Va. Code 18.2-51.6. In a separate criminal case, Edward Chilton was also convicted of strangulation resulting in bodily injury. Both defendants appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions. The Court of Appeals denied Ricks’ petition for appeal but reversed Chilton’s conviction and dismissed the indictment against him. The Supreme Court considered the two appeals together because they presented similar assignments of error regarding the wounding or bodily injury element necessary to prove the crime of strangulation in violation of section 18.2-51.6. The Supreme Court affirmed in both cases, holding that the Court of Appeals did not err in its findings regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to prove bodily injury. View "Ricks v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant entered Alford pleas of guilty to attempted carnal knowledge of a minor, indecent liberties with a minor, and related offenses. Appellant was sentenced to a total of thirty-five years of incarceration, with twenty-five years suspended, for a total time to serve of ten years. Appellant later filed a motion in the circuit court seeking a new sentencing hearing, alleging that his sentences for attempted carnal knowledge of a minor and use of a communications system to procure or promote certain sex offenses involving a minor exceeded the statutory maximum. The circuit court denied Appellant’s motion for a new sentencing hearing and entered an amended sentencing order. Under the amended sentencing order, Appellant was sentenced to a total of twenty-five years of incarceration, with fifteen years suspended, for a total time to serve of ten years. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion for a new sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a defendant convicted of a felony has a right to be personally present at a new sentencing hearing at which his sentence is modified so as not to exceed the maximum sentence provided by law. Remanded. View "Grafmuller v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, pled guilty to a single count of grant larceny. Petitioner was subsequently served with a notice to appear for removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that her trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance because he failed to advise her of the immigration consequences of her plea. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the petition, finding (1) trial counsel adequately advised Petitioner of the immigration consequences of her guilty plea, and (2) alternatively, Petitioner failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance test under Strickland v. Washington because she did not show that she would have pled not guilty and proceeded to trial if she had received competent advice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, on the facts of this case, the performance of Petitioner’s counsel satisfied the constitutional standard of reasonableness. View "Fuentes v. Clarke" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant, a contractor who had been hired by a homeowner to install a replacement liner in the homeowners’ swimming pool, was convicted of construction fraud. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he received a statutorily compliant letter from the homeowner demanding a return of an advance he had previously received from the homeowner. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the evidence failed to prove that the homeowners’ letter to Defendant made an unqualified demand for the return of the advance, Defendant’s conviction could not stand. View "Bowman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, maliciously shooting into an occupied vehicle, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and reckless handling of a firearm, a misdemeanor. After a trial on the misdemeanor charge and a preliminary hearing on the felonies, the general district court dismissed the misdemeanor reckless handling of a firearm charge and refused to certify Defendant’s felony charges to the circuit court for lack of probable cause. The Commonwealth subsequently obtained direct indictments charging Defendant with first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the charges. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant’s convictions and dismissed the indictments, holding that the Commonwealth was collaterally estopped from prosecuting Defendant for murder or attempted murder after Defendant’s acquittal of reckless handling of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant’s misdemeanor acquittal and subsequent felony convictions were based on the same issue of ultimate fact, the felony convictions were barred by the prohibition of double jeopardy. View "Commonwealth v. Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty in the District Court of Stafford County to petit larceny and three misdemeanor tampering charges. After Petitioner’s sentences expired, Petitioner was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities. In a Notice to Appear, the ICE charged that Petitioner was subject to removal because his petit larceny conviction subjected Petitioner to removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A). While in federal custody, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Stafford County, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because the attorney representing him in the petit larceny case incorrectly informed him that his guilty plea would not have negative immigration consequences. The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the petition because Petitioner was not in custody pursuant to the challenge conviction and because the petition was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a Virginia circuit court does not have jurisdiction to provide habeas corpus relief to a petitioner being detained by federal authorities because of immigration issues arising as a consequence of a state conviction after the sentence for the state conviction has expired. View "Escamilla v. Superintendent, Rappahannock Reg’l Jail" on Justia Law