Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

During a routine traffic stop, law enforcement conducted an open-air sniff using a drug-sniffing canine. The canine alerted to the vehicle, leading officers to search it without a warrant under the automobile exception. Inside a backpack, they found marijuana, a loaded handgun, Ziploc bags, and a scale. The defendant, a passenger, was indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver; possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the canine could not distinguish between legal hemp and illegal marijuana.The trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the charges, finding the canine's reliability was not established due to its inability to differentiate between hemp and marijuana. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the smell of illegal marijuana provides probable cause to search a vehicle and that law enforcement had probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and clarified that a positive alert from a drug-sniffing canine does not establish a per se rule of probable cause but should be considered within the totality of the circumstances. The court held that a positive indication from a drug-sniffing canine may still contribute to a finding of probable cause despite the legalization of hemp. Examining the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that law enforcement had probable cause to search the vehicle. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, reinstating the indictments against the defendant and remanding for further proceedings. View "State v. Green" on Justia Law

A prisoner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, a legal order allowing a court to correct its original judgment, long after the one-year limitations period had expired. The petition was based on new evidence that the prisoner claimed demonstrated his actual innocence. The coram nobis court held a hearing and determined that the new evidence did not show that the prisoner was actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted. As a result, the court dismissed the petition as untimely.The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the coram nobis court's decision, arguing that the prisoner had met the requirements for tolling, or delaying, the statute of limitations. The appellate court remanded the case for a hearing on the allegations in the petition.The Supreme Court of Tennessee disagreed with the appellate court's decision. The Supreme Court held that if a petition for a writ of error coram nobis is not timely filed and seeks tolling of the statute of limitations, it must be based on new evidence that clearly and convincingly shows that the petitioner is actually innocent of the underlying crime. The court found that the prisoner's new evidence did not meet this standard. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and affirmed the decision of the coram nobis court, dismissing the petition as untimely. View "Clardy v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Tennessee heard the appeal of Tony Thomas and Laronda Turner, both convicted of three counts of first-degree premeditated murder stemming from a 2015 triple homicide in Memphis. The defendants were members of the Vicelords gang, and the murders were allegedly conducted in retaliation for a previous killing. Their trial relied heavily on the testimony of co-defendant Demarco Hawkins, whose trial was severed and who testified against them. Mr. Thomas and Ms. Turner appealed their convictions, alleging that the prosecution breached the requirements of Brady v. Maryland by failing to produce inconsistent statements made by Mr. Hawkins, and that the evidence was insufficient to support Ms. Turner’s murder convictions.The Supreme Court found that the State did not breach its obligations under Brady with regard to Mr. Thomas. However, the Court determined that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Ms. Turner’s convictions because Mr. Hawkins’ testimony was not adequately corroborated, leading to a reversal of her convictions. In addition, the Court abolished Tennessee’s common law accomplice-corroboration rule, which required some level of independent corroboration for accomplice testimony to be used in securing a conviction, but only applied this change prospectively. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

A man, David Wayne Eady, who was charged with multiple robberies in Nashville over a month, appealed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals which denied his motion to disqualify the District Attorney General’s Office from prosecuting his case. Eady argued that the District Attorney General's office should be disqualified because the District Attorney had represented him in a previous case approximately thirty years earlier. The Supreme Court of Tennessee disagreed, finding that the District Attorney did not have an actual conflict of interest under the Rules of Professional Conduct because the current case and the previous case were not "substantially related." The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the appearance of impropriety should disqualify the District Attorney General’s Office, noting that the Rules of Professional Conduct did not retain the concept of appearance of impropriety.Eady also argued that his trial was improperly conducted as a single trial for multiple offenses under the theory that the separate crimes were all parts of a larger, continuing plan. The Supreme Court of Tennessee agreed with Eady on this point, finding that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the offenses. The court held that the evidence did not support a finding that the offenses were parts of a larger, continuing plan, and remanded the case for a new trial on one of the counts. View "State v. Eady" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of criminal appeals reversing the trial court's sentence imposed in connection with Defendant's plea of guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication and other offenses, holding that the clear and precise language of the 2017 amendment to the probation eligibility statute, Tenn. Code Ann. 40-35-303, prohibits all forms of probation for a defendant convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication.Defendant pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication, aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and driving without a license. The trial court imposed a sentence of ten years in prison, largely suspended to probation with periodic weeks of confinement for the first three years. The court of criminal appeals reversed and ordered Defendant to serve the full sentence in confinement, concluding that the 2017 amendment to the probation eligibility statute expressly prohibits probation of any kind for criminal defendants convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the clear and precise language of section 40-35-303 prohibits defendants convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication from receiving any form of probation, including periodic and split confinement sentences. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of criminal appeals reverting Defendant's aggravated robbery convictions to a classification lower due to the absence of a gang enhancement, holding that the court of criminal appeals erred in its decision.Defendant was arrested for aggravated robbery as to four individuals. The indictment contained four alternative counts each of aggravated robbery against four victims and four corresponding counts of criminal gang offense enhancement and alleged that Defendant was a "Crips" gang member. A jury convicted Defendant as charged. On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his gang enhancement conviction. The court of appeals agreed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the gang enhancement statute does not require the State to specify in the indictment a criminal defendant's gang subset nor that the defendant is in the same gang subset as the individuals whose criminal activity establishes the gang's pattern of criminal gang activity; and (2) Defendant waived all other issues raised on appeal. View "State v. Shackleford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court denying Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief, holding that the provisions of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13 are constitutional as applied, that Petitioner was not unconstitutionally denied appellate review of the denial of his request for expert funds, and that Petitioner was not deprived of a full and fair post-conviction hearing.Petitioner requested funds under Rule 13 to hire expert witnesses to assist in his post-conviction proceedings and, as to the four instances at issue on appeal, the post-conviction court authorized the funds. The Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts and the Chief Justice, however, either reduced the requested amount or denied approval of the funds. Petitioner continued without assistance of the witnesses, and was denied post-conviction relief. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the provisions of Rule 13 for prior approval review are constitutional as applied; (2) Petitioner was not unconstitutionally denied appellate review of the post-conviction court's denial of his expert funds request; and (3) Petitioner was not deprived of a fair post-conviction hearing due to the denial of expert funds. View "Dotson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's summary judgment to the three named state official defendants in this complaint seeking a temporary injunction related to the August 6, 2020 election, holding that Plaintiff was required to comply with both Tenn. Code Ann. 2-19-143(3) and Tenn. Code Ann. 40-29-202 before he could be re-enfranchised.Plaintiff, a Tennessee resident since 2018, was convicted in 1986 of involuntary manslaughter in Virginia. In 2020, the governor of Virginia granted Plaintiff clemency, thus reinstating his right to vote in Virginia. Later that year, Plaintiff attempted to register to vote in Grainger County, Tennessee but was denied. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit arguing that Tenn. Code Ann. 2-19-143(3) requires the state to re-enfranchise persons convicted of infamous crimes out of state when the governor or the appropriate authority of such other state restores that person's rights of citizenship. The chancery court granted summary judgment for Defendants, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, to regain the right of suffrage in Tennessee, Plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals must comply with both Tenn. Code Ann. 2-19-143(3) and the additional requirements set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. 40-29-202. View "Falls v. Goins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of criminal appeals dismissing Defendant's appeal from the trial court's order for restitution and vacated the restitution order itself, holding that the restitution order was a final order but that the trial court erred by failing to consider Defendant's ability to pay in setting the amount of restitution.Defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and leaving the scene of an accident. Defendant was later arrested for driving on a revoked license. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant's probation, ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement, and ordered restitution in the amount of $30,491. The court of criminal appeals dismissed Defendant's ensuing appeal from the restitution order, concluding that it was not a final order because it did not contain payment terms or schedule. The Supreme Court reversed the court of criminal appeals and vacated the restitution order, holding (1) because the order resolved all the issues in this case it was a final order under Tenn. R. App. P. 3; but (2) in setting the amount of restitution, the trial court erred by failing to consider Defendant's financial resources and ability to pay restitution. View "State v. Gevedon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of criminal appeals ruling that the restitution order at issue on appeal was not a final and appealable order under Tenn. R. App. P. 3, holding that a criminal restitution order is final and appealable when it directs a defendant to pay a set amount of restitution without payment terms.Defendant pleaded guilty to burglary and theft. As a condition of his probation, Defendant was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $5,500 during his supervision. Defendant appealed the restitution order, but the court of criminal appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the restitution order was not a final order because it failed to include either payment terms or a payment schedule. The Supreme Court reversed and affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding (1) the restitution order resolved all issues and was a final order under Rule 3; and (2) the trial court did not err by ordering Defendant to pay $5,5000 in restitution over his two-and-a-half-year probationary period. View "State v. Cavin" on Justia Law