Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a second jury trial, Defendant was convicted of thirty-seven counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the State failed to make a proper election of offenses but that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the election of offenses doctrine does not require the prosecution to identify a single incident of sexual battery in cases where the child victim testifies to repeated incidents of sexual contact occurring over a substantial period of time but does not furnish specific dates, details, or distinguishing characteristics as to individual incidents of sexual battery; (2) where a prosecution is based solely on generic evidence, such as this one, the trial court must provide the jury with a modified unanimity instruction that allows a conviction only if the jury unanimously agrees the defendant committed all the acts described by the victim; and (3) although the trial court did not provide such a modified unanimity instruction in this case, the omission of this instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Qualls" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of facilitation of first degree murder and one count of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting an autopsy report through the testimony of a medical examiner who did not perform the autopsy, as the autopsy report was not testimonial and therefore did not violate Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause; (2) the warrantless search of Defendant’s home by officers who entered the home after the first responding officer’s initial entry into the home was lawful, and consequently, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence that was in plain view and within the scope of the search; and (3) even if the trial court erred in admitting items that were not in plain view, the error was harmless. View "State v. Hutchison" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and related offenses. The trial court imposed a sentence of death based on three aggravating circumstances. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of criminal appeals did not err by affirming the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress statements he gave to law enforcement officers on the basis that the confessions were knowingly and voluntarily made; and (2) Defendant’s death sentence was not imposed arbitrarily, the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and the sentence of death was not disporportionate. Remanded for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the trial court’s merger of Defendant’s convictions for first degree murder into a single conviction. View "State v. Freeland" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding (1) the lead prosecutor violated Defendant’s constitutional right against self-incrimination during final closing argument by making a remark that the jury necessarily would have taken to be a comment on Defendant’s exercise of her constitutional right not to testify; (2) the prosecution violated Defendant’s constitutional right to due process by failing to provide to the defense until after the trial the third statement a key witness gave to law enforcement officers investigating the murder; and (3) these constitutional errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered best interest guilty pleas to attempted first degree murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. Petitioner later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made. Petitioner requested that the post-conviction court issue subpoenas for his three co-defendants, who were incarcerated at the time, to testify at the post-conviction hearing. The post-conviction court granted the State’s motion to quash because the defendants were incarcerated. After a subsequent hearing, the post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief. The court of criminal appeals concluded that the post-conviction court erred in refusing to allow Petitioner to present witnesses in support of his claims, but that the error was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the post-conviction court committed prejudicial error by applying an incorrect legal standard and by overlooking the relationship between the proffered testimony and Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Remanded. View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of fabricating evidence and six counts of making a false report. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial. After a hearing, the trial court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for making a false report but reversed Defendant’s fabricating evidence convictions. The court of criminal appeals dismissed as multiplicitous two of Defendant’s convictions for making a false report, reinstated the convictions for fabricating evidence, and affirmed the remaining convictions. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of criminal appeals’ reinstatement of Defendant’s convictions for fabricating evidence; (2) dismissed two of Defendant’s convictions for making a false report for lack of sufficient evidence; (3) dismissed two of Defendant’s convictions for making a false report as multiplicitous; and (4) affirmed the court of criminal appeals in all other respects. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide and was sentenced to twenty-four years' imprisonment. Defendant twice appealed his sentence. On both appeals the court of criminal appeals remanded the case for resentencing, and on each remand the trial court imposed a twenty-four year sentence. No appeal was filed from the third sentencing order. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to appeal the third sentencing order. At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he and Defendant discussed a third appeal and that Defendant agreed that no appeal would be filed. The post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief, finding the testimony of trial counsel to be more credible than the testimony of Defendant and concluding that Defendant knew of his right to appeal and waived that right. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial counsel’s failure to file a written waiver of appeal as required by Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(d)(2) did not violate Defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel; and (2) Defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence his allegations of ineffective representation. View "Arroyo v. State " on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, pleaded guilty to patronizing prostitution and was granted judicial diversion. Petitioner successfully completed his diversion, and his criminal record was subsequently expunged. Approximately three years after the entry of his plea, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was entitled to relief under Padilla v. Kentucky because his trial counsel failed to inform him of the immigration consequences of his plea. The trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was time-barred. The court of criminal appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition, concluding that a petitioner whose record has been expunged may not obtain post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act may not be used to collaterally attack a guilty plea that has been expunged after successful completion of judicial diversion. View "Rodriguez v. State" on Justia Law

After being arrested and while in custody, Defendant admitted his involvement in Maurice Taylor’s killing. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated robbery and first-degree felony murder. The court of criminal appeals reversed, concluding (1) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his pretrial confession because the confession was the result of an illegal arrest and detention; and (2) insufficient evidence supported the convictions because the State did not introduce sufficient evidence, other than Defendant’s confession, to corroborate the commission of the attempted robbery. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the police had probable cause to arrest Defendant; and (2) Defendant’s confession did not require corroboration because he repeated his confession under oath at trial, but, had his extrajudicial confession required corroboration, the State presented sufficient evidence that this confession was trustworthy. View "State v. Bishop" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was stopped for a moving violation, a law enforcement officer administered several field sobriety tests. The officer arrested Plaintiff for DUI because he had been driving in the wrong direction on a divided highway, smelled of alcohol, and admitted he had been drinking. Plaintiff filed a motion to suppress the evidence and to dismiss the charges of DUI and DUI per se. The trial court dismissed the charges, concluding that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff in light of his performance on the field sobriety tests. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the charges, holding that the officer had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for DUI because, even considering Plaintiff’s successful performance on the field sobriety tests, Plaintiff’s moving violation, the odor of alcohol, and Plaintiff’s admission to drinking were sufficient to permit a prudent person to believe Plaintiff was driving under the influence of an intoxicant. View "State v. Bell" on Justia Law