Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant Joshua Parker was convicted of second degree murder and attempted rape. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of attempt to commit rape but reversed and vacated Defendant's conviction of second degree murder, holding (1) there was insufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction, (2) State v. Mellons did not control the outcome of this case, (3) sufficient proof must support every element of the offense of which a defendant is convicted, even where the conviction offense is charged as a lesser-included offense and sufficient proof supports the greater offense, and (4) the trial court erred in charging the jury with second degree murder as a lesser-included offense of first degree felony murder. Because the proof was sufficient to support the offense of reckless homicide, remanded for entry of an amended judgment reflecting a conviction of reckless homicide and sentencing on reckless homicide.

Defendant pled guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to six years of enhanced probation. During the proceedings, the trial court did not warn Defendant that, upon the expiration of his sentence, he would be subjected to lifetime community supervision, which is mandated by statute for Defendant's conviction. Before Defendant's sentence expired, the State filed a petition to amend the judgment to include lifetime community supervision. The trial court corrected the judgment, and Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion. The court of criminal appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant had been adequately informed of the lifetime community supervision requirement by his trial counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the trial court failed to warn Defendant of the mandatory nature of lifetime community supervision, as was required by the Court's recent ruling in Ward v. State, and because the State was unable to establish that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Defendant was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. Remanded.

In two cases consolidated for oral argument, defendants entered guilty pleas to one count in their respective indictments in exchange for dismissal of other counts. In both cases, the trial court denied their subsequent requests for expungement of the dismissed charges. Both defendants filed petitions for writ of certiorari. The court of criminal appeals reversed both cases and remanded for entry of orders requiring the requested partial expungement. The Supreme Court granted the State's applications for permission to appeal and ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the court of criminal appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Court affirmed, holding (1) the procedural requirements for petitions for writ of certiorari set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. 27-8-106 do not apply in criminal cases, and (2) a conviction for one count in an indictment does not preclude expungement of the records relating to a dismissed charge in a separate count.

Plaintiffs Timmy Sykes and Curtis Greene were employed as criminal investigators by the Chattanooga Housing Authority (CHA) when they expressed their concerns regarding illegal searches and seizures and racial profiling by the CHA chief and assistant chief. Subsequently, CHA terminated the employment of both Sykes and Greene, alleging sexual harassment on the part of Sykes and violations of the CHA cell phone policy on the part of Greene. Sykes and Greene sued the CHA and the CHA chief, alleging retaliatory discharge in violation of the state Whistleblower Act and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA). The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims. The court of appeals vacated summary judgment on the THRA claims and affirmed the trial court's judgment in all other respects. On appeal, the Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the Whistleblower Act claims, finding the undisputed facts established the plaintiffs could not prove an exclusive causal relationship between the plaintiffs' whistleblowing activity and their discharge; and (2) affirmed the appellate court's ruling vacating summary judgment in defendants' favor on the THRA claims, finding there were genuine issues of disputed fact.

In separate trials, petitioner Rudolph Powers was convicted of aggravated rape for an incident occurring in March 1980 and of aggravated rape and robbery by use of a deadly weapon for an incident occurring in May 1980. In 2007, petitioner sought to have a DNA analysis performed on the remaining evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, arguing that he could conclusively establish his innocence if the evidence was uploaded into a DNA database and matched another profile in the system. The post-conviction court denied relief. The court of criminal appeals affirmed, holding that DNA analysis was limited to a comparison between the petitioner's DNA and that collected as part of the evidence in the case. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding the Act permits access to a DNA database if a positive match between the crime scene DNA and a profile contained within the database would create a reasonable probability that a petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained or would have rendered a more favorable verdict or sentence if the results had been previously available.

Terrence Shaw was indicted by a grand jury for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. During the trial, Shaw denied having possession of a gun. The jury convicted Shaw of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment. At the sentencing hearing the trial court specifically denied Shaw's request for judicial diversion. Shaw appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of judicial diversion. The Supreme Court held that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for reckless endangerment, and (2) the trial court considered the necessary factors when considering Shaw's request for judicial diversion and that there was substantial evidence to support the court's denial of judicial diversion. The Court reversed the judgment because of insufficient evidence. Vacated and dismissed.

Defendant Gary Wade was convicted of aggravated burglary, theft of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, and theft of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. The trial court classified Wade as a career offender. On appeal, the court of criminal appeals found (1) that the conviction for theft of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 violated the prohibition against double jeopardy and was therefore dismissed; (2) that, if properly convicted of the remaining offenses, the defendant qualified as a persistent rather than a career offender; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for aggravated burglary and theft of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. The State appealed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment of the appellate court with regard to two of the convictions, holding that the evidence presented at trial warrants reinstatement of the convictions for aggravated burglary and theft of property with a value of $10,000 or more but less tan $60,000; and (2) affirmed the appellate court's determination that Wade qualifies as a persistent rather than career offender. Remanded.

Defendant Terry Dominy was charged with three counts of aggravated rape. At trial, defendant was found guilty of the charges. The defendant appealed, arguing that the aggravated rape convictions were invalid due to a statutory exclusion in Tennessee law that precludes a prosecution for rape if the perpetrator is the spouse of the victim. The intermediate court modified defendant's convictions to spousal rape, acknowledging that spousal rape is not a lesser-included offense in the indicted offense. The court of criminal appeals affirmed, holding that the indictment charging aggravated rape was sufficient to support a conviction for spousal rape, a "lesser grade" offense under the supreme court's decision in State v. Trusty. The supreme court held (1) Trusty was overruled to the extent that it recognizes lesser grade offenses as distinct from lesser-included offenses and permits convictions of lesser grade offenses that are not lesser-included offenses embraced by the indictment; and (2) in light of the overruling of Trusty, the defendant's indictment was not sufficient to support a conviction for spousal rape. The court vacated the defendant's convictions, dismissed the indictments and remanded the case to the trial court.

Defendant Cedric Johnson was charged with committing an aggravated robbery and was separately charged with initiating a false police report. Within one month of being indicted for initiating a false police report, Defendant pled guilty to the offense. The trial record revealed that Defendant's car was used in the robbery, and in order to thwart discovery by the police, Defendant reported the car as stolen. The grand jury indicted Defendant for aggravated robbery. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the robbery indictment, arguing that he had already been prosecuted for filing the false report in connection with the robbery. The trial court granted Defendant's motion, and the State appealed. The issue before the Supreme Court pertained to offenses arising from the same criminal episode. In the Defendant's case, the Court found that the two offenses were not part of the same episode, and therefore, the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's dismissal of the robbery charge. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.