Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A woman called 9-1-1 to report a suspicious four-door Chevrolet Silverado driving slowly in a rural area of Willacy County, Texas. Thirty minutes later, Officer Garcia arrived and saw only the appellant’s pickup truck, which was not a Chevrolet Silverado, driving down a dirt road. Without witnessing any traffic violation or confirming the vehicle matched the caller’s description, Officer Garcia activated his emergency lights to initiate a stop. The appellant continued at a slow pace, stopped to open a gate, and was ultimately arrested after a physical altercation. The appellant was charged with evading arrest or detention with a motor vehicle.At trial in the 197th District Court of Willacy County, the jury found the appellant guilty. The appellant moved for a directed verdict, arguing the State failed to prove the lawfulness of the attempted detention, but the motion was denied. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the appellant was sentenced to two years’ confinement, probated for three years. On appeal, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Officer Garcia’s testimony and the circumstances were sufficient to support a finding that the detention was lawful beyond a reasonable doubt.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case on petition for discretionary review. The court held that the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Officer Garcia’s initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. The court found insufficient specific, articulable facts linking the appellant’s vehicle to any criminal activity and concluded that the lawful-arrest element of the offense was not satisfied. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered a judgment of acquittal. View "HERNANDEZ v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of ten counts of possession of child pornography. After conviction, the State discovered and disclosed impeachment evidence relating to the arresting officer, which had not been available at trial. This disclosure occurred after the defendant’s 30-day deadline to file a motion for new trial had passed. Despite this, the defendant filed an untimely motion for new trial based on the new evidence, while the appeal was already pending and after the trial court had lost plenary power over the case.The defendant then sought to have the First Court of Appeals abate the appeal and remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on the motion for new trial. The First Court of Appeals, citing emergency COVID-19 orders and appellate procedure rules, ordered abatement and remanded for a hearing. The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion for new trial. Subsequently, the First Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the State on suppression and sufficiency issues but found the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for new trial, and reversed and remanded for a new trial.On discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas considered whether the First Court of Appeals had authority to abate the appeal and order the trial court to hear the untimely motion for new trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the appellate court lacked authority to do so because the trial court had lost jurisdiction and neither the emergency orders nor appellate procedure rules permitted the creation of jurisdiction where none existed. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the First Court of Appeals and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion, dismissing all other grounds of review as improvidently granted. View "THOMSON v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

A man drove his semi-truck into the shipping yard of a bedding company in Navarro County, Texas, and attempted to attach his truck to a trailer loaded with mattresses and box springs. The trailer was scheduled for authorized pickup by a specific carrier, but the man was neither driving an authorized vehicle nor had he followed the required check-in procedures. An employee grew suspicious, documented the incident, and involved supervisors and police. The man claimed he believed he was lawfully dispatched to pick up the load, but the person he named as his dispatcher denied involvement. The State charged him with cargo theft, alleging that he intentionally conducted an activity—connecting his truck to the trailer—in which he possessed stolen cargo.A jury convicted the man of cargo theft under Texas Penal Code § 31.18(b)(1), and the trial court sentenced him to thirty-seven years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the evidence showed he possessed the cargo and that his actions met the statutory definition of conducting an activity involving stolen cargo. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals initially agreed on some points and remanded for clarification on whether the defendant’s conduct constituted the requisite “activity” under the statute. On remand, the court of appeals again affirmed the conviction, concluding that backing under the trailer and trying to connect brake lines constituted activity in which he possessed stolen cargo.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the case and held that the cargo theft statute is not materially different from the organized retail theft statute and requires proof of conduct distinct from the acts inherent in stealing. Because the only conduct proved was inherent in the theft itself, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for cargo theft. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to consider possible lesser included offenses. View "JOE v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted for aggravated assault, a second-degree felony, and tried in Harris County district court in January 2023. During the trial, the court required all participants, including witnesses, to wear surgical masks at all times, except when necessary for in-court identifications. The defendant’s counsel objected to the mask mandate on Sixth Amendment grounds, arguing that masking hindered the jury’s ability to assess witness credibility by observing facial expressions. The objection was overruled, and the two key witnesses to the assault testified while masked. The defendant was subsequently convicted.On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the conviction, finding that the mask mandate violated the defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation. The appellate court emphasized that concealing facial features impairs the fact-finder’s ability to evaluate witness demeanor, citing Romero v. State and other precedents. When considering whether this constitutional error was harmless, the court relied on a procedural rule that places the burden on the State to show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the State did not substantively address the issue of harm in its brief, the court presumed harm and reversed the judgment.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case. It agreed that the trial court’s mandatory masking policy violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, as it did not make any case-specific findings of necessity or individualized determinations for masking. However, the Court held that the appellate court erred by applying a rule of default and presuming harm solely because the State did not brief the issue. The Court clarified that appellate courts have an independent duty to assess harmlessness under Chapman v. California and Rule 44.2(a), regardless of the State’s briefing. The judgment was reversed and remanded to the Fourteenth Court of Appeals to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "SMITH v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

Police responded to a business after several 911 hang-up calls and found the defendant’s mother covered in transmission fluid. The defendant, after a verbal exchange with officers, retreated into an office and refused commands to come out. Officers entered, and a struggle ensued as they attempted to arrest him. The defendant resisted, was tased, and continued to resist while being handcuffed. During the struggle, he bit an officer, causing a serious injury. The defendant claimed he bit the officer because he feared for his life, alleging the officer was impeding his breathing.At trial in the 207th District Court of Comal County, the defendant was charged with assault on a public servant. He requested a jury instruction on the necessity defense, arguing his actions were immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm. The trial court denied this request but included a self-defense instruction. The jury convicted him. On appeal, the First Court of Appeals held the defendant was not entitled to the necessity defense because he provoked the difficulty and, under the self-defense statute, was not justified in using force to resist arrest after he had already resisted. The court also found any error in the self-defense instruction was harmless, as the defendant was not entitled to it under the law.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed whether a defendant who illegally resists arrest and then claims necessity to justify assaulting an officer can use that defense. The court held that if a defendant is barred from using self-defense to resist arrest under the statutory resisting-arrest exclusion, he is likewise barred from using the necessity defense for the same conduct. The court overruled its prior decision in Bowen v. State, clarified that the resisting-arrest exclusion in the self-defense statute also applies to the necessity statute, and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "NAVARRO v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death after a jury found she intentionally killed a pregnant woman, Reagan Hancock, and removed the unborn child, Braxlynn, in the course of committing or attempting to commit kidnapping. The evidence showed the appellant had a history of faking pregnancies and went to great lengths to convince her boyfriend she was expecting a child, including purchasing a fake belly and staging events. On the day of the offense, she attacked Hancock, inflicted numerous fatal injuries, performed a crude C-section to remove the baby, and was later stopped by law enforcement with the infant, who was not breathing and later died.The case was tried in the 202nd Judicial District Court of Bowie County, Texas. The appellant raised multiple pretrial motions, including for a change of venue and a continuance, both of which were denied. She also challenged the admission of various pieces of evidence and the conduct of the prosecution. The jury found her guilty of capital murder and answered special issues in favor of the death penalty. The conviction and sentence were subject to automatic direct appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed twenty-five points of error, including challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the kidnapping element, pretrial publicity, evidentiary rulings, prosecutorial conduct, and the scope of expert testimony. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to find the aggravating element of kidnapping or attempted kidnapping, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary or procedural rulings. The court found no reversible error and affirmed the conviction and sentence of death. View "PARKER v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was stopped by a Harris County Sheriff’s Deputy for a traffic violation. The individual, who was a convicted felon with an active warrant for a parole violation, was driving a car borrowed from his sister and was armed with her handgun. During the stop, the individual lied about his identity and, after his passenger left the scene, shot and killed the deputy at close range while the deputy was standing by his patrol car. The individual fled, disposed of the weapon, and was later apprehended at a nearby shopping center. At trial, he admitted to the shooting but claimed it was accidental, asserting he was attempting a citizen’s arrest.The 230th Judicial District Court of Harris County tried the case. The jury found the individual guilty of capital murder and, after considering evidence of his extensive criminal history and lack of remorse, answered the special issues in a manner that resulted in a death sentence. The individual represented himself at trial after waiving his right to counsel, but later unsuccessfully sought to withdraw that waiver and have counsel reappointed. He raised several points of error on appeal, including challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of his request to withdraw his waiver of counsel, the admission of certain punishment-phase evidence, and the constitutionality of Texas’s death penalty statute.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the case on direct appeal. The court held that the evidence was legally sufficient to support both the conviction for capital murder and the jury’s finding of future dangerousness. It found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the request to withdraw the waiver of counsel, nor in the admission of the challenged evidence. The court also determined that the constitutional challenges to the death penalty statute were not preserved for review and, in any event, lacked merit. The conviction and sentence of death were affirmed. View "SOLIS v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

A state trooper stopped a vehicle for speeding in Waller County, Texas. The driver and passenger appeared nervous, and the trooper noticed strong odors of food and cigarillo smoke, with a possible faint smell of marijuana. After the occupants denied consent to search, a backup officer arrived with a drug-detection dog. During an open-air sniff, the dog’s handler directed the dog to various parts of the vehicle. The dog repeatedly jumped up and stuck its nose through the open passenger window into the car’s interior. After the third intrusion, the dog alerted, and officers searched the vehicle, finding a large quantity of pills. The driver was charged with possession of a controlled substance.The 506th District Court of Waller County initially denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that the totality of the circumstances provided reasonable suspicion and that the dog’s alert provided probable cause. Upon reconsideration, however, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that the dog’s nose entering the vehicle constituted a trespass and an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment, and that the evidence found should be excluded. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the dog’s intrusion into the vehicle’s interior was an unreasonable search.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals’ decision. The court held that the repeated physical intrusion of the drug-detection dog’s nose into the interior of the vehicle during an open-air sniff constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. Because this search was conducted without probable cause, the trial court properly suppressed the evidence obtained as a result. The court clarified that such an intrusion is distinct from a routine exterior sniff and is subject to constitutional protections. View "STATE OF TEXAS v. ORGAN" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, after a contentious visit to San Antonio Police Department headquarters regarding a child custody issue, returned later that day and fatally shot a police detective who was sitting in his patrol car. The defendant was apprehended the following day by a SWAT team, and during and after his arrest, he made several incriminating statements to law enforcement, a detention officer, and a mental health assessor. At trial, the defendant challenged the admissibility of these statements, arguing they were involuntary or obtained in violation of his rights. He also raised issues regarding jury selection, the presence of alternate jurors during deliberations, and the constitutionality of certain aspects of Texas’s capital sentencing scheme.The 379th District Court of Bexar County conducted the trial. The jury convicted the defendant of capital murder for killing a peace officer in the line of duty and, based on their answers to special sentencing issues, imposed a sentence of death. The defendant raised multiple points of error on direct appeal, including claims that his statements should have been suppressed, that the State’s peremptory strike of a Black venireperson was racially motivated, that the presence of alternate jurors during deliberations violated statutory and constitutional rights, and that the Texas capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the case on automatic direct appeal. The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the defendant’s statements, as they were either voluntary or not the product of custodial interrogation. The court found no clear error in the trial court’s rejection of the Batson challenge, concluding the State’s reasons for the peremptory strike were race-neutral. The court determined that the presence of alternates during deliberations, while a statutory violation, was harmless error. The court also rejected the constitutional challenges to the sentencing scheme. The conviction and death sentence were affirmed. View "MCKANE v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of engaging in organized criminal activity and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. He filed three post-conviction motions under Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking DNA testing on a golf club used in the offense. The trial court denied all three motions, finding that identity was not an issue and that exculpatory DNA results would not have affected the outcome. The appellant received notice of the denial of his third motion several months after the order was signed.The Thirteenth Court of Appeals previously affirmed the trial court’s denial of the first two DNA testing motions. When the appellant attempted to appeal the denial of his third motion, he filed two separate motions for extension of time to file his notice of appeal: one under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.6, which is specific to DNA appeals, and another under Rule 26.3, which applies generally to criminal appeals. The Rule 26.3 motion was filed in the court of appeals, while the Rule 4.6 motion was filed in the trial court. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, noting that the notice of appeal was untimely and that the Rule 4.6 motion was pending in the trial court.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed whether the court of appeals erred in dismissing the general motion for extension while the DNA-specific motion was pending. The court held that neither motion properly invoked the appellate court’s jurisdiction: the Rule 26.3 motion was untimely, and the Rule 4.6 motion was unsworn and therefore did not meet the requirements to serve as a notice of appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "HERNANDEZ v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law