Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
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The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas ruled that a peace officer can legally arrest a suspect, without a warrant, for killing another person while driving intoxicated, even if the accident did not occur in the officer's presence. This interpretation is based on the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 14.03(a)(1), which allows any peace officer to arrest a person found in a “suspicious place” and the circumstances reasonably show that the person is guilty of a felony or breach of peace.The case involved Sean Michael McGuire, who was arrested on suspicion of causing another person's death by driving while intoxicated and failing to stop and render aid. Prior to his arrest, McGuire hit a motorcycle, causing the death of its driver, then drove to a nearby gas station where he was later found by the police. The police officer noted that McGuire exhibited signs of intoxication and had "red glassy eyes" and "an odor of alcohol coming from his person." As a result, the officer formed probable cause to believe that both a felony and breach of the peace had occurred.The court found that McGuire's arrest met the requirements of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 14.03(a)(1) and thus reversed the court of appeals and the trial court’s suppression of McGuire’s arrest and all evidence arising from it. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "State v. McGuire" on Justia Law

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In Texas, the appellant was stopped by an officer for failing to remain in a single lane of traffic. After the officer smelled alcohol on the appellant's breath and observed signs of intoxication, he obtained a warrant for a blood sample, which showed a blood alcohol content of .174. The appellant was subsequently indicted for felony driving while intoxicated. The appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress, arguing that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellant was convicted. The appellant appealed, and the Third Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the stop was unlawful because the appellant's failure to maintain a single lane was not unsafe.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas considered whether a mistake of law should apply when an officer conducts a search or seizure under an ambiguous law. The court held that the officer's reasonable misinterpretation of the law did not undermine the reasonable suspicion required to conduct the traffic stop. The court noted that at the time of the stop, there was no controlling interpretation of the relevant section of the Texas transportation code from the Court of Criminal Appeals and the intermediate courts were split in their interpretations. The court therefore reversed the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Daniel v. State" on Justia Law

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In a case reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, the trial court mistakenly permitted an alternate juror to participate in the jury's deliberations and vote on the defendant's guilt. The defendant, charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, argued that this violated constitutional and statutory provisions requiring a jury to consist of twelve people and prohibiting any person from being with the jury while it was deliberating. On review, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the presence and participation of an alternate juror during jury deliberations did not violate the constitutional or statutory requirements regarding the size of a jury. However, the Court held that the alternate juror’s presence and participation during deliberations did violate the statutory prohibitions against a “person” being with the jury while it is deliberating and conversing with the jury about the case. As such, the Court remanded the case to the lower court to conduct a harm analysis, i.e., to determine whether the alternate juror's presence and participation during deliberations had a substantial or injurious effect on the jury's verdict. View "BECERRA v. STATE" on Justia Law

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In this consolidated case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals interpreted the 2017 amendments to Texas Penal Code Section 32.21, the forgery statute. The statute provides that a basic forgery offense is a Class A misdemeanor but includes provisions that can raise the offense to a state-jail felony or a third-degree felony based on the type of writing forged. The 2017 amendments added a new subsection (e-1) or the "value ladder" provision, which sets forth offense classifications based on the value of property or services the defendant sought to obtain through the forgery, ranging from a Class C misdemeanor to a first-degree felony. The court held that the value ladder provision is not discretionary but mandatory whenever a defendant forges a writing with the intent to obtain property or services. The court further held that the value ladder constitutes an element of the offense rather than a punishment-phase issue. However, the court disagreed with the court of appeals' application of Apprendi principles and rejected its conclusion that the State must plead and prove a non-statutory "purpose" element in a forgery prosecution under subsections (d) or (e). The court of appeals' judgments were vacated and the cases were remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Green" on Justia Law

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Harry Donald Nicholson Jr. was sitting in his parked truck at a gas station when he began throwing tissues out of his window. An officer noticed the litter, approached Nicholson, and asked him to pick up the tissues. After Nicholson provided his driver's license number and began picking up the litter, the officer was informed by dispatch that Nicholson had active felony warrants. It was disputed whether Nicholson heard this over the officer's radio. When the officer attempted to handcuff and arrest Nicholson, he managed to get back into his truck and drive away, crashing into another officer's vehicle in the process.Nicholson was charged with aggravated assault of a public servant and evading arrest or detention with a vehicle. He was convicted on both charges and sentenced to 60 years in prison. On appeal, the Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the aggravated assault charge but found that the jury instructions on the evading arrest or detention charge were improper and egregiously harmed Nicholson. The court reversed the evading arrest conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on that charge.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas granted Nicholson's petition for discretionary review on the conviction for evading arrest to clarify the elements of the evasion statute. The court reviewed the statute, which provides that a person commits an offense if he intentionally flees from someone he knows is a peace officer or federal special investigator trying lawfully to arrest or detain him. The court had to determine whether the defendant must know that the attempted arrest or detention is lawful. The court concluded that the defendant does not need to have such knowledge.The court found that the statute is ambiguous because it is susceptible to multiple interpretations. Considering the legislative history and purpose of the statute, the court interpreted the statute to not require the mental state of knowledge to be applied to the lawfulness of the detention or arrest. The court determined the elements of the evasion statute are: (1) a person (2) intentionally flees (3) from a peace officer or federal special investigator (4) with knowledge he is a peace officer or federal special investigator (5) with knowledge the peace officer or special investigator is attempting to arrest or detain the defendant, and (6) the attempted arrest or detention is lawful. The court affirmed the lower appellate court's decision to reverse Nicholson's evasion of arrest conviction and remand the case for a new trial. View "NICHOLSON v. STATE" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, the defendant, Jemadari Chinua Williams, was charged with aggravated promotion of prostitution. The indictment against him followed the language of the relevant statute, which enumerated six potential methods of committing the offense. Williams filed a motion to quash the indictment on the grounds that the State was required to specify which of the six methods it would rely on to establish his guilt. The trial court denied the motion and Williams was convicted.On appeal, Williams argued that the indictment was insufficient as it failed to specify the manner and means of committing the offense. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that the State was required to pick one of the methods allowed by statute and alleged in the indictment to satisfy the notice requirement.Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals, holding that the State is not required to elect between alternative statutory methods of committing an offense alleged in an indictment. The Court noted that the maxim requiring the State to specify the manner of commission applies when a statute defines an offense in multiple ways and is an exception to the general rule that statutory definitions do not have to be included in a charging instrument. The Court clarified that this rule can require the State to allege more detail in a charging instrument, but it does not require the State to abandon a manner or means in the charging instrument. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for consideration of Williams's remaining points of error. View "Williams v. State of Texas" on Justia Law

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In Bowie County, Texas, Zimbabwe Raymond Johnson was involved in a car accident where he collided with a utility pole and an antique truck. He continued to drive away from the scene until his vehicle was no longer operational. Upon the arrival of the police, Johnson provided identification information but did not have insurance. Consequently, he was charged with failure to comply with duties to provide information after an accident and was convicted of attempting to commit those offenses. The trial judge imposed a $200 fine for each offense and ordered Johnson to pay restitution of $200 for the utility pole damage and $10,000 for the vehicle damage.On appeal, Johnson contested the restitution order, arguing that the offenses for which he was convicted did not cause the pole and truck damage. The court of appeals agreed and deleted the restitution awards. The State of Texas petitioned for a discretionary review of the decision by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. The court held that, under Article 42.037 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, restitution could be ordered only when the offense for which the defendant was convicted caused the damage. The court stated that there was no evidence to suggest that Johnson's failure to comply with his duties of providing information after the accident caused any of the damage. Although the court acknowledged that in some situations, a failure to provide information could cause damage (such as by delaying necessary medical help), such was not the case here. The court dismissed the State's concern that limiting restitution might motivate overcharging just to obtain restitution, stating that such concern could not dictate the resolution of the issue. View "JOHNSON v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

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A Texas man, Brian Christopher Reed, was charged with sexual assault for allegedly penetrating the victim's sexual organ with his own without her consent. At trial, the jury convicted him of a lesser-included offense of attempted sexual assault. The jury charge for the lesser offense did not limit the means of penetration to his sexual organ, and the charge's definition of sexual assault mentioned that penetration could be committed "by any means." The jury also heard some evidence that Reed may have used his mouth, not his sexual organ. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, stating that the jury charge was erroneous and caused egregious harm to Reed because it expanded the theory of liability beyond the language of the indictment. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' finding of egregious harm. The Court noted that while there was conflicting evidence as to whether Reed used his sexual organ or his mouth, the main issue in the case revolved around consent, not the means of penetration. The Court also emphasized that neither the prosecution nor the defense suggested to the jury that it could convict Reed if it thought he used his mouth. The Court thus concluded that the possibility that the jury charge error led the jury to find the defendant guilty of attempting to sexually assault the victim with his mouth instead of his sexual organ was "hypothetical at best." As such, the Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case back to the court of appeals to consider Reed's remaining issues. View "REED V. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

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In this case, the appellant, Roberto Medina Flores, was convicted of second-degree felony sexual assault and later filed a motion for a new trial. The trial court had 75 days to rule on the motion, but due to the COVID-19 emergency order, the court extended the deadline. The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion for a new trial. Flores appealed, and the court of appeals found the trial court erred in extending the deadline, as this 75-day period is jurisdictional, not procedural, and a trial court cannot create jurisdiction for itself where it would otherwise be absent, even based on an Emergency Order. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas unanimously agreed with the court of appeals, stating that the requirement for a court to have jurisdiction is not procedural and the 75-day jurisdictional deadline cannot be suspended. The trial court did not have the authority to preside over the hearing on the motion for a new trial, and its ruling is void. Therefore, the appellant's motion for a new trial was overruled by operation of law when the 75-day plenary period expired. The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "FLORES v. THE STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

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The Appellants in consolidated cases filed pretrial writs of habeas corpus challenging the facial constitutionality of portions of the statutes they were charged under. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide the cognizability of their pretrial claims and the meaning of “immediate release”—release from what? The Court held the facial challenges were cognizable in a pretrial writ of habeas corpus if a grant of relief would result in immediate release from prosecution for an alleged offense. Release from prosecution for every alleged offense is not required. In Appellant Tonya Couch's case, the claim was not cognizable: if her indictments alleged one offense committed via four different, alternative, statutory manner and means, she challenged the constitutionality of two of those purported manner and means in her habeas application, leaving two unchallenged. If she were granted relief, her single-count indictment would still stand, and trial on it could still proceed. A grant of relief on her claim would not result in her release from prosecution for the offense alleged in her indictment. In Appellant Glenda Hammons’ case, her claim was cognizable because she challenged the constitutionality of the statute defining two counts of her three-count indictment. If she were granted relief, she would be released from prosecution for two alleged offenses, and trial on those counts could not proceed though trial on the third one could. View "Ex parte Couch, Hammons" on Justia Law