Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Texas Department of Public Safety detained and arrested the appellant for criminal trespassing as part of Operation Lone Star in Maverick County. Unlike the appellant, the two women in his group were transferred to the custody of the U.S. Border Patrol. The appellant claimed selective arrest and prosecution based on his sex and sought relief through pretrial habeas proceedings.The trial court held a hearing and heard testimony from various witnesses, including DPS officers and a client advocate. The court found that the appellant, along with other adult males, was arrested for criminal trespass while the women were transferred to federal custody due to jail capacity issues. The trial court denied the appellant's pretrial writ and motion to dismiss, concluding there was no sex discrimination.The Fourth Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held that the appellant's claim was cognizable on pretrial habeas and found that he had demonstrated a prima facie case of sex discrimination. The appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case to allow the State to rebut the presumption of sex discrimination under strict scrutiny.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and agreed that the appellant's claim was cognizable. However, the court found that the appellant failed to meet the demanding burden of showing a prima facie case of selective enforcement or prosecution. The court noted that the evidence suggested the discriminatory effect was due to logistical issues during an ongoing state of emergency, rather than intentional sex discrimination. The court reversed the appellate court's decision and affirmed the trial court's denial of relief. View "EX PARTE APARICIO" on Justia Law

In 2009, the applicant was convicted of possessing more than one but less than four grams of cocaine and sentenced to two years and nine months in prison following a guilty plea. The conviction involved former Houston Police Department Officer Gerald Goines, who has been found to have provided false information and testimony in other drug cases. In 2019, the Harris County District Attorney’s Office informed the applicant that Goines was under criminal investigation. The applicant then filed for a writ of habeas corpus, initially on four grounds, but later amended it to focus solely on the claim that his guilty plea was involuntary due to not knowing about Goines’s misconduct.The 184th District Court of Harris County recommended granting relief, finding that the applicant’s guilty plea was involuntary and that the conviction was obtained through the use of false evidence. The court concluded that the applicant had established an inference of falsity under the Coty-Mathews framework, which applies to cases involving police officers with a history of falsifying evidence. The court found that the false evidence was material to the applicant’s guilty plea.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case to determine whether Goines’s conduct warranted an inference of falsity. The court concluded that the record did not support the habeas court’s conclusion because Goines was not the sole officer involved in the applicant’s arrest, and the evidence did not establish that Goines was the first to find the contraband. Therefore, the court held that an inference of falsity did not apply and remanded the case to the habeas court to consider the applicant’s involuntary plea claim without applying an inference of falsity. View "EX PARTE CHRISTIAN" on Justia Law

In 2018, Robbie Gail Charette, a Republican candidate for Judge of the County Court-at-Law in Washington County, Texas, was indicted on four misdemeanor charges related to campaign law violations. These charges included misrepresenting the source of a campaign communication, falsely claiming to hold a public office, failing to file a personal financial statement on time, and not maintaining proper records of political expenditures. A special prosecutor pursued these charges without a prior referral from the Texas Ethics Commission (TEC).The trial court denied Charette's pretrial habeas application, which argued that the prosecution was unauthorized without prior TEC proceedings. The court found no legislative language granting the TEC exclusive authority to enforce the violations and ruled that district attorneys could independently investigate and prosecute election-related crimes. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld this decision, stating that the district court had jurisdiction over the misdemeanors and that any alleged deprivation of civil due process rights by the TEC did not affect this jurisdiction.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the TEC has exclusive jurisdiction over the offenses listed in Chapter 571 of the Texas Government Code. The court held that the TEC must make an initial determination on alleged violations before any criminal charges can be brought. Since no TEC proceedings occurred in Charette's case, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the charges. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and ordered the dismissal of the indictments against Charette. View "EX PARTE CHARETTE" on Justia Law

In August 2021, the appellant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to 30 years in prison, along with an $8,000 fine and $325 in court costs. The trial court's judgment noted that an inquiry into the appellant's ability to pay was conducted, but no such inquiry appears in the record, nor did the appellant request it or object to its absence. The appellant argued that the trial court failed to conduct an ability-to-pay inquiry as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 42.15(a-1), and he claimed that he did not need to object to preserve this complaint.The 14th Court of Appeals in Houston reviewed the case and agreed with the appellant that the trial court had a duty to conduct the inquiry sua sponte, making it a non-forfeitable right under Marin v. State. However, the court upheld the trial court's judgment, citing a previous decision that the amendment requiring the inquiry to be on the record was not retroactive.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and focused on whether the right to an ability-to-pay inquiry is a forfeitable right under Marin. The court concluded that the ability-to-pay inquiry is not fundamental to the adjudicatory process and is therefore a forfeitable right. The court noted that the inquiry is a post-trial procedure and does not affect the fairness or accuracy of the trial. Additionally, the court highlighted that relief from fines and costs is available after sentencing through other means. Consequently, the appellant forfeited his right to the inquiry by not objecting at trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgments of the lower courts. View "CRUZ V. TEXAS" on Justia Law

The case involves an appellant who engaged in online conversations with an undercover police officer posing as a 13-year-old girl named "Alyssa." The appellant's communications became romantic and sexual, leading to a solicitation for a meeting to have sex. When confronted by police, the appellant claimed he intended to warn the girl about the dangers of meeting strangers online. At trial, he testified that he did not believe "Alyssa" was a minor and thought she was lying about her identity. He introduced testimony from a past "catfisher" and sought to introduce testimony from his brothers and autism experts, which the trial court excluded.The Fifth Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the excluded testimony from the appellant's brothers and Dr. Masino, an autism expert, was relevant to rebut the mens rea element of whether the appellant knowingly solicited a minor. The court found that the exclusion of this evidence was constitutional error because it prevented the appellant from fully presenting his defense. Consequently, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower court's decision. The court held that the expert testimony on autism did not directly rebut or negate the mens rea required for the offense. The court found that the autism evidence did not show that the appellant was incapable of perceiving the age of the person he was communicating with. The court concluded that the trial court properly excluded Dr. Masino's testimony and remanded the case to the court of appeals to address the admissibility of the brothers' testimony and Dr. Jerome's testimony. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "CRUMLEY v. STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of capital murder after evidence was obtained from a search of his cell phone. He filed a motion to suppress this evidence, arguing that the warrant affidavit did not provide probable cause for the search. The trial court denied his motion, leading to his conviction. On appeal, the appellant contended that the affidavit was insufficient, and the court of appeals agreed, reversing the trial court's judgment and remanding for a new trial.The trial court initially denied the appellant's motion to suppress, resulting in his conviction. The appellant then appealed to the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, which found that the affidavit supporting the search warrant lacked sufficient particularized facts to establish probable cause. Specifically, the affidavit did not describe the murder or provide a factual nexus between the cell phone and the crime. Consequently, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new trial.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case, focusing on whether the court of appeals had applied an overly stringent standard for probable cause. The higher court found that the court of appeals had misinterpreted the precedent set in State v. Baldwin, which does not require that an affidavit must always show the cell phone was used during, before, or after the crime. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the court of appeals erred in its interpretation and reversed its judgment. The case was remanded for further consideration consistent with the higher court's opinion. View "STOCKER V. STATE" on Justia Law

In 1998, the appellant pled nolo contendere to indecency with a child by sexual contact and was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for six years, which he completed in 2004. In 2018, following a recantation by the victim, the appellant sought habeas corpus relief, claiming actual innocence. The trial court referred the matter to a magistrate judge to issue the writ and conduct a hearing. The magistrate judge held a hearing and recommended granting relief based on actual innocence. However, the State filed a motion to reconsider, which the magistrate judge granted, later adopting the State's proposed findings and orally denying relief without a written order.The appellant filed a notice of appeal, but the court of appeals initially indicated the appeal might be dismissed for lack of a final, signed order. The State then obtained a written order from the magistrate judge, which purported to deny relief. The court of appeals proceeded on the assumption it had jurisdiction and ruled in favor of the appellant, stating the State's motion to reconsider did not extend the trial court's jurisdiction. The State's subsequent motion for rehearing argued the magistrate judge lacked authority to issue a final order, but the court of appeals rejected this argument based on the doctrine of invited error.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court had not entered an appealable order granting or denying relief. The court held that only a written order from the trial court judge, not the magistrate judge, could constitute an appealable order under Article 11.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over the appellant’s attempted appeal. The judgment of the court of appeals was vacated, the appeal was dismissed, and the case was remanded to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the appeal. View "EX PARTE SINCLAIR" on Justia Law

The case involves Waymon Jaeshell Stepherson, who was convicted by a Brazoria County jury. The former District Clerk, Rhonda Barchak, used a race-based system to create jury panels by sorting prospective jurors by race and residence. Stepherson, who is black, claims this process violated his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and an impartial jury, as well as the statutory requirement for a randomly selected jury panel.Stepherson was convicted of aggravated robbery in 2016. He did not object to the jury composition at trial. On appeal, he raised issues unrelated to jury selection, and the court of appeals upheld his conviction. After his conviction was affirmed, Stepherson filed a habeas corpus application, alleging newly discovered evidence of a race-based jury selection process. The habeas court found that while race was a factor in creating the jury panels, there was no evidence of systematic exclusion or underrepresentation of any racial group. The court concluded that Stepherson's jury panels represented a fair cross section of the community and recommended denying relief.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and held that to prove a due process violation based on racial discrimination in jury selection, a defendant must show systematic exclusion of a particular group and that this exclusion rendered the jury plainly illegal. The court found that Barchak's process was designed to include, rather than exclude, racial groups proportionally. Therefore, Stepherson did not meet the criteria for a due process violation. The court also found no violation of equal protection or the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, as there was no evidence of systematic exclusion or underrepresentation of non-whites. The court denied Stepherson's application for habeas corpus relief. View "EX PARTE STEPHERSON" on Justia Law

Investigators from the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force conducted an undercover operation and found child pornography on the appellant's cell phone. The appellant was indicted under Section 43.262(b) of the Texas Penal Code for knowingly possessing visual material depicting the lewd exhibition of the pubic area of a clothed child under 18 years old, which appealed to the prurient interest in sex and had no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.The appellant filed a pretrial writ application arguing that Section 43.262(b) was unconstitutional on several grounds, including that it was an impermissible content-based restriction on protected speech and was overbroad. The trial court denied the application, concluding that the statute was a content-based restriction but passed strict scrutiny, regulated only obscenity and child pornography, and was not void for vagueness.The First Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Section 43.262(b) was unconstitutional because it regulated protected speech, did not survive strict scrutiny, and was overbroad. The court of appeals concluded that the statute did not regulate only child pornography or obscenity and that the State failed to show a compelling interest in regulating child erotica.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed the court of appeals' decision. It held that Section 43.262(b) regulates only child pornography, an unprotected category of speech. The court concluded that the statute was not an unconstitutional restriction on protected speech because it met the criteria established by the United States Supreme Court for regulating child pornography. The court also held that the appellant failed to preserve his overbreadth claim for appellate review. The case was remanded to the court of appeals to address the remaining points of error. View "EX PARTE LOWRY" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Shanea Lynn Reeder, who was convicted for Unlawful Possession of Firearm and sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment. At the time of his arrest, Reeder was serving deferred-adjudication community supervision for a felony offense of distributing a controlled substance. Reeder, representing himself, argued that his conviction was improper as he had not been convicted of a felony at the time of his arrest.Prior to the current review, two hearings were held on the same day. In the first, Reeder pled guilty to Unlawful Possession of Firearm and was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment. In the second, the State alleged Reeder violated conditions of his deferred-adjudication community supervision for the controlled-substance offense. Reeder pled true to the violations, and the court found him guilty, sentencing him to a concurrent term of 5 years' imprisonment. Later, Reeder filed a post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his conviction was improper because he was not a convicted felon at the time he was arrested for Unlawful Possession of Firearm.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and had to decide whether serving deferred-adjudication community supervision constitutes being convicted of a felony for the purpose of Unlawful Possession of Firearm. The court concluded that it does not. Therefore, the court agreed that Reeder was not convicted of a felony at the time of his arrest for Unlawful Possession of Firearm. The court also held that Reeder's plea was involuntary due to a fundamental misunderstanding by all parties of the law in relation to the facts at the time the plea was made. As a result, the court set aside the judgment of conviction for Unlawful Possession of Firearm, and Reeder was allowed to withdraw his plea. The judgment on the motion to adjudicate the underlying offense of distributing a controlled substance remained undisturbed, with Reeder serving 5 years' imprisonment for that violation. View "EX PARTE SHANEA LYNN REEDER" on Justia Law