Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") officers searched defendant Sanchez-Leon's home, discovering methamphetamine, firearms, and cash. A federal grand jury charged Sanchez-Leon with violating various federal drug laws. On the first day of trial, he changed his plea to guilty. He later moved to withdraw his guilty plea, which the district court denied. The district court sentenced him to 295 months in prison. Sanchez-Leon appealed the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea as not entered knowingly or voluntarily. He also appealed his sentence as both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions and defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Sanchez-Leon" on Justia Law

James Woods and several others were indicted for participating in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Woods’s defense theory at trial was that he and the cooperating witnesses did not deal in methamphetamine, foreclosing Woods’s involvement in the charged conspiracy. Defense counsel argued the cooperators were lying about the charged conspiracy to obtain favorable treatment from the government as part of their plea bargain arrangements. In response to this line of attack, during his closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury, among other things, that, if the drug conspiracy was about “anything other than meth, then why would those witnesses all come in and plead guilty to . . . conspiracy to distribute meth?” Although Woods did not object to the prosecutor’s closing argument, he argued on appeal that the district court committed plain error in failing to sua sponte declare a mistrial or instruct the jury to disregard the objectionable statements. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Woods" on Justia Law

Thomas Hale filed for bankruptcy in 2005. During the course of that bankruptcy, he allegedly lied under oath and attempted to conceal from the bankruptcy trustee an agreement to sell property. After his relationship with the trustee became antagonistic, Hale sent her a package with unidentified material and a note that said, "Possible Haz-mat? Termites or Hanta virus [sic] from mice?" In 2013, Hale was convicted of making a materially false statement under oath in a bankruptcy case, concealing a contract from the bankruptcy trustee and creditors, and perpetrating a hoax regarding the transmission of a biological agent. Upon review of Hale's appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part: "instead of charging Hale with 'making a false declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury' with regard to his representations in [his bankruptcy petition,] Hale was charged with falsely answering a temporally ambiguous question that inquired about numerous filings and was asked nearly a year after the documents were submitted. We do not think it proper to condone the prosecution’s creation of this ambiguity. We thus conclude that the error 'seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" The Court reversed the conviction with regard to the false statement, but affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Hale" on Justia Law

Petitioner John Doe was convicted of first-degree murder by a jury in Oklahoma and sentenced to life without parole. His direct appeal was unsuccessful and he did not file for a writ of certiorari, an application for state post-conviction relief, or a federal habeas petition. He was separately convicted in federal court for robbery of a federally insured bank, which took place in connection with the Oklahoma murder, and was sentenced to life imprisonment for that crime. While serving the federal life sentence in Texas, petitioner was convicted of murdering a fellow inmate. The government introduced evidence of petitioner’s Oklahoma murder conviction during the sentencing phase of his federal capital case, and he was subsequently sentenced to death. Petitioner filed this first habeas petition and an almost identical post-conviction relief application in state court, challenging the constitutionality of a prior Oklahoma state court conviction based on evidence of actual innocence. He also filed a motion to abate this section 2254 action pending state court exhaustion of his claims. The district court dismissed his habeas petition without prejudice, adopting a magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation and holding that a stay under "Rhines v. Weber," (544 U.S. 269 (2005)), was not available because the petition was not "mixed" as in "Rhines" and, in any event, because petitioner lacked good cause for the stay. Although the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court’s reasoning regarding the potential application of Rhines, it affirmed its denial of a stay. View "Doe v. Jones, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant April Rampton received a large tax-refund check from the IRS after she submitted false tax forms. She claimed that the refund check was a government pronouncement that her actions were legal. After receiving her refund she helped others submit false tax returns using the same method. Defendant was convicted on nine counts of aiding and abetting the filing of false and fraudulent claims for income-tax refunds. On appeal, she argued that the district court's refusal to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment by estoppel deprived her of a fair trial. The Tenth Circuit concluded defendant was not entitled to an entrapment-by-estoppel instruction because it would have been unreasonable to infer the legality of her conduct from the payment of the refund. View "United States v. Rampton" on Justia Law

Michael Fisher filed a post-conviction application, but the state district court waited over eight years to rule on it. The Respondents argued that by failing to ask for an expeditious ruling, Fisher abandoned the post-conviction proceedings. The issue this case presented to the Tenth Circuit was whether a state post-conviction application remains “pending” when it could have been (but wasn’t) dismissed on grounds of abandonment? The Court concluded that the application does remain pending in these circumstances. Thus, the limitations period was tolled while the post-conviction application worked its way through the state courts. Because the federal district court drew the opposite conclusion, the Tenth Circuit reversed. View "Fisher v. Clements, et al" on Justia Law

Defendants-Appellants David Banks, Kendrick Barnes, Demetrius Harper, Clinton Stewart, Gary Walker, and David Zirpolo were convicted following a jury trial on multiple counts of mail fraud and wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud. Defendants contacted numerous staffing agencies to “assist in providing temporary services. Witnesses from multiple staffing companies testified that a Defendant (or someone acting as Defendants’ agent) approached them and expressed the desire for "payrolling" services. The staffing-company witnesses testified that they were induced into believing that Defendants’ companies were either doing business with major law-enforcement agencies or were on the verge of selling a specialized software to these agencies. These witnesses testified that Defendants (or Defendants’ agents) assured them that this alleged law-enforcement business would enable Defendants’ companies to pay the staffing companies’ invoices, and, critically, that they relied on these representations in choosing to do business with Defendants. Trial testimony from representatives of the law-enforcement agencies with whom Defendants claimed to be doing business revealed the falsity of Defendants’ representations to the staffing companies. When questioned about their failure to pay the staffing companies’ invoices, Defendants gave false assurances that payment would be forthcoming, and they continued to imply that they were doing business with large government law enforcement agencies. In the end, forty-two different staffing companies were left with outstanding invoices totaling in excess of $5,000,000, which could not be submitted to the government agencies, which had no business relationship with Defendants’ companies. Defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 87 to 135 months. Defendants argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit: (1) their right to a speedy trial was violated when the district court granted multiple continuances of the trial date (at Defendants’ request); (2) the district court compelled co-Defendant Barnes to testify in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and failed to give a proper curative instruction; (3) the district court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of two witnesses Defendants sought to call at trial; and (4) the cumulative effect of the district court’s otherwise harmless errors prejudiced them and required reversal. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Banks" on Justia Law

After a sting operation involving two confidential informants and substantial audio and video surveillance, federal law enforcement officers caught Jesus Cabral-Ramirez ("Mr. Cabral") and Defendant-Appellant Maria Gutierrez de Lopez ("Ms. Gutierrez") attempting to transport an undocumented alien from El Paso, Texas to Denver, Colorado. A federal grand jury indicted Ms. Gutierrez on one count of conspiring to transport undocumented aliens. At trial, the Government elicited testimony from Border Patrol Agent Brian Knoll about the immigration status of the individual Ms. Gutierrez allegedly conspired to smuggle. Agent Knoll also provided expert testimony that transporting undocumented aliens away from U.S./Mexico border regions to the interior of the United States significantly reduced the odds of apprehension by law enforcement. The confidential government informants testified anonymously about several conversations they had with Ms. Gutierrez tending to support the charges against her. Although the Government provided the defense with the informants’ general criminal backgrounds, compensation records from federal agencies, and immigration status, it did not disclose their actual identities. Defense counsel cross-examined both witnesses in light of the disclosures provided by the Government, but was unable to conduct adequate independent pre-trial investigation. The jury convicted Ms. Gutierrez as charged, and the district court sentenced her to three years of probation. She appealed, arguing: (1) Agent Knoll’s testimony about the smuggled individual’s immigration status introduced inadmissible testimonial hearsay in violation of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause; (2) Agent Knoll’s expert testimony about the alien-smuggling trade was not helpful to the jury under Federal Rule of Evidence 702(a); and (3) the Government’s use of anonymous testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Gutierrez De Lopez" on Justia Law

Camille Lente appealed a sentence of 192 months' imprisonment, which was well above her advisory Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months, for three counts of involuntary manslaughter and one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The district court relied on several specific factual circumstances in calculating its sentence, including Lente's excessive recklessness, her underrepresented criminal history, and her postconviction conduct. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court thoroughly considered the relevant sentencing factors and adequately explained the basis of its decision to vary substantially upward, and that the sentence imposed was reasonable. View "United States v. Lente" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, defendant Tony Washington was convicted on two drug charges: (1) conspiracy to distribute crack and marijuana; and (2) conspiracy to maintain a residence for the purpose of distributing those same drugs. As part of determining Washington's advisory sentencing range under the 2008 version of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court calculated Washington's base offense level. On direct appeal, Washington contended the district court attributed too large a quantity of crack to him, "challeng[ing]" two components of the district court's calculations: (1) the conversion of $2600 into 85.05 grams of cocaine base; and (2) the estimation he and his coconspirators purchased 680.4 grams of cocaine base with their pooled money. The Tenth Circuit specifically declined to resolve Washington's challenge to the conversion of $2600, noting: "Washington . . . recognizes that only the challenge to the 680.4 grams can lower the drug quantity below 500 grams and thereby reduce his base offense level under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c)(4). We therefore confine our analysis to the 680.4 grams." The Court then denied Washington's appeal, concluding the quantity of 680.4 grams was supported by sufficient evidence. In August 2011, Washington filed a pro se motion for sentence reduction pursuant to section 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 750 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Instead of challenging the correctness of his base offense level, he made the legally erroneous argument that Amendment 750 allowed the district court to reconsider its previous decision to give him a sentence above the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range. The district court denied his motion, concluding that because Amendment 750 did not reduce Washington's offense level, and it was without power to alter his sentence. In May 2013, Washington, acting through appointed counsel, filed another 3582 motion. Although he styled his pleading as a "Motion for Sentence Reduction Under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)," he did not assert the district court had the power to modify his sentence. The district court denied Washington's motion. Washington then appealed to the Tenth Circuit, asking the Court to take up and decide the issue it declined to resolve on direct appeal. The government argued the Tenth Circuit lacked statutory jurisdiction because Washington's appeal did not fit within the four categories of allowed sentencing appeals under 18 U.S.C. 3742(a). The question presented to the Court on appeal was thus a narrow legal question: Could Washington use the sentence-modification procedure set out in 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) to have the court decide an issue left unresolved on direct appeal? "The Supreme Court's decision in Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010), coupled with the policy statements accompanying U.S.S.G. 1B1.10, compel[ed] a negative answer." View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law