Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey Shaun Bagby was indicted on one count of possessing, with intent to distribute, fifty grams or more of cocaine base (crack), and one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition. On the morning his jury trial commenced, Defendant, against the advice of the district court, waived his right to counsel and proceeded to represent himself. The jury convicted him on the drug count but acquitted him on the ammunition count. Because of his prior felony drug convictions, Defendant received a mandatory minimum sentence of life in prison. He appealed his conviction and sentence, alleging errors at trial and in the imposition of sentence. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that any error committed by the district court was harmless. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's imposition of a mandatory life sentence. View "United States v. Bagby" on Justia Law

In cross-appeals, the parties raised challenges to various rulings made by the district court in a section 1983 action arising out of an allegedly unlawful seizure. Defendants Gary Carson and Don Mangin, employees of the New Mexico Department of Corrections, observed Plaintiffs Phillip Martinez and Ricardo Sarmiento sitting or standing with a third man in a low-lit area outside an apartment building in a high-crime neighborhood at night. Defendants pulled up to the apartment building in an unmarked police car and turned on the emergency lights. Defendants forced Plaintiffs to the ground, handcuffed them, drew weapons, and conducted a pat-down search. When additional Rio Rancho officers arrived on the scene a few minutes later, Defendants transferred Plaintiffs, still in handcuffs, into the custody of these officers. The Rio Rancho police officers eventually arrested and booked Plaintiffs, holding Mr. Martinez for twelve hours and Mr. Sarmiento for five hours before their release. In their 1983 action, Plaintiffs raised claims of unlawful seizure against several Rio Rancho police officers as well as the named Defendants in this appeal. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Rio Rancho defendants subsequently settled the claims against them and were dismissed from the action. Defendants filed a third motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs filed a crossmotion for partial summary judgment. The district court denied both motions, citing multiple factual disputes. The court held that the pertinent question for the jury to decide was whether Defendants had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when they detained Plaintiffs, and if so, the brief seizure was warranted as an investigative detention responsive to officer safety concerns; if not, it was an illegal seizure. The court further held that Defendants could only be held liable for their own allegedly unlawful conduct, not for the actions of the Rio Rancho officers. The case then proceeded to trial, where the jury found for Plaintiffs on their unlawful seizure claim, finding Defendants lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the initial seizure, and awarded Plaintiffs compensatory and punitive damages totaling $5,000 each. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's orders limiting Defendants' liability to the first few minutes of the seizure, as well as a discovery sanction. On cross-appeal, Defendants raised issues regarding (1) the district court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity, (2) the district court's denial of their Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law, (3) various evidentiary rulings the district court made at trial, and (4) the inclusion of a punitive damages jury instruction. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's sanctions order, reversed the district court's summary judgment order limiting Defendants' liability, and remanded the case back to the district court for a new trial limited to the issue of whether (and to what extent) Defendants reasonably should have known their unlawful seizure of Plaintiffs would have resulted in a prolonged detention and, if so, whether any additional damages were appropriate. Defendants' cross-appeal was dismissed. View "Martinez v. Carson" on Justia Law

Two direct criminal appeals arose from the same incident and had one sentencing issue in common. The crime in which the two Defendants-Appellants, Johnson Joe and Cynthia Jones participated included a brutal beating and sexual assault that came at the end of a bout of heavy drinking. Joe and Jones each eventually entered a guilty plea to a single charge of aggravated sexual abuse. After the guilty pleas, the district court directed the preparation of a presentence report (PSR) for each of them. In both cases, the PSR recommended that the offense level be increased by four under U.S.S.G. 2A3.1(b)(1) because the offense involved the use of force against the victim. In the case of Ms. Jones, the PSR also recommended that her offense level be further increased by two under U.S.S.G. 3A1.3 because the victim had been restrained during the offense. In the case of Mr. Joe, the government objected to the PSR because it did not include an enhancement for the restraint of the victim. Neither Defendant contested the facts underlying the recommendations. Both Defendants, however, objected to the recommendation (that of the PSR in the case of Ms. Jones and of the government in the case of Mr. Joe) to apply both the use-of-force and the restraint-of-the-victim enhancements. The district judge overruled these objections in both cases. In Ms. Jones’s case, the PSR found that the applicable sentencing range under the advisory Guidelines was 168 to 210 months of imprisonment. The district judge decided to vary downward from that range and sentenced her to 140 months’ imprisonment. In Mr. Joe’s case, the PSR found that the applicable Guidelines range was 125 to 168 months, but with the restraint-of-the-victim enhancement added by the court, the resulting advisory Guideline range was the same as for Ms. Jones – 168 to 210 months. The district judge again decided to vary downward from that range and sentenced Mr. Joe to 110 months’ imprisonment. Both Defendants were also sentenced to a life term of supervised release to commence upon their release from incarceration. Neither Defendant objected to this provision of extended supervised release. On appeal, both Mr. Joe and Ms. Jones contended that the district court erred by applying both the enhancement for the use of force and the enhancement for the restraint of the victim. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred when it enhanced Defendants’ offense levels for physical restraint of the victim as well as enhancing for the use of force against her. The government, which has the burden of proof of showing harmlessness, did not show that this error was harmless. Case law lead the Court to conclude that the error was not. The Court did not find, however, that there was plain error in the imposition of the lifetime term of supervised release. Therefore, the Court remanded the cases back to the district court to vacate Defendants' sentences and for resentencing. View "United States v. Joe" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Mendiola appeals from the district court's imposition of a two-year term of imprisonment following revocation of his supervised release. Defendant argued that in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in "Tapia v. United States," (131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011)), the district court committed plain error in basing the length of the revocation sentence on Defendant's need to participate in a prison-based drug rehabilitation program. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed and reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to vacate Defendant's revocation sentence and for resentencing. View "United States v. Mendiola" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether a prior conviction constituted a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Defendant Gerald Sandoval pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, he admitted to several previous felony convictions, two of which, he also admitted, were violent felonies as defined by the ACCA. But he claimed neither of the two remaining previous felonies considered by the court, first-degree criminal trespass and second-degree assault, were violent. Because either conviction could serve as the third "violent felony" triggering a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA, the Tenth Circuit addressed only one and concluded his conviction of second degree assault, even though mitigated by heat of passion, is a violent crime for the purposes of the ACCA. View "United States v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

Denise Ann Vigil appealed a twelve-month prison sentence imposed she received earlier this year following a series of revocations of probation or supervised release. Appellant argued her sentence was unreasonable because, although she “remained unmotivated throughout her term of supervised release,” and had a “propensity to misstate the truth,” those characteristics do “not constitute ‘severe’ or ‘exceptional’ behavior.” The Tenth Circuit affirmed: "her argument conveniently fails to recognize how her behavior has compounded her circumstances - -a teaching moment apparently lost. . .The first judge used a carrot, encouraging her rehabilitation through participation in programs; her behavior remained unchanged. The second judge dangled another carrot, to no avail. He then used a stick, imposing incarceration followed by supervised release; still no change. The attempts to “provide the defendant with . . . correctional treatment in the most effective manner” utterly failed. . . All that was left was to impose 'just punishment' for her most recent breach of trust." View "United States v. Vigil" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Storey brought civil rights claims against police officers after they arrested him at his home during an investigation of a report of a loud domestic argument. The question before the Tenth Circuit was whether the officers had probable cause to order Plaintiff to step outside his home and arrest him when he refused to do so, and if exigent circumstances or community safety concerns could support the seizure to facilitate further investigation. Upon review, the Court concluded the officers lacked probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify the arrest, and the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment did not apply. The Court therefore reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Storey v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Federal inmate Defendant Travis Denny sought a certificate of appealability (COA) to allow him to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The court ruled that his motion was time-barred under the one-year limitations period of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Most of Defendant’s challenges to that ruling were "routine," but he raised a novel claim based on the AEDPA provision that delays the start of the limitations period until "the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." He argued that he should be given additional time because he discovered the pertinent facts only by exercising extraordinary diligence. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit granted a COA on the timeliness issue but affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Denny" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Justus Rosemond appealed his conviction for using a firearm during a federal drug-trafficking offense. The United States charged Defendant with that offense under alternate theories, alleging that he was the principal and, alternatively, that he aided and abetted a cohort who fired the weapon. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the trial court properly instructed the jury on these alternate theories and that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict.

Defendant-Appellant Tracy Harris was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) of conspiracy to commit a racketeering offense in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), and sentenced to 188 months in prison. On appeal, he challenged the substantive correctness of the jury instructions on the elements of section 1962(d) conspiracy; the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of that crime; the failure of the district court to issue a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of withdrawal; and the substantive and procedural reasonableness of his sentence. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded: (1) that the existence of an enterprise is not a required element of section 1962(d) conspiracy; (2) alternatively, even if the Government was required to prove the existence of an enterprise, there was sufficient evidence to show that the various gang sets in this case constituted an association-in-fact enterprise under :Boyle v. United States," (556 U.S. 938 (2009)); and (3) that Defendant failed to present evidence that he had withdrawn from the alleged conspiracy sufficient to warrant a jury instruction on that defense.