Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Zinna appealed the district court's attorneys' fee award following a successful 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights suit against county official Defendant-Appellee James Congrove. On its consideration of the jury verdict favoring Plaintiff, the district court determined the damage award was nominal and the victory merely technical. It proceeded to award Plaintiff $8,000 in attorneys' fees under section 1988 ($1,000 for each day of an eight-day trial). In light of the Tenth Circuit's jurisprudence applying "Farrar v. Hobby," (506 U.S. 103, 116-22(1992)(O'Connor, J., concurring)), the Court concluded that the district court's award was arbitrary, reversed, and remanded.

Upon entering a plea agreement with the government, Defendant Marcus Oakes pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma to one count of distributing cocaine base. At the sentencing hearing, the government breached its promise in the plea agreement not to oppose Defendant's request that his sentence be concurrent with a prior federal sentence, and the district court sentenced him to 37 months' imprisonment to run consecutively to the other sentence. When the breach was brought to the court's attention a few minutes later, the court struck from the record the improper part of the government's argument but resentenced Defendant to the same consecutive sentence. On appeal Defendant contended that the breach required that his sentence be vacated and resentencing be set before a different judge. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court: "Defendant does not seek, and we would not order, that he be allowed to withdraw his plea. Therefore, the sole remedy for the government's breach is resentencing. Ordinarily, we would order resentencing before another judge. But a defendant can choose to be resentenced before the same judge, that choice can properly be made by defense counsel, and defense counsel made that choice below. Hence, there is no further remedy available for Defendant on direct appeal."

Defendant-Appellant Dennis Dean Neff entered a conditional guilty plea on one count of traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to distribute cocaine. He was sentenced to sixty months' incarceration. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Defendant reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. On appeal, Defendant argued that the state trooper's initial stop of his vehicle was unconstitutional because the trooper lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity under "Terry v. Ohio," (392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the facts known to the trooper at the time of the initial stop did not rise to the level of reasonable, articulable suspicion by providing a particularized and objective basis for wrongdoing. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress and remanded the case with directions to vacate Defendant's conviction.

Defendant-Appellant John Lloyd Whitley was pulled over in his truck based on information that he was a felon in possession of a firearm. During the stop, officers observed two firearms in plain view and found another firearm and ammunition in their subsequent search of the vehicle. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the stop was not justified. After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Finding that the police had a reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment denying Defendant's motion to suppress.

Defendant David Martinez-Zamaripa pled guilty to being an alien present in the United States after deportation. The district court imposed a sentence of 54 months based on a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) for prior conviction of a crime of violence, citing Defendant's Oklahoma conviction for indecent proposal to a child in 1995. Defendant appealed the sentence, arguing that his state conviction should not have been considered a crime of violence under the Guideline. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Defendant's Oklahoma conviction was indeed a crime of violence, and affirmed his sentence.

Defendant Deshane Gantt pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas to brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence for which he was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. He appealed the sentence, arguing that it was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence, finding the sentence was procedurally reasonable because the district court adequately explained why it varied from the guideline sentence, and it was substantively reasonable because the length of the sentence was not an abuse of discretion.

Defendant Cody M. Justice pled guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas to possession of a firearm by a felon. In calculating Defendant's offense level under the sentencing guidelines, the district court applied a four-level enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(4) for possession of a weapon with an obliterated serial number and another four-level enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(6) for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense. It then imposed a sentence of 108 months' imprisonment. On appeal Defendant contended that the district court improperly applied the 2K2.1(b)(4) enhancement because the serial number to his gun was restored with chemicals and therefore was not obliterated; that the evidence was insufficient to support the 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement; and that the court applied the 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement without making the factual finding that a firearm facilitated his drug possession. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that "obliterate" in the context of 2K2.1(b)(4) means "to make indecipherable or imperceptible, not necessarily irretrievable;" that the evidence sufficed to show that a firearm facilitated Defendant's possession of drugs by emboldening him; and that the district court's failure to make a specific facilitation finding was not plain error.

Defendant Antonio de los Santos pled guilty to the offense of being a felon in possession of firearms. Before sentencing, the Government filed notice of its intent to seek an enhanced sentence under the ACCA based on Defendant's four prior convictions for serious drug offenses. These included one conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute on or about November 10, 1992, and three convictions for distribution of cocaine occurring on or about November 2, 1992, November 16, 1992, and November 24, 1992. Defendant objected, arguing that each of these convictions arose from a single criminal episode and thus should be treated as a single conviction for purposes of section 924(e)(1). The district court orally overruled Defendant's objection to the Government's ACCA notice and sentenced him accordingly. The district court concluded the offenses involved were sufficiently separate and distinct. Specifically, the district court stated Defendant had a meaningful opportunity to cease his criminal conduct, but did not do so. On appeal, Defendant did not challenge whether his convictions qualify as "serious" drug offenses under the ACCA. Rather, he challenged only whether the four convictions were "committed on occasions different from one another." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding no single criminal episode existed in this case because each violation occurred at distinct, different times.

Defendant-Appellant Cedric Burks provided codes to an auto-theft ring that were used to create working keys for specific vehicles. One such vehicle was stolen in Nevada, stripped to its frame, and subsequently discovered and auctioned by authorities. Several months later, the same vehicle reassembled, was identified in Utah. Based on this discovery, Defendant was charged and convicted of aiding and abetting the possession and transportation of a stolen. On appeal, he argued that the jury was improperly instructed on the affirmative defense of withdrawal and was allowed to make an improper inference that Defendant's associates knew the vehicle was stolen. The Tenth Circuit disagreed on both points: "First, assuming that withdrawal is an affirmative defense to a conviction premised on accomplice liability, [the Court held] that the jury was properly instructed that the burden of proving the defense rested on [Defendant]. Second, [the Court held] that the jury was properly instructed that it could infer that Defendant's associates knew the vehicle was stolen."

Defendant-appellant Rayne Alisa Osborn appealed a district court's order denying her a reduction of her criminal sentence under 18 U.S.C. sec. 3582(c)(2). Osborn argued that the district court abused its discretion in declining to apply an ameliorative amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines to reduce her term of incarceration. In May 2008, Osborn sought and obtained a reduction of her sentence based on an ameliorative amendment to the Guidelines, Amendment 706, which made her eligible for a two-level reduction in her offense level. Osborn contended the district court erred in denying her relief "based on historical factors used to justify the initial sentence and the [earlier] partial reduction of that sentence." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the court acted well within its discretion in denying the joint motion for sentence reduction.