Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Reshard Benard challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a vehicle stop on January 16, 2009. Following the denial of his suppression motion, Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to conspiracy to manufacture cocaine base and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He was then sentenced to a twenty-year sentence, the mandatory minimum for his conspiracy charge. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in failing to suppress Defendant’s post-arrest statements, particularly his statement that his girlfriend might have left a gun in his car. The district court concluded that, although Defendant was in custody at the time this statement was made, he was not subjected to interrogation. Having so held, the Court then considered whether the district court’s failure to suppress this evidence entitled Defendant to withdraw his conditional guilty plea under Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant would still have agreed to waive his right to a jury trial as to the counts of conviction absent the district court’s error. Accordingly, the Court held that the district court’s suppression error required remand of both counts of conviction under Rule 11(a)(2).

Oklahoma state prisoner Petitioner James DeRosa was convicted of two counts of first-degree felony murder for the 2000 stabbing deaths of two people, and was sentenced to death on both counts. Petitioner unsuccessfully challenged his convictions and sentences on direct appeal, as well as in an application for state post-conviction relief. He then sought federal habeas relief by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied his petition but granted a certificate of appealability (COA) as to one issue: his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Tenth Circuit, in turn, granted a COA on two additional issues: (1) whether the cumulative effect of the improper comments of the prosecuting attorney made during both phases of trial was harmless; and (2) whether allowing the jury to hear the responses of two victim-impact witnesses who testified during the penalty phase of trial was harmless constitutional error. Taking each issue in turn, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Petitioner's convictions, finding that the evidence presented at trial "overwhelmingly" established that Petitioner committed the murders, and that his trial counsel's alleged failure to present evidence of mitigating circumstances was unfounded. The jury found the existence of two aggravating factors with respect to each of the murders. The evidence presented by the prosecution, which was essentially uncontroverted, overwhelmingly supported the jury’s findings. Further, the jury was properly instructed by the trial court on the use of mitigating evidence and its role in the sentencing deliberations, as well as the proper role of victim-impact evidence. Consequently, the Court concluded that the admission of the improper portions of the victim impact testimony did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."

A jury convicted Defendant Tracy Don Cartwright of being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The probation office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) that classified Defendant, based on three prior Oklahoma burglary convictions, as an armed career criminal subject to a 15-year minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Defendant objected to that classification, arguing two of the three identified crimes did not qualify as "burglary convictions" within the meaning of section 924. The district court overruled Defendant's objections to the PSR and sentenced him accordingly. Defendant appealed, asking the Tenth Circuit to decide two questions: (1) whether an Oklahoma second-degree burglary conviction based on entry into a building by an instrument capable of completing the intended crime qualifies as a "burglary" under the ACCA and, (2) whether a nolo contendere plea to another Oklahoma second-degree burglary conviction qualifies as a "conviction" under the ACCA. Considering each of the issues Defendant raised on appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: because the Government properly showed Defendant had three prior violent felony convictions for purposes of the ACCA, the Court affirmed the district court's decision to overrule Defendant's objections.

Appellant Derrick Handley appeals his sentence, following revocation of his supervised release and imposition of a new term of incarceration of twelve months and supervised release of four years, on grounds his supervised release exceeds the amount allowed by law under 18 U.S.C. 3583(h). Appellant pled guilty to one count of distributing more than five grams of crack cocaine for which he was sentenced to seventy-two months imprisonment and four years of supervised release, to begin in early 2008. Jurisdiction for his term of supervised release was transferred to the federal district court in Kansas. Over the next few years, Appellant would appear before the Kansas court for multiple violations of the terms of his release. The release was revoked, and Appellant was sentenced again for another term of imprisonment followed by additional years of supervised release. After a third violation of the terms of his release, Appellant was again sentenced to prison and another term of supervised release. Appellant appealed the last prison term and supervised release period on the grounds that the district court exceeded the maximum amount allowable by law under 18 U.S.C. 3583(h). Upon review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed that the district court exceeded its discretion in sentencing Appellant, and affirmed his sentence.

Defendant-Appellant Linda Diaz was convicted of knowingly leaving the scene of a car accident where she hit and killed a pedestrian. The accident occurred on the Pojoajue Pueblo Indian reservation. She was charged with committing a crime in Indian Country under 18 U.S.C. sec. 1152. On appeal, among other issues, Defendant contended the federal court lacked jurisdiction over the crime because the government failed to prove that the victim was not an Indian, a jurisdictional requirement under section 1152. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the government met its burden of proof. The testimony of the victim’s father provided enough evidence for a jury to conclude the victim was not an Indian for purposes of the statute. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court did not err in its rulings on various other evidentiary and trial issues.

This case was about the government’s repeated efforts to remove Petitioner Kairi Abha Shepherd from the United States on the ground she is a criminal alien. In the initial removal proceeding, the government did not effectively contest Petitioner's claim to automatic citizenship under the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 (CCA), and the Immigration Judge (IJ) dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The next day, the government initiated a new removal proceeding, explaining to the same IJ that it had made a mistake and now realized that Petitioner was too old to qualify under the CCA for citizenship. The IJ eventually decided that his initial ruling precluded the government from relitigating Petitioner's citizenship or alienage status, and he terminated the proceeding. The government successfully appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which held that collateral estoppel did not apply and remanded to the IJ, who ordered removal. Petitioner then appealed to the Tenth Circuit for review. Upon review, the Court found that Petitioner's alien status precluded the Court's jurisdiction: "[Petitioner's] issue preclusion argument based on the IJ’s first decision is unavailing because administrative collateral estoppel does not apply to our sec. 1252(b)(5) analysis." Accordingly, the Court dismissed her petition for review.

Defendant-Appellant Emmanuel Huitron-Guizar entered a conditional guilty plea to being an illegal alien in possession of firearms transported or shipped in interstate commerce, and was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. Defendant was to be delivered upon release to an immigration official for deportation. On appeal, he argued that 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(5)(a) was unconstitutional and that the district court committed various sentencing errors in applying the Sentencing Guidelines. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found the applicable statute constitutional, and that the district court committed no errors in arriving at Defendant's sentence.

Defendant-Appellant Thomas Bader appealed his convictions of distribution of human growth hormone (HGH), conspiracy to knowingly facilitate and knowingly facilitating the sale of HGH brought into the United States contrary to law, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance (testosterone cypionate). He asked the Tenth Circuit to reverse his convictions or, at a minimum, to grant him a new trial. Defendant also challenged the district court's forfeiture order requiring him to remit the $4.8 million in proceeds that he allegedly derived from his unlawful activity. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions for distribution of HGH and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute testosterone cypionate, but reversed based upon instructional error his convictions for knowingly facilitating the sale of HGH imported into the United States contrary to law, and conspiring to do so. Further, in light of the Court's reversals, it concluded that the forfeiture judgment could not rest on its current statutory basis, but the Court left it to the district court in the first instance the task of determining the precise amount (if any) of the forfeiture judgment authorized by the remaining, upheld convictions.

Petitioner-Appellant Jesus Hector Palma-Salazar was indicted in 1995 for conspiracy to distribute cocaine; he was arrested in Mexico in 2002. After he was extradited to the United States pursuant to an extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico, Petitioner pled guilty and began serving his sentence. In 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his confinement at the Administrative Maximum Prison in Florence, Colorado (ADX). He alleged his confinement at ADX violated his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights and also the extradition treaty. The district court denied his petition. It concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider his Fifth and Eighth Amendment claims because they were challenges to the conditions of his confinement and must, therefore, be brought under "Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics," (403 U.S. 388 (1971)). It also concluded Petitioner's confinement at ADX did not violate the extradition treaty. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion.

Defendant-Appellant Aaron Cope was convicted of one count of operating a common carrier (commercial airplane) under the influence of alcohol. On appeal, Defendant challenged his conviction based on improper venue, insufficiency of the evidence, and improper reliance on federal regulations. In 2009, Defendant was the copilot and first officer of a commercial flight from Austin, Texas to Denver, Colorado. Robert Obodzinski was the captain. Following the flight to Austin, Mr. Obodzinski invited the crew to dinner, but Defendant declined, stating that he did not feel well. Mr. Obodzinski did not see Defendant again until the next morning in the hotel lobby. Mr. Obodzinski testified that “[Mr. Cope] had a little bit of a puffy face, and his eyes were a little red, and I assumed that since he said the night before he wasn’t feeling well, that he was probably coming down with a cold.” The pilots flew from Austin to Denver that morning without incident. While in the cockpit, Mr. Obodzinski detected occasional hints of the smell of alcohol. When they arrived in Denver, Mr. Obodzinski leaned over Defendant and “took a big whiff,” concluding that the smell of alcohol was coming from Defendant Mr. Obodzinski contacted dispatch to delay the next leg of their flight, and contacted the airline's human resources officer. Defendant would later be indicted by the federal grand jury in Colorado. After a two-day bench trial, the district court convicted Mr. Cope and sentenced him to a below-guidelines sentence of six months in prison and two years of supervised release. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court had sufficient evidence to find that Defendant was “under the influence of alcohol,” even if the district court relied on the FAA regulations or Republic Airways'[Defendant's employer] company policy, such reliance would have been harmless error.