Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A Utah state trooper stopped Sherida Felders for speeding while on a trip from California to Colorado. Based on her answers to a few questions, Trooper Brian Bairett asked to search Felders’s car for drugs. After Felders refused, Bairett called for assistance from K-9 Unit officer Jeff Malcom to conduct a dog sniff. The ensuing two-hour search yielded no drugs. Felders and her passengers filed suit against Bairett and Malcom under 28 U.S.C. 1983, alleging, among other claims, that both Bairett and Malcom unlawfully searched Felders’s car in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Malcom moved for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim based on qualified immunity. The district court denied Malcom’s motion for summary judgment. The district court found as a matter of law that Malcom could not establish probable cause to search the car prior to conducting the dog sniff and that material facts were in dispute regarding (1) whether Malcom’s canine alerted prior to jumping into the vehicle; and (2) whether Malcom facilitated the dog's entry into the vehicle prior to establishing probable cause. Malcom filed an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. He argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment because he had probable cause to search the car prior to conducting the dog sniff and, alternatively, that the law did not clearly establish that his actions during the sniff violated the Fourth Amendment. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Malcom did not have probable cause to search the vehicle prior to conducting the sniff. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of Malcom's motion for summary judgment. View "Felders, et al v. Malcom, et al" on Justia Law

In 2012, Cheston Foster was arrested for violating the terms of his supervised release, including traveling to Massachusetts without permission. Following a revocation hearing where Foster admitted the violations enumerated, the district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced Foster to time served and 30 months of supervised release. The court imposed a special condition that he reside in a halfway house residential re-entry center. Foster’s attorney sought an alternative arrangement by providing the probation office with the address of Foster’s mother, but the probation officer opposed this suggestion. The district court stated, “[w]hat we will do is we will start with a residential re-entry center, and if through his assigned probation officer there is an alternative that is reasonable, we will go at it that way, but we will start there.” On December 27, 2012, Foster left the residential reentry center without permission and did not return. A few months later, a grand jury issued an indictment charging Foster with a single count of escape from custody. Foster’s attorney moved to dismiss the indictment because the residence requirement “was not part of any detention or a sanction for his supervised release violation,” and therefore Foster was not in custody for purposes of the escape statute. The district court dismissed the indictment after concluding that Foster was not in custody. The government appealed. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Foster" on Justia Law

Five members of Petitioner Steven Bonney's extended family, four girls and one boy, accused him of sexually assaulting them on various occasions when they were between the ages of six and eight and Petitioner was a teenager. The assaults allegedly occurred around 2000 or 2001. The State of Wyoming charged Petitioner in 2008 with four counts of second degree sexual assault and one count of third degree sexual assault. The issue before the Tenth Circuit, as framed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, was whether the Wyoming state court's denial of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on collateral review of a guilty plea "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established" Supreme Court precedent. The federal district court thought so, but upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit disagreed and reversed. View "Bonney v. Wilson, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner Enrique Garcia-Mendoza petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision upholding an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his request for cancellation of removal. The agency determined that he was ineligible for such relief because he could not establish that he "ha[d] been a person of good moral character" due to his confinement in a penal institution for more than 180 days. In 2010, he was arrested and charged with driving under the influence and leaving the scene of an accident. He could not afford bond and remained confined during his pretrial criminal proceedings. He was released after he had been confined for a total of 197 days when the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took him into custody and initiated removal proceedings. Petitioner conceded that he was removable for remaining in the United States beyond his authorized period of stay and applied for cancellation of removal. The IJ denied his request because petitioner had been confined for more than 180 days for his 2010 conviction and therefore he could not establish the requisite good moral character. While petitioner’s appeal of that decision was pending with the BIA, he filed a motion with the state trial court seeking to amend his sentence. In the motion, he alleged that his counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his sentence before he entered his guilty plea. He asked the court to resentence him to 166 days with no credit for time served. The state court granted the motion and issued a modified mittimus nunc pro tunc to the original sentencing date. Petitioner then filed a motion for remand with the BIA based on the new evidence that his sentence was modified to 166 days. The BIA granted the motion and remanded to the IJ. On remand, the IJ again denied cancellation of removal, noting that the nunc pro tunc order modifying the sentence did not change the fact that petitioner had already been confined for more than 180 days as a result of his conviction. The BIA upheld the IJ’s decision. Petitioner then petitioned the Tenth Circuit. Seeing no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied review. View "Garcia-Mendoza v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2009, a Kansas state court convicted Defendant of possessing cocaine with intent to sell and sentenced him to 40 months in jail. Around the same time, Defendant was convicted in a Kansas state court of eluding a police officer. For this latter crime, Defendant’s presumptive Kansas guideline range allowed for a maximum of seven months of jail time. The prosecutor did not seek an upward departure. In the end, the court imposed a six month sentence. In 2012, Defendant pled guilty in the federal District of Kansas to possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base, and to using and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office concluded in its Presentence Report (PSR) that Defendant was a "career offender" under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a) because, among other requirements not at issue in this case, he had "at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense." Defendant objected to his career offender classification, arguing that eluding a police officer, while indeed a crime of violence, was not a federal felony in this instance because it was not "punishable by . . . imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit was whether defendant committed enough prior qualifying felonies to be considered a "career offender" under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The district court said yes, relying on "United States v. Hill," (539 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2008)). On appeal, defendant admitted "Hill" mandated this classification, but he argued that "Hill" was abrogated by the Supreme Court in "Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder," (560 U.S. 563 (2010)). The Tenth Circuit agreed, reversed and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Hartshorn appealed a district court's issuance of an injunction against him, arguing the court erred in concluding he promoted an abusive tax shelter in violation of 26 U.S.C. 6700. Defendant organized and was appointed head minister of the Church of Compassionate Service in 2004. At that time, the church had approximately fifty active ministers. To become a minister, an individual is required to take a vow of obedience and a vow of poverty. Upon taking the vow of poverty, ministers transferred title to all of their property to the church. They also assigned to the church all income that was earned as part of their normal employment, either endorsing their employment checks in favor of the church or directing their employers to deposit their earnings directly into various church accounts. According to internal church documents, 90% of the money ministers earned and assigned to the church was "available for local ministry funding." Defendant testified that the church’s "policy [of trying] to make 90 percent available to fund ministries for their compassionate service projects [is] not tied to how much money they make." However, ministers who were deposed in the course of this litigation indicated that it was their understanding they would “get back 90 percent of whatever funds [they] generate[d] for the church.” Ministers deposed for the litigation had not filed tax returns for numerous years though the income they earned at their jobs outside the church was taxable income. The district court agreed with the government that Defendant was promoting abusive tax shelters through his church, and particularly through his representations that individuals who took vows of poverty and obedience and became ministers of his church would not be required to pay taxes on income they earned and assigned to the church. The court accordingly granted summary judgment in favor of the government and issued an injunction prohibiting Defendant from promoting or selling "the use of church-based tax-fraud schemes." On appeal, Defendant argued that the Tenth Circuit should reverse the district court’s summary judgment decision because: (1) Defendant’s statements regarding the tax benefits for vow-of-poverty ministers were correct; and (2) if any of his statements were false or fraudulent, he did not know or have reason to know of this fact. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Defendant’s representations to the ministers regarding the tax consequences of becoming a minister of the church were false or fraudulent. With respect to reversal of summary judgment because of statements Defendant made to the ministers, the Tenth Circuit found none of his arguments persuasive: "the test for injunctive relief under [26 U.S.C. 7408] is satisfied if the defendant had reason to know his statements were false or fraudulent, regardless of what he actually knew or believed. And we conclude that, whether or not Defendant actually knew his purported interpretation of federal tax law was incorrect, 'a reasonable person in [his] subjective position would have discovered' the falsity of his representations." View "United States v. Hartshorn" on Justia Law

Terry Jo Rollings pled guilty to one count of knowingly possessing stolen goods. As part of the plea agreement, Rollings waived the right to appeal his guilty plea, the restitution imposed, and any other aspect of his conviction. Despite waiving his right to appeal in his plea agreement, Rollings petitioned the Tenth Circuit to challenge his plea, arguing it was not knowing and voluntary because he was not advised of the court’s authority to order restitution and because he was not aware of all of the elements of the crime charged. Since his guilty plea allegedly was not knowing and voluntary, he claimed that his waiver of his right to appeal the plea was likewise invalid. The government moved to enforce Rollings’s appeal waiver. The Tenth Circuit found the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily, affirmed the district court's decision and granted the government's motion to enforce the appeal waiver in the plea agreement. View "United States v. Rollings" on Justia Law

In 2012, defendant Henry J. Adams III was the lookout for a bank robbery, and recruited a friend to drive her car. After pleading guilty, he received an above-guidelines sentence of 140 months’ imprisonment. On appeal he argued that he should have received an offense-level reduction for being a minor participant, and that the district court abused its discretion in imposing an above-guidelines sentence. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held: (1) that defendant was not entitled to a minor-participant reduction because he helped plan the robbery and acted as the lookout; and (2) that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it varied his sentence upward. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Taurus Hoyle appealed the remand proceedings of his prior appeal. The Tenth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed again, this time challenging the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial on remand and consideration of prior state convictions at resentencing. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial. View "United States v. Hoyle" on Justia Law

A Roswell police officer discovered a gun magazine containing ammunition during a protective pat down of defendant Cruz Garcia. A grand jury charged defendant with being a felon in possession of ammunition. Defendant was sitting in the passenger seat of a vehicle driven by Gilbert Romero. Romero was driving under a suspended license for which he was arrested. The vehicle he was driving had a crack in the windshield that obscured the driver's view. Because it was deemed unsafe to drive, the car was towed. Before towing the vehicle, the contents of the car were inventoried. Before the inventory, police asked defendant to exit the vehicle. The officer recognized defendant from a recent encounter and had learned months earlier from a fellow officer that defendant had a criminal history, which included at least one violent felony. Based on that foreknowledge, the officer decided to pat defendant down for weapons, at which time, police discovered the gun magazine. Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the ammunition on Fourth Amendment grounds, contending the pat down search was unjustified. The district court denied the motion after concluding the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. But finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law