Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, robbery and the commission of a Hobbs Act robbery. On appeal, defendant challenged his sentence. The court concluded that the district court did not err in applying a two-level bodily injury enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(3)(A) where defendant's objection was untimely and where the victim sustained a bodily injury within the meaning of the guidelines. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Aguilar-Ibarra" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence and convictions of drug and firearms charges. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress three searches because the first search at issue was a valid protective sweep; in regards to the second search at issue, defendant agreed to a warrantless search of his residence; and in regards to the third search at issue, the lessee of the property voluntarily consented to the search. The court concluded that defendant's remaining challenges were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Yeary" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of offenses stemming from his involvement in an operation of a series of companies that marketed and sold fraudulent business opportunities. Defendant raise several issues on appeal. The court concluded that the district court erred in adding a two-level sentencing enhancement for defendant's alleged violation of a prior court order where defendant received the enhancement because he violated an order he never actually received from a case his attorney presumably should have handled. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed as to all other issues raised on appeal. View "United States v. Mathauda" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for assault of a federal officer that resulted in bodily injury. Because it was undisputed that defendant made physical contact with the officer, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give an instruction relevant only to a scenario in which no physical contact had occurred; because this case did not involve threats or attempts, but did involve an intentional act and bodily injury, as the jury was so instructed, the district court's decision not to include the pattern instructions' definition of forcible assault was not plain error; the district court did not plainly err by not presenting the defense instruction to the jury; and the district court's instruction did not constructively amend the indictment. Further, the district court did not commit error or abuse its discretion in the challenged rulings at trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a federal death-row inmate, appealed the district court's denial of his petition to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to investigate mental health mitigation evidence and then present it during the sentencing phase of the trial; his attorneys failed to object to jury instructions on the issue of petitioner's future dangerousness and escape risk; and his attorneys failed to request a jury instruction that the balancing of the aggravating and mitigating factors could be conducted according to the reasonable doubt standard. The court applied Strickland v. Washington's deferential standard and rejected defendant's arguments. Even if counsels' performances were deficient, petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "LeCroy, Jr. v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of 71 counts including murder of an Eleventh Circuit judge, petitioned for a writ of mandamus ordering the recusal of a district judge who was randomly assigned to hear his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus and directing the transfer of this matter to a district judge outside the bounds of the Eleventh Circuit. Petitioner then moved for the recusal of all judges on this court, requesting that the court likewise transfer his mandamus petition to a different circuit. At issue was whether, 24 years after the judge's murder, recusal was required for current Eleventh Circuit judges who had no personal connection or relationship with the judge and who were not members of the Circuit at the time. The court answered in the negative, concluding that under the unique facts of this case such a tenuous connection would not, standing alone, raise significant doubt in the mind of an informed, objective, and disinterested lay observer about the court's ability to fairly decide cases involving defendant. Further, the court could not conclude that the court became prospective members of the so-called "victim class" upon the court's confirmation to the Eleventh Circuit. The court finally concluded that defendant was not entitled to the recusal of the district court judge. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for recusal and the mandamus petition. View "In re: Walter Moody, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of motions for a stay of execution and applied for a stay of execution with the court. Plaintiff challenged the method of execution in Florida as cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. The court concluded that plaintiff could not establish that he had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; the Supreme Court of Florida had already decided his Eight Amendment claim; and res judicata barred his federal complaint. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to stay the execution and the amended motion to stay the execution. The court also denied plaintiff's application for a stay of execution. View "Muhammad v. Secretary, FL DOC, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants Harris and Stanley appealed their securities fraud convictions and sentences stemming from their role in a "pump and dump" scheme. The court concluded that Harris waived his right to counsel knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; the district court did not err by refusing to allow counsel to represent an absconded Harris; the district court, which issued a curative instruction to mitigate any perceived prejudice, did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant severance and mistrial; because the district court at no point pressured Harris into foregoing his right to silence, it did not err by considering remorseless statements freely volunteered by Harris at the sentencing hearing; and the district court did not clearly err in finding that Stanley played more than a minor role in this massive fraud, and it did not abuse its considerable discretion because Stanley's sentence was substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed both defendants' convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Stanley" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition brought under the savings clause in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e). The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded, concluding that petitioner satisfied the five requirements necessary to proceed with a section 2241 petition under section 2255(e) as set forth in Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium. View "Mackey v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a death row inmate convicted of murder, appealed the denial of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) Motion for Relief from Judgment, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision of Martinez v. Ryan constituted an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to justify the reopening of the final judgment of his prior 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition. Martinez involved the procedural default doctrine as to an ineffective-trial-counsel claim in initial-review state collateral proceedings. The court concluded that Martinez did not apply to petitioner's section 2254 petition that was barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(d), statute of limitations. Even assuming that the Martinez rule changed or affected in some way the decisional law about AEDPA's statute of limitations and equitable tolling, any such change in law was not an extraordinary circumstance warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Arthur v. Thomas" on Justia Law