Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United States after removal for committing an aggravated felony. At issue was whether second-degree sexual battery under Florida law was a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The court concluded that the district court erred by applying only an 8-level enhancement to defendant's base offense level by relying on the Supreme Court precedent, Johnson v. United States, which held that a defendant's prior battery conviction under Florida law was not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). However the Supreme Court in Johnson was dealing with a different issue under the ACCA, not the amended definition of "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii). Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Contreras" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to one count of knowingly possessing firearms and ammunition while being a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 933(g)(1) and 924(e). On appeal, petitioner challenged the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition, brought pursuant to the "savings clause" in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e). The court concluded that defendant has proven that his prior section 2255 motion was "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention" and that his 2241 petition could not proceed under section 2255(e) because: (1) from the time of his initial sentencing in 2002 throughout his first section 2255 proceeding in 2005, the court's binding precedent in United States v. Hall held that a concealed-firearm offense under Fla. Stat. 790.01 was a "violent felony" under section 924(a); (2) subsequent to petitioner's first 2255 proceeding, the Supreme Court's decision in Begay v. United States set forth a new standard to evaluate which crimes constituted violent felonies under section 924(e), and Begay, as interpreted by United States v. Archer overturned the court's precedent in Hall; (3) Begay's new rule is substantive and applies retroactively to petitioner's section 924(e) claim on collateral review; (4) as a result of pure section 924(a)-Begay error and retroactive application of Begay, petitioner's 235-month sentence exceeds the 10-year statutory minimum authorized by Congress in section 924(a); and (5) the savings clause in section 2255(e) reaches his claim of illegal detention above the statutory maximum penalty. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions. View "Bryant, Jr. v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and 420-month sentence for, inter alia, conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine. The court concluded that when the officers in this case installed GPS trackers on defendant's vehicles without a warrant, they acted in reasonable reliance upon the court's then-binding precedent. Suppression of reliable, competent, and probative evidence was a last resort justified only where the benefits of deterrence outweigh the substantial social costs of exclusion. Therefore, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied in this case and the district court properly denied defendant's motion based on United States v. Jones. The court also rejected defendant's evidentiary claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and judgment. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, daughters of the late Kenneth Weinberg, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to county jail officers. Kenneth, a pretrial detainee at the jail for twenty months, commenced this civil rights suit under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming deliberate indifference to his basic medical needs because the officers refused to provide him with batteries for his hearing aids, rendering the aids worthless and leaving him unable to hear. Kenneth also filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and a First Amendment retaliation claim against the officers for the same conduct. The court concluded that Kenneth stated a viable constitutional claim but that state law did not provide the officers with "fair warning" that their alleged conduct was unlawful. Accordingly, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the officers. View "Weinberg Gilmore, et al. v. Hodges, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The court found that the district court erred in holding that the emergency aid exception justified law enforcement officers' warrantless entry into defendant's apartment where, considering the totality of the circumstances, it was not reasonable for the officers to believe that someone inside defendant's apartment was in danger and in need of immediate aid. Because the officers' initial entry into defendant's apartment was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the district court erred in holding that the same justification permitted the officers to enter defendant's bedroom. Finally, the court held that the district court erred in denying defendant's ore tenus motion to suppress with regard to defendant's statements during two telephone calls at issue, but did not err in denying defendant's ore tenus motion to suppress with regard to defendant's statements during another telephone call. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Timmann" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of possessing and distributing child pornography. On appeal, defendant filed a motion for release on bond pending his sentencing hearing, or, in the alternative, for limited remand and temporary release on bond pending the conclusion of the proceedings on limited remand. Defendant argued that his terminal cancer and short life expectancy provided the exceptional circumstances which make his detention pending sentencing inappropriate. The court reversed the district court's order finding that it lacked the jurisdiction to consider whether exceptional reasons under 18 U.S.C. 3145(c) warrant defendant's release pending sentencing. The court recognized that, on limited remand, the district court determined by clear and convincing evidence that defendant had clearly shown in accord with section 3145(c) that there are exceptional reasons why his detention pending sentencing would not be appropriate. However, given the discretionary language of the statute, and the court's holding today, the court remanded for the district court to assume jurisdiction and to make a determination of whether to order defendant's release. View "United States v. Meister" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Florida death row inmate convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The court rejected petitioner's evidentiary claims, conflict of interest claim, and ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court concluded that defendant had not shown that the Florida state courts' decisions were contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the section 2254 petition. View "Downs v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the district court's denial of his habeas petition because it was untimely. The district court concluded that petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence that his Initial Motion complied with Florida's oath requirement. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that petitioner rebutted the presumption of correctness of the state court's finding with clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the Initial Motion was properly filed and docketed for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations for a federal habeas petition. View "Kearse v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction for knowingly transmitting a threatening communication under 18 U.S.C. 875(c). Defendant sent an anonymous email to a local radio show host threatening, inter alia, the safety of local schools. The court held that Virginia v. Black did not require a subjective-intent analysis for all true threats. Therefore, when the Government shows that a reasonable person would perceive the threat as real, a true threat may be punished and any concern about the risk of unduly chilling protected speech has been answered. The court also rejected defendant's overbreadth claim. Because true threats are unprotected speech, and because the court's reading of section 875(c) limited that statute to true threats, defendant had not demonstrated a realistic danger that the statute would significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's conviction and restitution order. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendants Sterling and Brumfield appealed their convictions for armed bank robbery, use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The court concluded that the district court's interpretation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 was proper and that the district court did not err in proceeding without Sterling once his rights were explained to him. Accordingly, Sterling voluntarily and permissibly waived his right to be present at trial, and no error occurred. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of defendants' prior conviction for robbing a bank together under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Finally, there was sufficient evidence to convict Brumfield on all counts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Sterling" on Justia Law