Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants were convicted of drug related charges after they were arrested in Panama and the Panamanian Government consented to their prosecution in the United States. At issue was the scope of congressional power to proscribe conduct abroad: whether the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. 70503(a), 70506, exceeded the power of Congress to "define and punish... Offences against the Law of Nations," as applied to the drug-trafficking activities of defendants in the territorial waters of Panama. Because the court concluded that drug trafficking was not an "Offense against the Law of Nations" and that Congress could not constitutionally proscribe defendants' conduct under the Offences Clause, the court vacated their convictions. View "United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado" on Justia Law

In this capital case, at issue was whether defense counsel were ineffective in failing to seek a competency hearing at the penalty phase of defendant's trial and whether defendant was in fact incompetent at the time he entered a plea of guilty to the murder of the victim. The court held that the new testimony adduced at the postconviction evidentiary hearing on which defendant relied was insufficient to establish that the Florida Supreme Court's determination was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington. The court also held that there was no basis on the record to conclude that the district court's finding that defendant was competent was clearly erroneous and therefore, defendant was not entitled to relief on the merits of his substantive competency claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lawrence v. Secretary, Florida DOC, et al" on Justia Law

The State appealed the part of the district court's judgment that granted petitioner habeas relief from his death sentence on the theory that application of the jury sentencing provisions of the Florida statute violated his Sixth Amendment rights, as interpreted in Ring v. Arizona. Based on Supreme Court precedent, the court reversed the district court's judgment insofar as it granted federal habeas relief to petitioner on Ring grounds. In his cross-appeal, petitioner contended that his Sixth Amendment right to public trial was violated when the court partially closed the voir dire proceedings because of the limited seating that was available in a small hearing room. The court agreed with the district court that the Florida Supreme Court's decision on this issue was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court and the court added three points about the nature of the deference due to the state court. Finally, the court rejected petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Evans v. Secretary, FL DOC, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of his 1995 conviction and death sentence imposed in Alabama for capital murder. The district court denied the petition in its entirety, concluding, inter alia, that the claims petitioner raised in his original state petition for post-conviction relief, as well as the claims raised in his amended petition were procedurally barred from federal review, but that even if reviewed on the merits, they would fail. After thorough review, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Boyd v. Commissioner, Alabama Dept. of Corrections, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant moved to suppress ammunition and statements made to an officer and the district court granted the order. At issue was whether a constitutionally valid stop and frisk became unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the officer asked some brief questions unrelated to the reason for the stop and the purpose of the frisk. The officer in this case asked defendant whether he was carrying batteries in his pocket, to which defendant answered that he was actually carrying shotgun shells, not batteries. The court reversed the district court's holding and concluded that the questions posed did not convert a permissible encounter into an unconstitutional one. View "United States v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a death row inmate, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner contended that he was denied a fair trial by an impartial judge and unbiased jury because the jury gave the judge and the bailiff inappropriate gag gifts at the conclusion of the trial. Specifically, some jurors gave the judge chocolate candy in the shape of a penis and a bailiff chocolate candy shaped as female breasts. Petitioner also contended that there was racial discrimination in the selection of the jury. The court held that it was not unreasonable for the Georgia Supreme Court to find that petitioner did not prove purposeful discrimination by the state in the selection of the jury. The court also held, without condoning the regrettable behavior of either, that both the jury and the judge remained impartial and unbiased throughout the trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief.

Petitioner sought review of the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner was convicted of malice murder and robbery and was sentenced to death. The court concluded that the Georgia Supreme Court's determination, that the evidence petitioner's collateral counsel presented in the evidentiary hearing was largely cumulative of the evidence that his trial lawyers had presented during the sentencing phase of his trial, was not an unreasonable determination of fact under section 2254(d)(2). The court also concluded that the Georgia Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Strickland when it held that he was not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed the district court's amendment to an existing criminal forfeiture order to include two Thailand condominiums defendant owns. The court held that the condos were subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. 853(a)(1) and (d). The court held that even if the statute of limitations, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1621 were applicable in this instance, the statute of limitations would be tolled because the condos were not located in the United States. Further, defendant's laches argument failed because the United States was generally not subject to the defense of laches when it enforced its rights. In any event, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(e)(1) permitted the district court to amend a criminal forfeiture order "at any time" on motion by the government. The court also held that defendant's due process rights were not violated. Finally, defendant's Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty argument lacked merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order amending the 1999 forfeiture order to include defendant's condos.

Defendant appealed his convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm in connection with drug trafficking. At issue, among other things, was whether the district court committed plain error by constructively amending an indictment that charged possession of two specific kinds of firearms, a Taurus .45 pistol and an Arminius revolver, by instructing the jury that it could find defendant guilty of the charges if the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed "a firearm." The court held that any error in submitting the unredacted indictment to the jury was harmless; the district court did not plainly err in its instructions to the jury that it could convict defendant of the firearm charges if it found that he possessed any firearm instead of the specific firearms named in the indictment; and defendant's acquittal on state charges was inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions.

Defendant challenged the district court's application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer. Defendant was a passenger in a getaway car whose driver led a dangerous police chase from the robbery of a pharmacy. Finding that two of the facts relied on by the Government were insufficient to prove that defendant actively encouraged or otherwise brought about the driver's dangerous conduct and that the district court did not make the requisite finding for the sentencing enhancement with respect to the third fact, the court vacated and remanded for additional resentencing proceedings.