Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from the district court's order denying his motion to suppress firearms seized from within his residence following his arrest outside the house pursuant to a warrant for absconding from his conditional release on parole. Defendant contended that the district court erred in concluding that the warrantless entry of his residence did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the evidence showed that probable cause existed that illegally possessed firearms were in the residence and that exigent circumstances justified an entry without obtaining a search warrant. The court concluded that a reasonable, experienced officer would have concluded under the totality of the circumstances that the firearms might be removed or concealed before a warrant could be obtained to enter the residence. Consequently, the court agreed with the district court's holding that the officer's conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment and affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner, a Honduran national, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This appeal involved the constitutional separation of powers and the limited judicial role in the extradition of a foreign national. On appeal, petitioner contended that the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment barred his extradition by the Secretary of State, that the murder of the victim constituted a political offense for which he could not be extradited, and there was no valid extradition treaty in force between Honduras and the United States. The court held that petitioner's first argument was not ripe because the Secretary of State has not yet determined whether he was likely to be tortured nor decided whether to extradite him, and his other arguments lacked merit. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and affirmed in part the denial of petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, lifted the stay of the extradition proceedings, and remanded with instructions to dismiss petitioner's claim under the Convention Against Torture.

Petitioner, a Florida state prisoner, petitioned for federal habeas relief, challenging the constitutionality of a Florida statute that altered the mens rea requirement for state drug offenses. The district court, finding a due process violation, granted relief. The court concluded that the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court and therefore, reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief.

Petitioner William Ernest Kuenzel, a state prisoner, appealed the district court’s dismissal of his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. section 2254. Because Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred under state law and he has made no attempt to demonstrate cause for (or prejudice from) his default, Petitioner could not obtain relief without properly supporting a claim of actual innocence. Petitioner was unable to carry this burden; so the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his petition.

Petitioner-Appellant Anthony Ponticelli, a death row inmate in the Florida Department of Corrections, raised two issues about the denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus: (1) the prosecution violated his right to due process when it allegedly suppressed evidence of and failed to correct false testimony about an agreement to provide immunity for a witness for the state and about Petitioner's use of cocaine shortly before the murders; (2) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to present evidence of his incompetence to stand trial and by failing to present mitigating evidence of drug use and mental health problems during the penalty phase. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded both of Petitioner's arguments failed: the Florida Supreme Court reasonably determined the underlying facts as to the first issue; and on both issues, neither contravened nor unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the denial of Petitioner's petition for the writ.

Petitioner Odulene Dormescar, a native and citizen of Haiti, appealed a removal order issued by an immigration judge because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal of that order. He has petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review. His petition presented three issues: (1) whether the Eleventh Circuit had subject matter jurisdiction; if it did, then the second (2) issue was whether res judicata barred the Department of Homeland Security’s proceedings against Petitioner based on the aggravated felony conviction. If it did not, the third (3) issue was whether the Department had the authority to amend the notice to appear to charge Petitioner as "admitted to the United States, but . . . removable" when he was originally charged as an inadmissible "arriving alien." Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction over this case, res judicata did not apply, and that the Department had the authority to amend the notice to appear to charge Petitioner as admitted but removable.

Defendant-Appellant James Mathurin was convicted of a number of armed robbery and weapons charges. These convictions resulted from a five-month-long crime spree in Miami-Dade County that took place when Defendant was seventeen-years-old. On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions on a number of grounds, one of which is that the government violated his rights under the Speedy Trial Act. The narrow question on appeal before the Eleventh Circuit was whether the time during which plea negotiations are conducted is automatically excludable from the Speedy Trial Act’s thirty-day window for filing an information or indictment. After review, the Court concluded that the time during which plea negotiations are conducted are not automatically excludable. Therefore, the Court reversed the District Court’s denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss, vacated his convictions, and remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to determine whether dismissal of the charges should be with or without prejudice.

Petitioner Elias Jimenez-Galicia, a native and citizen of El Salvador, sought judicial review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). The BIA's order affirmed an immigration judge's ("IJ") order of removal and denial of Petitioner's request for cancellation of removal. The denial was based on a determination that Petitioner lacked good moral character. Because the Fourth Circuit was not presented with a genuine question of law, the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary determination that Petitioner lacked good moral character. Therefore the Court dismissed the petition.

The Eleventh Circuit consolidated two criminal cases involving sophisticated financial structuring arrangements between related corporate subsidiaries. Appellants, William Allen Broughton and Richard William Peterson were convicted of conducting a "modern-day financial shell game" in which they falsified financial statements, exchanged paper ownership over non-extant fraudulent assets, and collected insurance premiums and monthly payments from unwitting innocents. Collectively, they stated two bases for reversal: (1) Broughton contended that the Government's purported failure to file charges within the relevant statutes of limitations "demand[ed]" reversal; and (2) both Appellants claimed that the district court erred in denying their motions for judgment of acquittal due to an insufficiency of evidence. Finding no error, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Appellants' convictions.

In 1982, a jury convicted Defendant Omar Blanco of the first-degree capital murder of John Ryan and armed burglary of the residence where Ryan lived. The court accepted the jury's sentencing recommendation on the murder conviction and sentenced Defendant to death. The court also sentenced him to seventy-five years' imprisonment for the armed burglary conviction. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Blanco's convictions and death sentence and denied collateral relief. In 1987, Defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to set aside his convictions and sentences. The District Court denied the writ as to his convictions but granted the writ as to his death sentence on the ground that he had been denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase of his case. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The result of the new penalty-phase proceeding was the same: the jury recommended the death penalty and the court imposed it. In this appeal, the issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether a writ of habeas corpus should have been granted to vacate Defendant's death sentence. The District Court for the Southern District of Florida decided that it should not. The Eleventh Circuit agreed and therefore affirmed its judgment.