Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Johnny Shane Kormondy, a Florida death row inmate convicted of murder, appealed a district court decision that denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Two state court trial proceedings were before the District Court when it ruled. The first proceeding was the guilt phase of Defendant's bifurcated trial in July 1994. The second proceeding was the penalty phase of his 1999 trial. The District Court denied the writ with respect to both phases of the trial. After briefing and oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision.

This case represented the third decision the Eleventh Circuit issued within a month concerning the application of Amendments 750 and 759 to the sentencing guidelines and the scope of a district court’s authority to reduce a defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). In the first two decisions, the Court held that those amendments did not authorize a court to reduce a sentence under section 3582(c)(2) if the defendant’s guidelines range remained the statutory mandatory minimum after the amendments or if the guidelines range was otherwise not affected by the amendments. This appeal raised a different issue because the pro se appellant’s original guidelines range of 121 to 151 months was above, and thus not affected by, the applicable statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months. As a result, Amendments 750 and 759 would reduce his guidelines range. For those reasons, section 3582(c)(2) gave the district court authority to reduce the sentence in its discretion. But because the district court in this case believed it lacked that authority, the Eleventh Circuit vacated that order denying the motion for resentencing and remanded for the court to determine whether to exercise its discretion to reduce the sentence.

Defendant Daniel Anthony Smith entered a conditional guilty plea to receiving and attempting to distribute child pornography. Exercising his preserved right to appeal, Defendant sought review of the district court's denial of his motion to suppress inculpatory physical and testimonial evidence. He contended on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, as he did in the district court, that the officers' warrantless and uninvited entry into his house violated the Fourth Amendment and that the evidence that the officers gathered after that entry should be suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. "Even assuming that the officers' initial entry into Mr. Smith's home violated the Fourth Amendment, suppression is unwarranted because Mr. Smith's later consent was not tainted by the entry." The Eleventh Circuit therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court and Defendant's conviction.

A federal grand jury charged Appellant Hector Almedina with conspiracy to import 100 grams or more of heroin from Colombia to the United States, from January 2011 through February 2011; importation of 100 grams or more of heroin from Colombia to the United States; conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin; and possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin. A jury found Appellant guilty on each count and found that each charged offense involved at least 100 grams of heroin. After a sentencing hearing, the district court ordered Appellant to serve concurrent 97-month terms of imprisonment, which Appellant appealed. After reviewing the record, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Appellant to 97 months' imprisonment. The Court therefore affirmed his sentence.

In this case, death row inmate Petitioner Carlton Gary was appointed two attorneys to prosecute his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. After the writ was denied, and before his execution was to take place, the same attorneys represented Petitioner at a clemency hearing before the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles. Clemency was denied, but the Georgia Supreme Court stayed Petitioner's execution to enable him to pursue a motion for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing in the court in which he was convicted and sentenced, the Superior Court for Muscogee County (the "DNA motion"), and depending on the outcome of the DNA motion, an extraordinary motion for a new trial. The Superior Court granted Petitioner's DNA motion. Based upon "newly discovered DNA evidence," Petitioner began preparation for an extraordinary motion for new trial. The attorneys appointed to represent Petitioner in the District Court and at the clemency hearing prosecuted the DNA motion and are preparing, and intend to prosecute, his extraordinary motion for a new trial. In three appeals before the Eleventh Circuit, Petitioner challenged three orders: Appeal No. 09-16198 arose from the District Court's denial of a motion for funds to pay two experts to appear in person at Petitioner's clemency hearing; Appeal No. 11-10705 involved the District Court's partial denial of a voucher submitted by Petitioner's counsel for payment of services rendered in pursuing the extraordinary motion for a new trial; and Appeal No. 11-15396 addressed the District Court’s denial of a motion for funds to pay an expert to assist Petitioner's attorneys in connection with the DNA motion. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Petitioner's appeal in 11-10705, and affirmed the district court's decisions in his other two appeals.

Pro se Defendant-Appellant Deshawn Glover appealed a district court's denial of his motion to reduce his sentence based on a retroactive amendment to the sentencing guidelines that lowered base offense levels for certain crack cocaine crimes. He contended that Amendment 759 to the sentencing guidelines, U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 759 (Nov. 2011), abrogates the Eleventh Circuit's holding in "United States v. Mills," (613 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2010)), and gave the district court authority to reduce his sentence as a result of Amendment 750, which revised the crack cocaine quantity tables in U.S.S.G. 2D1.1 to conform to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. "[T]he the statutory provision, the Sentencing Commission's corresponding policy statement, and the commentary to that policy statement all make it clear that a court cannot use an amendment to reduce a sentence in a particular case unless that amendment actually lowers the guidelines range in that case. It is that simple." Neither of the Amendments changed Defendant's guidelines range. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded Defendant was not entitled to resentencing.

Florida death row inmate Duane Eugene Owen appealed a district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Owen was sentenced to death for two murders in 1984 for which he was separately tried, convicted and sentenced. On appeal, Owen raised multiple issues, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit found no error or violation of Owen's constitutional rights. The Court affirmed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas relief.

Defendant-Appellant James Early pled guilty to two counts of robbing a bank by violence with what turned out to be fake bombs. He was ultimately sentenced to a 210-month sentence. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing the evidence was insufficient to convict him. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed Defendant's sentence.

Following a jury trial, Defendant Robert Daniels, a/k/a "Twin T" appealed his convictions and sentences for using a facility and means of interstate commerce to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce any individual who had not attained the age of eighteen, to engage in prostitution and any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); knowingly transporting an individual in interstate commerce with the intent that she engage in prostitution and any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2421-22. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent 78-month terms to be served consecutively to a prior sentence imposed by the Eastern District of Michigan. On appeal, Defendant raised six issues. The primary issue was one of first impression for the Eleventh Circuit: whether a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 2422(b) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew that the victim was a minor. Upon review, the Court declined to find knowledge a requirement under 2422(b). The Court concluded that this statute was written for the protection of minors caught in the web of these illicit activities, rather than for offenders choosing to turn a blind eye to the age of the victims they transport. The Court found no merit in the other five issues Defendant raised and affirmed his convictions.

Defendant Geoffrey West appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He was sentenced to death. He raised three issues on appeal, all pertaining to his claim he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the "lack of showing of prejudice" as grounds for its affirming the district court's decision to grant relief: "even if we suppose that [Defendant could] overcome the various technical and procedural hurdles to having the merits of his claims considered by federal courts and even if we suppose that his trial counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable way, Petitioner has entirely failed to show . . .how [he] prejudiced by his counsel's supposed inadequate performance."