Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his convictions on one count of receipt of child pornography and two counts of possession of child pornography. The court rejected defendant's argument that his statements during two interviews should have been suppressed because the waiver form was "confusing, misleading and constitutionally deficient" where the language of the waiver forms reasonably, clearly, and accurately conveyed defendant's Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda and the waiver forms' qualifications of defendant's entitlement to a civilian lawyer did not invalidate the otherwise adequate statements of defendant's rights. The court also rejected defendant's claim that the district court abused its discretion by admitting defendant's statements at trial without first requiring the government to introduce evidence that defendant provided the statements voluntarily. Further, the child pornography statutes at issue were not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; the indictment was not multiplicitous; the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting certain testimony at issue over defendant's counsel's objections; the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence under rules 414 and 403 and by denying defendant's motion for mistrial; and defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's convictions.

Defendant was convicted for possessing with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine. On appeal, defendant argued that jury instructions were misleading, that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his prior drug-related offense, and that the evidence was insufficient. The court held that, although it disapproved of the constructive possession instruction given to the jury, the court did not find that, under the circumstances of this particular case, it mislead the jury or prejudiced defendant. The court also found that the district court committed no abuse of discretion in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence and that there was sufficient evidence to uphold defendant's convictions.

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The court held that the district court's findings were supported by the evidence and its conclusion that defendant gave legally effacious consent to the search was correct. The court also held that the Florida robbery, both before and after Florida promulgated the "robbery by sudden snatching" statute, qualified as a violent felony under the Act.

Petitioner appealed the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for failure to meet the "in custody" requirement. The district court found that because petitioner had completely served the sentence imposed by the state court, he was no longer "in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court" as required by section 2254(a). The court affirmed the district court's dismissal because petitioner served his state sentence and was presently in custody of a different sovereign.

In this capital case, petitioner was convicted of one count of first-degree murder for the 1976 death of a sixteen-year-old victim and two counts of attempted first-degree murder for the shootings of two other victims. A federal district court subsequently denied petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which included claims that: (1) the state trial court's admission of testimony of an undisclosed rebuttal witness was unconstitutional; (2) petitioner's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; and (3) the State's use of peremptory challenges to exclude all jurors who expressed reservations about the death penalty was unconstitutional. After thorough review, the court concluded that petitioner was not entitled to relief on any of these claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment and denied the petition.

Defendant appealed following his conviction for alien smuggling for commercial gain. Defendant argued that the district court erred by: (1) denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based on vindictive prosecution; (2) failing to grant a judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence; (3) granting the government's motion in limine precluding defendant from discussing the events of his prior trial beyond an excerpt of his own sworn testimony; and (4) denying defendant's motion in limine seeking to introduce portions of the prosecutor's closing argument from defendant's prior trial as an admission of a party opponent under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). After thorough review of defendant's claims, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed from his sentence of illegal reentry of a deported alien. The district court enhanced his base offense level by sixteen levels because he had previously been convicted of a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), and reduced it by three levels under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility. The court held that the distinct definition of "crime of violence" provided in the commentary to section 2L1.2 remained "authoritative" and the district court did not err by relying on the commentary in imposing the sixteen-level enhancement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner filed an application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A), seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence. The court held that, because petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing of the existence of either grounds set forth in section 2255(h), his application for leave to file a second or successive motion was denied.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute oxycodone and to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At issue was whether a Florida conviction for false imprisonment was a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The court concluded that Florida false imprisonment was not a strict liability, negligence, or reckless crime. It required an intent to confine, abduct, imprison, or restrain another person without lawful authority and against her or his will. The Begay v. United States inquiry into whether the crime was purposeful, violent, and aggressive therefore did not, under Sykes v. United States and United States v. Chitwood, apply. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner, a death row inmate, appealed the district court's denial of his first federal habeas corpus petition. At issue was whether petitioner was denied the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his capital trial. Because petitioner filed his federal petition after April 24, 1996, this case was governed by 28 U.S.C. 2254, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). After carefully reviewing the record and having the benefit of oral argument, the court concluded that petitioner had satisfied Strickland v. Washington's demanding standard of deficiency and prejudice, as well as AEDPA's demanding standard, because counsel failed to investigate and to present substantial mitigating evidence. Therefore, the court held that habeas relief was warranted.