Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, an Alabama prisoner on death row, appealed from the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court found that petitioner's claim that Alabama's judicial override scheme violated the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was foreclosed by precedent. The court could not say that the decisions of the state trial and appellate courts, in regards to the mitigation evidence, were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established law. By presenting several relevant circumstances that in sum were sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination, petitioner met his burden of establishing a prima facie Batson v. Kentucky case. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for the district court to complete the final two steps of the Batson proceedings.

This case arose from charges against defendants, which related to the stealing of prescription medical devices from hospitals and selling them on the black market. In this interlocutory appeal, defendants challenged a district court's order denying their motion to vacate a pretrial protective order restraining their assets. Defendant argued that, in addition to traceability, they should have been allowed to challenge the factual foundation supporting the grand jury's probable cause determinations at a pretrial, post-restraint hearing. Because defendants were not entitled to try the entire case twice, once before trial and then again before a judge and jury, the court affirmed the district court's order denying defendants' motion to vacate the protective order.

Defendant appealed his sentence of imprisonment of 27 months for illegal reentry after deportation. At issue was whether a sentencing court could assess a criminal history point for an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction where defendant was sentenced to probation and a monetary fine. The court agreed with the government's alternative contention that, even if the imposition of a sentence of probation violated defendant's right to counsel, the sentencing judge was entitled to assess the criminal history point for the monetary fine because that portion of the sentence remained valid. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence.

Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder, burglary of a dwelling, and robbery with a deadly weapon after the brutal killing of an 88-year-old woman in her apartment. Defendant was sentenced to death and after direct appeal, defendant subsequently sought review of the district court's denial of his habeas petition. At issue was four claims: (1) the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in excluding petitioner from an unrecorded bench conference during the penalty phase of trial; (2) the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advise petitioner of his right to testify at the penalty phase or to call him to testify at the penalty phase; (3) an alleged trial court error in concluding that petitioner's past drug use was "not mitigating"; and (4) cumulative error. After thorough review, the court also concluded that petitioner was not entitled to relief on any of these claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court and denied the petition.

Petitioner, convicted of two counts of malice murder and two counts of felony murder, was sentenced to death and subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition. Petitioner was granted a certificate of appealability on three issues: (1) whether petitioner's trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence during the penalty phase of the trial; (2) whether trial counsel failed to prepare adequately petitioner's father to testify during the penalty phase; and (3) whether the trial court improperly admitted inculpatory statements petitioner made to his father. Given the record and Supreme Court precedent, Georgia's high court decision on the issues was reasonable. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order denying the habeas petition.

Petitioner was convicted of four counts of first degree murder for shotgunning to death his girlfriend and her three children. Petitioner was sentenced to death. Petitioner subsequently appealed from the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for federal habeas relief because it was not filed until over three years after the one-year statute of limitations contained in section 2244(d) had run. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling of 1,393 days because he has not carried his burden of showing that he pursued his rights diligently.

Petitioner, an Alabama state prisoner, appealed from the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition challenging his conviction for capital murder. Because petitioner could not show prejudice based on his counsel's failure to investigate and to present evidence in support of the insanity defense, the district court's denial of his Strickland claim was affirmed. The court could not say that the state appellate court's denial of petitioner's Beck claim in this case was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Because Alabama law did not require the judge to follow the jury's recommendation no matter the number of jurors recommending life, the court could not state that the Alabama Supreme Court's affirmance of the appellate court's remand for judge-only resentencing was an unreasonable application of clearly established law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendants were convicted of multiple charges stemming from their involvement with a company called the Jive Network, which had various Internet websites to distribute prescription drugs. The government alleged that the websites allowed customers to order controlled substances without submitting any medical records or any prescriptions. On appeal, the court addressed issues related to the rule of lenity and vagueness; state of mind under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. 846; the meaning of "proceeds" under 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i); sufficiency of the evidence; continuance of the trial; severance; comments by the district court; jury tampering and alleged juror misconduct; remaining evidentiary rulings; prosecutorial misconduct; the Allen charge; the jury's question; cumulative error; judicial participation in plea discussions; and remaining sentencing issues. The court affirmed the convictions of all five defendants, as well as Akhil Baranwal and Geunnet Chebssi. The court vacated Jude LaCourt's sentence and remanded before a different district judge.

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court should have suppressed evidence seized at his property because the search was illegal and, in any event, the evidence was insufficient to support his conspiracy conviction. An alternative ground could justify affirming the district court's decision not to suppress the evidence, regardless of whether the search was illegal. Because it was the district court's role to find the facts, the court remanded the case to that court for the limited purpose of allowing it find whether the officer at issue would have sought the oral search warrant for the house and outbuilding if he had not already conducted the protective sweep of that house.

Defendant appealed his sentence of 87-months imprisonment, imposed following his plea of guilty to one count of illegal reentry following deportation. On appeal, defendant claimed that the district court erred by enhancing his sentence based on its finding that his prior conviction for false imprisonment under Florida law qualified as a conviction for a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The court held that it was error to find defendant's prior conviction under Florida Statutes 787.02 was a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) because, like false imprisonment, a conviction for the other charges contained in defendant's information could be secured without the "physical force" necessary to commit a crime of violence. Therefore, the court vacated the sentence.