Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of producing child pornography and of attempting to entice a child to engage in unlawful sexual activity. The district court sentenced defendant to 320 months' imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. After examining defendant's challenges related to authenticity and best evidence, motions to suppress, constitutional challenges to 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, and sentencing, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Willie Keen, a former zoning official for Dixie County, Florida, appealed convictions arising from two different cases consolidated on appeal. In Case No. 09-16027, a jury convicted Keen of fraudulently obtaining low-income housing funds in violation of federal criminal law. In Case Nos. 09-16028, 10-10438, and 10-10439, a jury convicted Keen, together with former Dixie County Commissioners John Driggers and Alton Land, of federal bribery charges that stemmed from an undercover investigation of corruption in Dixie County. On appeal, Keen, Driggers, and Land challenged their convictions. The court confirmed all convictions after careful review of the record and the parties' briefs, and after having had the benefit of oral argument. However, because the court concluded that the district court erred in calculating Keen's sentence, the court remanded to the district court with a mandate to vacate the sentence and re-sentence him.

Petitioner, a Florida prisoner sentenced to death for the murder and sexual battery of the victim, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner contended that, during the sentencing phase of his trial, the lead prosecutor made several improper arguments that persuaded the jury to recommend a death sentence. The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that none of the prosecutor's arguments rose to the level of misconduct that would violate petitioner's constitutional right to due process. Because no decision of the United States Supreme Court clearly established otherwise, the court could not say that the Supreme Court of Florida unreasonably applied federal law. Moreover, even under a de novo review, none of the prosecutor's comments were improper. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner appealed from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner was convicted of capital felony murder that occurred during a robbery of the victim's home. The court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief on petitioner's claims regarding (1) his motion for a change of venue; (2) his trial counsel's effectiveness in litigating the motion for a change of venue; (3) the prosecution's statements during the penalty phase; and (4) his trial counsel's effectiveness at the penalty phase of his trial.

This appeal by the union presented the question of whether a jury was entitled to find that the union had violated the National Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), by conducting a secondary boycott of Fidelity Interiors. On appeal, the union argued that the district court abused its discretion when it permitted the jury to consider, as part of the totality of the circumstances, evidence of lawful conduct by the union, and when it refused to instruct the jury that evidence of unlawful picketing at one site could not support a finding of unlawful picketing at another site. The union also argued that the jury wrongfully awarded damages based on speculative assumptions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of conduct of the union, whether lawful or not, and the jury instructions correctly stated the law. The court also held that the record supported the jury's award of damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of the motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial.

Petitioner, a federal prisoner, appealed the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The district court granted him a certificate of appealability (COA) as to the following issue: "[W]hether 'actual innocence' applies to a career offender sentence that has been final for nine years after a plea agreement that waived an appeal." Because petitioner's arguments centered on the legal classification of the crime of possession of cannabis, his claim was one of legal, not factual, innocence. Thus, petitioner had not excused the procedural deficiencies facing his motion to vacate and the court affirmed the dismissal of the motion in light of McKay v. United States.

In this interlocutory appeal, the government appealed from a district court order granting defendant's motion to suppress a firearm discovered after he and three associates were briefly detained by law enforcement officers at night in a parking lot. The district court granted the motion to suppress the firearm, holding that the detention of defendant was unreasonable and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. The court reversed and remanded because under the peculiar facts of the case and the danger extant, it was reasonable for the officers to make a split-second decision to briefly detain all four individuals as they investigated possible violations of Florida's concealed-weapons laws.

Plaintiff, an Alabama state prisoner sentenced to death, appealed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint alleging that Alabama's method of executing inmates by lethal injection violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the separation of powers required by Article III of the Alabama Constitution. The court held that the district court committed reversible error in dismissing plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim without any opportunity for factual development, including discovery between the parties. The court also held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's Equal Protection claim at this stage of the proceedings and remanded for further factual development. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions.

Defendant appealed his convictions and 37-month total sentence for illegal reentry after a felony and for illegal reentry after conviction of false representation. On appeal, defendant argued that: (1) he should not have received a 16-level enhancement based on his Florida conviction for resisting an officer with violence, because Florida's statute did not constitute a crime of violence; and (2) his 37-month sentence was unreasonable because the district court failed to grant him a variance based on sentencing disparities caused by the Middle District of Florida's lack of a fast-track program. The court held that the district court did not err in imposing the enhancement where a conviction under Florida Statute 843.01 constituted a crime of violence. Because defendant had a prior conviction for a crime of violence and because he did not enter into a written plea agreement - two requirements by the Attorney General for fast-track programs - defendant did not meet the Attorney General's requirements for a fast-track program. Therefore, he would not have been entitled to fast-track relief even if the Middle District of Florida were to have this kind of program. Accordingly, the district court did not err in failing to grant defendant a variance.

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his untimely 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition challenging his Florida second-degree murder conviction. This appeal centered around the "depraved mind" mens rea in Florida Statutes 782.04(2). Petitioner conceded that his section 2254 habeas petition was not timely filed but claimed that an actual innocence exception to the statute's time-bar existed and argued that he made a sufficient showing of actual innocence in order for his petition to proceed. The court concluded that petitioner failed to state a cognizable actual innocence claim under Schlup v. Delo. Even if petitioner's claim of actual innocence were cognizable, his claim still failed because his "new" evidence was largely cumulative of what the jury heard, and he had not made a sufficient showing that it was more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him of second-degree murder. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's time-barred section 2254 petition.