Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs brought suit individually and on behalf of James Christopher Allen's estate against defendants, including officers Cooks and Harkleroad, for excessive force, denial of medical care, violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., assault, battery, negligence, and wrongful death. Allen died shortly after the officers repeatedly used their Tasers in an attempt to subdue and arrest defendant, who died shortly thereafter while being transported to jail. Cooks and Harkleroad subsequently filed an interlocutory appeal after the district court's judgment. The court held that, given all the factors, the officers' conduct did not arise to the level of "obvious clarity" which would require all reasonable officers to inevitably conclude that the force used was unlawful. Accordingly, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. The court also held that no reasonable jury could find that the officers used their Tasers with the deliberate intent to do wrong. The court agreed, and plaintiffs concurred, with Harkleroad's claim that he could not be held liable under Georgia law for any negligence-based claim resulting from the performance of discretionary acts. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

This was an appeal of a judgment of civil contempt that arose from a child pornography investigation. John Doe was served with a subpoena duces tecum requiring him to appear before a grand jury and produce the unencrypted contents located on the hard drives of Doe's laptop computer and five external hard drives. Doe informed the U.S. Attorney that, when he appeared before the grand jury, he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to comply with the subpoena. The court concluded that, because Doe's act of production would have testimonial aspects to it, an order to compel him to produce the unencrypted contents of the drives would require immunity coextensive with the Fifth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. 6002. Immunity coextensive with the Fifth Amendment required both use and derivative-use immunity. The Government's offer of act-of-production immunity clearly could not provide the requisite protection because it would allow the Government to use evidence derived from the immunized testimony. Thus, because the immunity offered here was not coextensive with the Fifth Amendment, Doe could not be compelled to decrypt the drives. Therefore, the court held that Doe properly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege and reversed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of attempted alien smuggling and one count of failing to obey an order by federal law enforcement to heave to their vessel. The district court applied an enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2L1.1(b)(5)(A) because a firearm was discharged by law enforcement. Defendant appealed his sentence, contending that the district court committed procedural error by incorrectly calculating the advisory Guidelines range. The court concluded that defendant's actions induced law enforcement to discharge their firearms because law enforcement's response was a reasonable foreseeable result of defendant's conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's 84-month sentence.

This case concerned the fruits of a cooperative, multi-national criminal investigation directed at tracking a sprawling international child pornography ring. 14 members of the ring were charged with offenses related to child pornography and this appeal addressed seven of the defendants. Defendants raised numerous issues on appeal. After review of the record and having had the benefit of oral argument, the court vacated Ronald White's child exploitation enterprise (CEE) conviction under Count One; vacated the other six defendants' convictions for conspiracy under Count Two; and vacated all of defendants' convictions for statutory obstruction of justice under Count Forty. The court also vacated the restitution award against James Freeman and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other regards.

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment charging him with one count of illegal reentry by an alien who had been previously removed or deported. Defendant argued that the indictment must be dismissed because the Government was collaterally estopped from attempting to establish the essential element of alienage because a jury, in a previous federal criminal trial for illegal reentry, found against the Government on this indispensable element. Based on all of the evidence presented on the issue of defendant's alienage and considering that the evidence of the remaining three non-alienage elements was undisputed, the court concluded that "the jury's verdict of acquittal [in the 2009 trial] was based upon reasonable doubt about a single element of the crime." Accordingly, the court agreed that the Government was collaterally estopped from arguing that defendant was an alien, reversing and remanding with instructions to dismiss the indictment.

Defendant appealed from a final order of criminal forfeiture seized from a safe deposit box. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that defendant lacked standing to challenge the validity of the preliminary order forfeiture (POF). Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction over this claim. The court also held that the district court did not err in dismissing defendant's petition as untimely under 21 U.S.C. 853(n) and the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(1) based on excusable neglect. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and affirmed in part.

Defendant appealed his convictions for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and for aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. The court held that, because defendant could not have been convicted of an offense for which he was not indicated, the district court's jury charge did not constructively amend or broaden the indictment. The court also held that, although the district court abused its discretion by admitting defendant's 1988 conviction for selling marijuana, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence presented at trial. The court held that defendant's remaining claims lacked merit and affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff sued the Secretary and several elected officials, alleging that the officials' application of a Georgia statute that governed absentee voting, Ga. Code Ann. 21-2-381(a)(1)(D), denied him the right to have a ballot mailed to him at the jail and prevented him from voting while he was incarcerated in the fall of 2008. The court vacated the summary judgment entered by the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff's alleged injury was not fairly traceable to any actions of the officials where plaintiff would not have received a ballot at the jail regardless of the officials' application of the statute when he provided only his home address on his application for an absentee ballot.

Defendant was convicted of mail fraud and money laundering charges related to two separate fraudulent schemes: the River Shore Scheme and the GenSpec Scheme. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions and sentences on various grounds. The court concluded that the proof presented at trial in connection with the River Shores mail fraud count materially varied from the allegations contained in the superseding indictment and this variance substantially prejudiced defendant. Therefore, the court reversed his conviction on this count. The court also reversed defendant's money laundering convictions because they were predicated on the River Shores mail fraud count. The court affirmed defendant's mail fraud convictions related to the GenSpec Scheme. Finally, the court held that defendant's other assertions of error lacked merit.

Defendant, a medical doctor licensed by the State of Florida, appealed his convictions for dispensing controlled substances in violation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801, et seq., and for health care fraud. Defendant's convictions resulted in three separate but related appeals including his contention that the district court erred or abused its discretion by allowing the introduction of autopsy reports or handwritten medical notes without requiring testimony by their authors. The court reversed defendant's convictions because the admission of the autopsy reports and testimony about those reports, without live in-court testimony from the medical examiners who actually performed the autopsies, violated the Confrontation Clause under the facts of the case. Because the court concluded that this issue was dispositive, the court declined to address the other issues raised in defendant's merits appeal, except for the sufficiency of the evidence claim. While the court ultimately concluded that the evidence was sufficient, the degree to which the court viewed the government's case as less than overwhelming compelled the court's conclusion that the Confrontation Clause violation was not harmless in this case.