Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Cuba and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, petitioned for review of the decision of the BIA affirming the IJ's order of removal rendered on the ground that he was inadmissible to the United States because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude due to his conviction for false imprisonment under section 787.02, Florida Statutes. The court held that the BIA and the IJ erred by considering evidence beyond the record of petitioner's false imprisonment conviction to determine that he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The court held, however, that because the BIA and IJ assumed without deciding that the Florida offense of false imprisonment was not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, the court must remand to the BIA to determine in the first instance whether petitioner's false imprisonment conviction qualified as a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Therefore, the court granted the petition and remanded for further proceedings.

In 1987, petitioner burglarized a home and murdered the two people inside. Petitioner, now a death-row inmate, appealed the district court's denial of his section 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held that petitioner had pointed to no Supreme Court precedent establishing that the Florida Supreme Court's decision, that petitioner's trial lawyers had performed well enough, was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also held that the Florida Supreme Court's decision rejecting petitioner's Batson claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief.

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in ruling that his sentencing claim was not cognizable under section 2255. Defendant also argued that the actual innocence exception to the procedural default rule applied to excuse the procedural default of his sentencing claim. The court held that defendant procedurally defaulted his claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal and that the actual innocence exception did not apply to defendant's claim of legal innocence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the section 2255 motion.

Defendants were convicted of offenses relating to their support for Islamist violence overseas. The issues raised on appeal related to the admission of testimony from an FBI agent; sufficiency of the evidence; admission of an expert's testimony; admission of portions of a television interview with Osama bin Laden; denial of a motion to suppress statements made to FBI agents; denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment based on alleged outrageous government conduct; admission of evidence of innocent intent; denial of a motion for severance; application of the terrorism enhancement to defendants' sentences; and, on cross-appeal, substantive and procedural error in sentencing. After review of the entire record, the court held that defendants were not entitled to relief on any of their claims. The court held, however, that the district court erred in imposing Jose Padilla's sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendants' convictions in all respects but vacated Padilla's sentence and remanded his case to the district court for re-sentencing.

Defendant was convicted of 130 counts arising, inter alia, from his wire fraud, health care fraud, and unlawful dispensing of controlled substances. Defendant was also convicted of three counts charging a patient's death resulted from the use of controlled substances dispensed by defendant from his health care fraud violation. Defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that the district court gave erroneous instructions to the jury, he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and the government's evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. The court held that the district court's jury instructions were not erroneous where the district court properly instructed that the 18 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) standard was satisfied upon a finding that, but for the victims ingesting the controlled substances charged in the indictment, the victims would not have died. The court also held that 18 U.S.C. 1347(a) required nothing more than a cause-in-fact connection between defendant's conduct and the death, and that any claimed error in the section 1347(a) charge was harmless. The court rejected defendant's claim that his trial counsel's performance was deficient in that trial counsel failed to make appropriate motions for acquittal at the close of evidence. The court held that, given the overwhelming evidence, the government presented sufficient evidence to sustain all of defendant's convictions and that motions for acquittal, even if made, would have failed. Accordingly, defendant's convictions and sentences were affirmed.

Petitioner, a death row inmate, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, complaining that he was denied clemency proceedings or alternatively, was denied clemency itself without the benefit of a clemency investigation and clemency counsel. The court held that the district court correctly dismissed petitioner's section 2254 petition where he had no right to clemency that he could enforce through his habeas petition. The court also denied petitioner's request to stay the execution and remand to the district court so that counsel could be appointed and the complaint could be raised under 42 U.S.C. 1983 where petitioner had not shown a significant or substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his clemency claim or claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death in 1995 for murder. Because defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the murder, the state court eventually set aside his death sentence and resentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contended that his life without parole sentence was an unconstitutional penalty for him because he was not yet eighteen years old at the time he committed the murder. The court held that it owed 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) deference to the state trial and appellate court decisions that defendant's life without parole sentence, and the procedures under which it was imposed, were not unconstitutional in light of the Roper v. Simmons decision.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and was sentenced to 127 months in prison. Defendant appealed his sentence and contended that an intervening decision showed that the district court erred by failing to apply the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) in determining his sentences. The court held that FSA claims, like any other type of sentence claim, could be waived by a knowing and voluntary appeal waiver. Therefore, the court affirmed the sentence where defendant waived his right to appeal his sentence.

Plaintiff, a death row prisoner who was scheduled to be executed by the State of Florida, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and a motion for TRO and preliminary injunction and to stay his execution, alleging that Florida's use of an altered lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his motion and plaintiff sought a stay of execution from this court so that he could obtain a merits ruling on his complaint. The court held that plaintiff had not demonstrated that he had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim and therefore, denied plaintiff's motion for stay of execution.

Plaintiff, a Georgia state prisoner proceeding pro se, appealed the district court's sua sponte dismissal, under 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) and 28 U.S.C. 1915A, of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights action. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in dismissing his claims. The court held, and the state conceded, that the district court erred in dismissing without prejudice defendant's dental treatment claim on the basis that it was "clear from the face of the complaint" that defendant had not exhausted his administrative remedies with regard to this claim. The court held, however, that there was no merit in defendant's remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part.