Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jose Romero-Lopez was convicted after a jury trial of money laundering offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 982. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that there was no error in the district court's scheduling or evidentiary rulings, where (1) Defendant's due process rights were not violated when the district court advanced the scheduled trial date by one day; and (2) the district court did not err in allowing the prosecution to present evidence relating to (i) Defendant's tax returns and (ii) Defendant's activities and detention by federal authorities when traveling through the San Diego airport.

Appellant appealed his conviction of conspiracy to commit a carjacking and aiding and abetting an attempted carjacking resulting in a death. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the government presented inappropriate overview testimony from a FBI agent at the outset of its case, but the error was harmless; (2) the government engaged in improper vouching in its closing argument, but Appellant failed to show the requisite prejudice, and therefore the error was harmless; (3) the district court did not err in denying Appellant's Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal, as the government presented sufficient evidence to support Appellant's convictions; and (4) the court did not err in applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2B3.1(c) "murder cross reference" in determining the guidelines range for Appellant's sentence.

Appellant was convicted in the United States district court for his role in a scheme to illegally obtain and distribute prescription drugs. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in allowing testimony about the guilty pleas of Appellant's former co-defendants, but the error was harmless; and (2) in determining the appropriate sentence within the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), or in varying guidelines, a sentencing court has discretion to consider the defendant's cooperation with the government as an 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factor, even if the government has not made a USSG 5K1.1 motion for a downward departure.

Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit kidnapping and conspiracy to use interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder for hire. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of outrageous government misconduct in manufacturing federal jurisdiction and in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of jurisdictional entrapment. Both arguments depended on the contention that the government created United States jurisdiction by unlawfully orchestrating a change in location for the crimes that Appellant conspired to commit. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) without evidence that Appellant was coerced or unduly induced, or evidence that the government engaged in some other type of outrageous misconduct, the district court did nor err by denying Appellant's motion to dismiss; and (2) as Appellant plainly failed to satisfy his burden to make a threshold showing of inducement, the district court did not err in refusing to give Appellant's proposed jurisdictional entrapment jury instruction.

Defendant appealed the forty-six-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in connection with his shipping an assault rifle and pistol from Florida to Puerto Rico. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence, where (1) the district court's application of an upward departure was reasonable; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in choosing how far to enhance the sentence; and (3) the district court did not fail to balance the relevant mitigating factors.

Defendant was convicted for illegally trafficking in sperm whale teeth and narwhal tusks. Specifically, the jury found Defendant's whale-tooth dealings violated CITES, an international compact implemented in the United States via the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and regulations authorized by the ESA. Defendant appealed, contending (1) the district judge should have instructed the jury on certain lesser-included offenses because he did not actually know his transactions were illegal, even if he should have known; and (2) smuggling convictions are legally wrong because his conduct violated only regulations, not statutes. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed after quoting a line from Moby Dick, holding (1) the district court did not err in failing to give the requested instructions because a rational jury could not have found that Defendant lacked actual knowledge that his whale-tooth transactions were illegal; and (2) the smuggling statute criminalizes violations of regulations like those implementing CITES because Congress intended the word "law" in the phrase "contrary to law" to include regulatory law as well as statutory law.

Defendant pled guilty to firearms charges in three cases. The district court, at a consolidated hearing, subsequently sentenced Defendant to a total term of imprisonment of seventy-two months. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by failing to comply with 18 U.S.C. 3584(b), which requires a court to consider the statutory sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) when deciding whether multiple sentences of imprisonment will be served concurrently or consecutively. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the sentences, holding that the district court did consider the statutory sentencing factors when it imposed a consecutive sentence even though the court did not specifically reference the factors that Appellant highlighted.

Sumrall pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute over five grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). The government sought to invoke the career offender guideline, USSG 4B1.1(a), which applies where the "offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense" and the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions for controlled substance offenses or crimes of violence. A "crime of violence" is any offense punishable by more than one year of imprisonment that either "(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." Sumrall has a prior felony conviction for armed robbery and a prior conviction for assault and battery on a police officer, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, sect. 13D. The district court used the career offender guideline and sentenced Sumrall to 188 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed. Assault and battery on a police officer under the Massachusetts statute is categorically a crime of violence.

Based on challenges of planting evidence and conducting illegal searches and seizures, officers in the Puerto Rico Police Department were convicted (in different combinations) of conspiring to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate persons in the town of Mayagüez in the free exercise or enjoyment of their constitutional rights, 18 U.S.C. 241, and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & 846. The First Circuit affirmed all convictions against challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing counterfeit securities and possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 513(a), 922(g)(1). The presentence report recommended a guideline sentencing range of 70 to 87 months, based on a provision calling for an increased base offense level if a defendant, convicted of unlawful firearm possession, has previously sustained two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. USSG 2K2.1(a)(2). The guideline cross-references USSG 4B1.2(a) to defined "crime of violence." Defendant conceded that he had a prior drug conviction, but argued that conviction for assault and battery on a correctional officer, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, sect. 13D, was not a conviction for a crime of violence. The district court disagreed and, varying downward, imposed a 60-month term. The First Circuit affirmed. Under the career offender guideline, a crime of violence is any offense punishable by more than one year of imprisonment that either has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.