Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Denson spent about a year in federal prison for mail and wire fraud after he got caught up in a "Nigerian" money scam, 18 U.S.C. 1341 & 1343. After persons in Africa emailed Denson saying that he had inherited the rights to an overseas company worth $9-plus million Denson called a local Secret Service office. An agent warned him not to participate and that he could be criminally liable. Denson took thousands of dollars from persons who had trusted him to help with some "window-washing invention" he had "a patent for." Denson called the agent again and admitted that he had "deceived" others into giving him money. Meeting with some agents two days later, Denson described his scheme. He had tried to get an undercover agent to "invest" $30,000 in an overseas-construction venture, handing the agent false documents. The First Circuit upheld sentences of 15 months for supervised release (sentencing range 4-10 months) and 30 months terms for the fraud convictions, to run consecutively with the 15-month term. The court rejected a challenge to a “willful blindness” jury instruction.

DEA obtained permission to wiretap telephones. Symonevich arranged by phone to buy heroin at McDonald's off I-495. During a call, "Tony," asked Symonevich what kind of car he was driving; the answer was a green Subaru. Agents sent units to I-495; they observed what they thought was a meeting between Symonevich and a courier. Agents planned to stop Symonevich, but lost sight of the car. Later that day, unrelated to the DEA investigation, officer Sweeney stopped the car for a broken light, observed Symonevich, reaching under the seat and looking "scared." Officers smelled marijuana on Symonevich's clothing. The driver refused permission to search the car; Sweeney searched, fearing a safety threat. During the stop, Sweeney learned that Symonevich was the subject of a DEA investigation. Sweeney found a can of tire sealant under the seat. The weight was unexpected and he felt movement inside. The bottom of the can was separated; he unscrewed it and found bundles that he believed to be heroin. Convicted of conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with the intent to distribute, cocaine and heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, Symonevich appealed denial of his motion to suppress. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, admission of certain testimony and charts, and the conspiracy instruction given to the jury.

Carta pled guilty to child pornography in 2002 and was sentenced to five years in prison and three years of supervised release. Prior to his scheduled release, the Bureau of Prisons certified that Carta was a "sexually dangerous person" and commenced civil commitment proceedings under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. 4248(a). A "sexually dangerous person" is one "who has engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation and is sexually dangerous to others." A determination that an individual is a sexually dangerous person requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that he "suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder as a result of which he would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released." After a district judge ruled that the government had failed to establish that Carta's diagnosis of "paraphilia not otherwise specified characterized by hebephilia" was a "serious mental illness, abnormality or disorder" under the Act, the First Circuit reversed. A different district court judge subsequently ruled in the government's favor. The First Circuit affirmed.

Crooker was charged with possession of firearms and ammunition by an unlawful user of a controlled substance, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), and possession of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 844. He was convicted of possession of marijuana and fined $4000. The First Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court's denial of a motion to suppress statements and evidence recovered during the search of the residence where he lived with his parents and brothers. Given the familiarity of the surroundings in which Crooker was questioned, the calm and peaceable nature of the conversations, and the lack of physical restraint or show of force during questioning, Crooker was not in custody for Miranda purposes. In light of secretive conversations between Crooker’s father and uncle about the biological toxin ricin, their discussion about moving the uncle’s possessions while the uncle was incarcerated, and information provided by confidential informants, including information that the uncle had buried ricin in Crooker's backyard, there was probable cause to believe that evidence of the enumerated crimes would be found at Crooker's house.

Massachusetts Trooper Patterson, undercover, placed a phone call requesting two $40 bags of crack cocaine and waited for delivery in a truck equipped with concealed audio/video recording equipment. From across the street, Patterson could see people congregated around a driveway; a man left the group and walked toward Patterson's truck. Patterson watched the man carefully, to be sure he was unarmed, and later described his clothing in detail. Patterson told the man that he wanted two bags of crack. The man then went back to the group, got into a car and left. Shortly thereafter, a second unidentified man left the group, went to the truck and sold a bag that proved to contain crack cocaine. Using a video recording, another officer recognized the first man as Jones and the second as Richmond (who later pled guilty). Patterson identified photos of each. In Jones’s trial on conspiring to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 846, and abetting distribution, 18 U.S.C. 2 of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a school, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 860, the court refused to exclude the identification , but excluded a proposed defense expert to testify about issues related to eyewitness identification. Jones was convicted. The First Circuit affirmed.

Venti’s father received federal Civil Service Retirement System benefits. Venti’s father died in 1990, which should have terminated his benefits. The Office of Personnel Management continued to deposit the CSRS funds into a checking account that Venti had shared with his father. In 2003, Venti opened a new joint checking account at RFCU in the names of himself and his father and arranged for the CSRS benefits, as well as his own Social Security benefits, to be deposited in the new account. In 2005, OPM learned of the death of Venti's father and stopped depositing the CSRS benefits. In 2009, Venti was convicted of theft of government property (18 U.S.C. 641), one count for each of nine checks written in his father’s name during 2005, and was sentenced to 15 months. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that one count was time-barred. If the count had been time-barred, the sentence would have been limited to one year because Venti would be treated as a misdemeanant rather than as a felon.

Police received a tip that Howard, a suspected gang member with an outstanding arrest warrant for armed assault with intent to murder, was at a specific house. Officers knocked, announcing themselves as police, and demanded entry. The door was opened by Knowles, who lived with her son, a friend of Howard’s. Howard was spotted by officers in the yard, peering out a bathroom window. They found Howard in the basement. Once he was arrested, Knowles signed consent to search. In the bathroom where Howard had been spotted, officers found a cell phone containing pictures of Howard; a burning cigarette, with Howard's DNA; and, in the toilet tank, a loaded semiautomatic handgun and a bag of individually wrapped crack cocaine rocks. In the kitchen, officers discovered another bag of cocaine rocks and digital scales. After denial of a motion to suppress, Howard was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). He was sentenced to 13 years and three months. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the search, sufficiency of the evidence, and jury instructions.

In 1998, Holmes pled guilty to second-degree murder and received a sentence of life in prison, the mandatory sentence. Mass. G.L. ch. 265, 2. Holmes claims that he pled guilty because his attorney, Graham, told him that the prosecutor had proposed that if Holmes entered the plea and if the prosecutor wanted information from Holmes, Holmes would be able to reduce his sentence by filing a Motion to Revise or Revoke. Holmes filed the Rule 29 motion, but did not identify any grounds. The motion was futile; the trial judge had no discretion in sentencing. In 2000, Holmes filed pro se a motion to withdraw the plea, alleging that Graham was constitutionally ineffective. Graham stated that he had advised Holmes to accept the plea because there was significant risk of a first degree murder conviction. In 2004, Holmes filed an amended motion, claiming that he would not have pled guilty had he known that the Rule 29 Motion would have been futile. After successive denials Holmes filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely. The First Circuit remanded for consideration of whether the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled.

Officers searched a home inhabited by Clark and her adult son, Matthew. The warrant, issued the previous day, authorized a search for evidence of animal cruelty and unlicensed operation of a breeding kennel. Officers entered the Matthew's bedroom. Near a computer work station, they saw a list of web sites with titles suggestive of child pornography and nude photographs appearing to depict underage males. The officers immediately halted their search and obtained a supplementary warrant that authorized a search for child pornography. Officers seized evidence that formed the basis for indictment of Matthew for possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A (a)(5)(B). The trial judge rejected an argument that the first warrant was defective because the affidavit submitted with the application did not make out probable cause to believe that evidence of animal cruelty or an unlicensed kennel would be found and that the second search would not have occurred but for the evidence uncovered during the initial (illegal) search. The court relied on defendant's two prior convictions for indecent acts involving children as a basis for an offense-level enhancement and sentenced him to a 210-month term (the bottom of the guideline sentencing range). The First Circuit affirmed the conviction and the sentence.

Defendants were employees of subcontractor that provided concrete for Boston's Central Artery/Tunnel project, the "Big Dig." The government charged that over nine years, the company knowingly provided concrete that failed to meet project specifications and concealed that failure by creating false documentation purporting to show that the concrete provided complied with specifications. Several employees, including defendants, were convicted of mail fraud, highway project fraud, and conspiracy to defraud the government. The district court calculated the guidelines sentencing range as 87- to 108-months incarceration, then sentenced defendants to six months of home monitoring, three years of probation, and 1,000 hours of community service. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court's explanation ultimately supports the reasonableness of the sentences, based on its finding that the loss amount caused by the crimes, the most significant factor in determining the GSR, was imprecise and did not fairly reflect the defendants' culpability. The court also found that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the defendants' conduct made the Big Dig unsafe in any way or that the defendants profited from the offenses and considered personal circumstances.