Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After defendant had sexually-explicit online communications with a detective, posing as a 14-year-old, the detective researched defendant’s criminal history, which included convictions for public lewdness and disorderly conduct, obtained a warrant, and searched defendant’s home. Finding child pornography on a computer, police obtained a second warrant and discovered 3,366 images of child pornography, 95 emails sent from the computer with child pornography attachments, and 54 emails received with child pornography attachments. A district judge denied defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of the search of his home computer. Defendant pled guilty to unlawful transportation of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1) and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. The First Circuit affirmed denial of the motion, rejecting arguments that: the warrant allowed a search that was overbroad given the narrow scope of probable cause; the computer search unlawfully exceeded the broad scope of the warrant; and the plain-view and good-faith exceptions did not apply.

In 2010d Goergen pled guilty to four counts of sexual exploitation of children, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). Over several years, Goergen arranged for and took still pictures and videos of three minor girls engaged in explicit sexual activities or poses and then distributed the material. Georgen received a sentence of 60 years in prison, and appealed only the sentence. The First Circuit affirmed. The sentence is under the statutory maximum and, fairly viewed as effectively a life sentence, is what the guidelines recommended. It is a very grave sentence but, so were the crimes and their consequences for the victims.

Defendant was a police officer with the Puerto Rico police force from 1991 until September 2007, shortly after he was indicted on charges of conspiracy to engage in robberies (Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a)). At his trial, the government put on evidence sufficient to prove that defendant participated in one of five robberies. On August 7, 2002, he assisted in the robbery of a private security firm's payroll by loaning the robbers his personal firearm and by driving a getaway car. He received $7,500. The First Circuit reversed. Even if there was sufficient evidence to convict him of conspiring to commit the payroll robbery of August 7, 2002, there was not legally sufficient evidence to convict him of participating in the charged broader multiple-robbery conspiracy, much less one that included the next and final robbery of September 25, 2002. His conviction for the August 7 robbery was barred by the five-year statute of limitations for non-capital federal crimes, 18 U.S.C. 3282(a). The government was two weeks too late in indicting him on August 22, 2007.

The trooper saw a minivan with what appeared to be a glinting blue light, like those mounted behind the windshields of police cars. Because Maine law prohibits such lights on civilian vehicles, the trooper gave chase with his siren going. The driver continued on for 39 seconds, making unusual motions. The trooper saw a television screen attached to the windshield by a large blue suction cup and a blue placard on the rearview mirror. The driver was talking on a cell phone, and, asked about his furtive motions, said he had dropped the phone, picked it up, and called his wife; he claimed to have left his license and registration at home. He gave a false name, which did not match computerized records, and eventually admitted that he did not have a valid license. Arrested, he refused to be fingerprinted. The officer was applying for a search warrant when the driver admitted that he was wanted for kidnapping. A pistol, ammunition, and marijuana were found in the van. He entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a felon in possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 36 months The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to denial of a motion to suppress and to the sentence.

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute one or more kilograms of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846, and conspiracy to import one or more kilograms of heroin into the U.S., 21 U.S.C. 952(a),963, and was sentenced to 210 months' imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the district court erred in: denying a motion to dismiss pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act; making inappropriate comments during trial and providing the jury with misleading instructions; permitting the government to present inadmissible hearsay and improper overview testimony; allowing a government fact witness to render expert testimony without the requisite qualification and advance notice; denying multiple requests to suppress foreign wiretap evidence; and improperly applying the guidelines during sentencing.

In 2009, Vixamar and Saintfleur pled guilty to passport fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1542 and were sentenced to home confinement and probation. Vixamar agreed not to work at any healthcare job that gave her access to patient valuables unless she first told her employer or the patients about her criminal past: 2007 convictions for stealing, forging, and cashing checks from elderly patients. Before long Saintfleur was arrested for depositing a $4,000 check stolen from an elderly, mentally-incompetent hospice patient. Vixamar likely stole the check while working for a healthcare-staffing company, where she did not reveal her criminal past and gave false information. Each was charged with five probation violations. The judge held a hearing, revoked probation, and resentenced each to 36 months in prison (18 U.S.C. 3564(e)) at the top of the guidelines. The judge referenced the U.S.S.G. 3553(a) factors and explained that each had gotten a break earlier and that they are “a menace, a tremendous danger to other people." The First Circuit affirmed.

Defendant entered an Internet chat room that was being watched by an undercover law enforcement officer and offered the officer access to his pornography collection through a peer-to-peer file sharing program. Using his undercover account, the officer learned that defendant was sharing 112 gigabytes of content and downloaded nine files from the digital library. Four of these files contained depictions of different young boys engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The FBI tracked the IP address, obtained a warrant, and searched defendant’s residence. Defendant waived Miranda rights and admitted that he had possession of child pornography and handed over the external hard drive, which verified earlier interactions with the undercover officer and the existence of thousands of images depicting child pornography. Defendant pled guilty to interstate transportation of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1), and possession of child pornography, 2252(a)(4)(B) with a waiver of appeal and was sentenced to five concurrent terms of 84 months. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he should have been sentenced either for transportation of child pornography or for possession of child pornography, but not both. There is no colorable showing of a double jeopardy violation.

In 1982, Jimenez was convicted of the parolable offense of second degree murder for killing a police officer and simultaneously acquitted of murder in the first degree, conviction of which would have carried no possibility of parole. The Massachusetts Parole Board denied his parole applications in 1999, 2004, and 2009. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violations of due process and equal protection and infringements of guarantees under the Commonwealth's constitution. The defendants are the six members of the Board, named in their official capacities, each of whom voted to deny parole. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim for constitutional violations, finding specific relief barred by the section 1983 prohibition of injunctions against judicial officers. The First Circuit affirmed. There is nothing shocking or arbitrary about the parole board’s discretion. A state may rationally take the position that a law enforcement officer’s constant exposure to violence calls for a more powerful deterrent to homicidal behavior than the general laws of homicide provide.

Defendant, convicted of first degree murder in Massachusetts, exhausted state appeals. No physical evidence linked him to the crime, but circumstantial evidence included his threats to kill the victim, testimony that the victim was last seen getting into a car with defendant, and defendant’s statements indicating guilt. The district court rejected his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, which was based on an argument that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied a beyond a reasonable doubt standard contrary to that articulated by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), in evaluating his claim that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support his conviction or incorrectly applied the correct standard. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

For 20 years, George was a clerk-magistrate. In 1995, he was charged with conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371, 1343, 1346 for selling blank search warrants, used to commit robberies. George entered a plea for a sentence of 20 months and a $10,000 fine. George retired before his plea and began receiving a monthly benefit of $1,424.91, plus health-care. In 2003, the state retirement board suspended benefits; his attorney had advised him that he would remain eligible if he started receiving benefits before he entered a plea. The district court denied his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The First Circuit affirmed. The Board authorized recoupment of benefits in excess of contributions. In 2010, the Supreme Court held that "intangible right of honest services," in 18 U.S.C. 1346, would be unconstitutionally vague unless limited to schemes involving bribes or kickbacks. George’s second petition was denied. The court found that, in light of Skilling, a fundamental error had occurred, but that cessation of benefits did not constitute a continuing collateral consequence sufficient to justify the remedy. The First Circuit affirmed, referring to a “Hail Mary pass.” A court has discretion to withhold the remedy where the interests of justice dictate.